FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER
1950

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The Editors.

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THE PLOUGH AND THE FURROW

By Sir Duff Cooper

THE world that has emerged from the last war is very different from the world that existed before it. The war of 1914, although the fighting casualties were greater, made a far smaller change in the standing and relationship of the Great Powers. Among those Powers, Austria-Hungary was the only casualty. After the first war, as after the second, it was not long before the generous hearts of the victorious democracies began to bleed with pity for the defeated, and the tears that filled their eyes blinded them to the fact that although rations might be short in Germany she had gained one enormous advantage as the result of the war. She no longer in 1919 had two Great Powers as her neighbors. Her frontiers no longer marched with those of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Where they had stood there remained now only nations of the second or the third category—Poland, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic republics. How quickly she availed herself of this advantage was only realized when 15 years after her complete defeat Europe was once more trembling before her menaces.

From this remarkable fact we should have learnt the lesson that the victor is not always the winner, nor is the defeated necessarily the greatest loser. No nation had a prouder record in the Second World War than Great Britain, the only one that went into it of her own will at the beginning and remained undefeated until the end. Yet Great Britain has lost her naval supremacy, upon which has depended her authority ever since she became one of the Great Powers; she has lost her foreign investments, with which have gone her supremacy in the financial and her leadership in the commercial world; and, since the war, she has also lost her Indian Empire with dominion over 340,000,000 souls.

More disastrous even than these gigantic losses is the fact, still

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only dimly appreciated by the majority of Englishmen, that Great Britain has lost the inestimable advantages conferred upon her throughout the centuries by her insular position. She is no longer an island. She is part of the continent of Europe.

This precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall

wrote Shakespeare. That wall has been knocked down. Those narrow waters that have so often saved the life of the nation saved it once again in 1940. But it was for the last time. General Eisenhower has stated definitely in his war reminiscences that if the Germans had launched their attack of flying missiles against Great Britain before instead of after the invasion of Europe, that invasion could not have taken place. This means that the fact of being an island, instead of counting as an asset as in the past, has become a liability. The inhabitants of the mainland can retreat before a bombardment. In the last war the Russians retreated 500 miles on a 1200 mile front, but for the inhabitants of an island, retreat is limited, and the resources of modern science will find little difficulty in putting a girdle round about the island in whose immunity from attack Shakespeare had such good reason to believe.

If we compare what Great Britain has lost in the last ten years with what Russia has gained, the complete revolution in world affairs becomes more glaringly and alarmingly apparent. Russia had two great enemies before the war. She stood in constant dread of both of them, and with good reason, for they had both defeated her in the present century. First she had been defeated by Japan, and ten years afterwards by Germany. Now, owing to the efforts of the United States and of Great Britain—for though Russia had a larger population than those two countries combined, and inexhaustible supplies of raw materials, she was dependent on her allies for many munitions of war—now she is freed from the anxieties that so long beset her. She no longer looks anxiously to East or West, for neither Japan nor Germany can harm her, and she has already made such good use of her newfound freedom from fear that she has absorbed in her vast maw Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and Czechoslovakia. This has been the rich reward of the contemptible and cowardly policy pursued by Stalin from and before the outbreak of war. He let loose the war in Europe by making an alliance with Hitler. He refused to believe

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the evidence laid before him by the British that Hitler meant to betray and attack him. He allowed two fronts, those of France and of Greece, to be destroyed without raising a finger. And after being attacked he never ceased to complain of his allies for not establishing another front more rapidly.

Fortunately Russia is not the only Power that has found her world situation radically altered as a result of the war. America had long occupied the position of the recognized heir to a great estate—a young man who was in no hurry to step into his inheritance and who, awaiting without envy the demise of his elderly cousin, was content meanwhile to enjoy the good things of the earth, postponing as long as possible the assumption of those grim responsibilities that go with greatness. Since the defeat of Napoleon—for nearly a century and a half—it has fallen to Great Britain to maintain the peace of the world and, incidentally, it has been the duty of the Royal Navy to protect the long Atlantic and Pacific seaboards of the United States. But now that has all changed. The heir has inherited, and the coming half century will show how America fulfils the great task, the high duty that has been laid upon her. She has begun well.

Some of us believed when the war was over that there yet remained a great opportunity for the British people. It seemed to us that there was ample space between the American continent in the West and the Euro-Asiatic empire of the Soviets in the East for the creation of a third confederation which, if properly constituted and firmly united, would prove inferior in strength to neither of its neighbors. The western states of Europe are in themselves unimpressive so far as extent of territory and figures of population are concerned. But each of them possesses colonial empires which are still awaiting full development. The French overseas empire is second only to that of Great Britain. The Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Italy and even Spain have control over large territories in various parts of the world. A confederation of those Powers, in friendly collaboration with the Union of South Africa, would exercise practically complete control over the whole African continent, with which the recent independence of Egypt would not seriously interfere. At the same time British, French and Dutch possessions in Asia, if all controlled by one policy towards one end, would constitute an influence in that continent which no Power could afford to neglect. Great Britain would have been the natural leader of this vast

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confederation, and the link which would have united it to the British self-governing Dominions. Thus would have been called into being yet a third giant to grapple with the earth's affairs, a giant upon whose birth I believe the American people would have smiled, and upon whose firm friendship they could have counted.

Five years have passed, and with them has passed also Britain's great and, it is to be feared, her last opportunity. Her present Government has paid lip service to the idea of a united Europe, but those who have been genuinely striving for it, and believe it to be a practical ideal, have found to their bitter regret that at every effort that has been made to advance along the hard road it has been the representatives of His Majesty's Government who have blocked the way. Many instances could be given. The last is the worst.

During these same five years no suggestion has come from any of the Powers concerned as to how the problem of Germany's future should be tackled. Many people, preoccupied by the more pressing and immediate problem of Russia, appear to have forgotten that a German problem exists. They need reminding that it was the Germans who started the two world wars; that the the Germans are still there and that their numbers are undiminished; that they possess great military qualities, and probably regard war with less distaste than do other nations; that they have everything to gain by war and nothing to lose by it; and that they have two defeats to avenge.

There is one obvious way of rendering Germany harmless, which is to deprive her of control over her own output of steel. The Americans and the British have refused to adopt this method, which would have set the fears of Germany's neighbors at rest. Germany has already surpassed the limits of steel production which were imposed upon her, and no protest has been made by the Allies.

In these circumstances the French Foreign Minister has brought forward a simple but a daring suggestion. He has proposed that the European output of steel should be controlled by a combine of European nations. Thus Germany would be asked to make no sacrifice of sovereignty greater than those made by the other nations, yet she would place herself under an international authority which could prevent her from repeating her misdeeds of the past. The other nations who have been invited to collaborate in this experiment have consented. Great Britain

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alone has refused, and by her refusal she has not only forfeited her right and her opportunity to lead Western Europe, but she has also gravely endangered the success of the scheme. Great Britain and France, with the smaller Powers, could have controlled Germany. Whether France will be able to do so without Britain's aid remains to be seen. M. Schuman is taking a terrible risk.

The refusal of Great Britain to assume her responsibilities or to play her part must impose a heavier burden upon the United States. Leadership demands not only courage, a quality which Great Britain never lacked, but also foresight and imagination, gifts which do not always accompany it. The President of the United States has proved, beyond the expectation even of many of his admirers, that he not only possesses these gifts but is willing to be guided by them. When the Communists struck their first open blow, committed their first brutal, undisguised act of aggression in Korea, deep gloom prevailed in the hearts of those Europeans who had closely studied the genesis of the last war. They were painfully reminded of March 1936, when Hitler by marching into the Rhineland sought to test the strength of the resistance which further acts of aggression would encounter. Mr. Truman's prompt rejoinder lifted from those hearts a weight that had been growing heavier these last five years. The free nations felt that they could breathe again because the challenge had been accepted.

It is now generally believed that the American nation, having put its hand to the plough, will not look back. And now that it has raised the torch of leadership it will find followers who will be faithful unto the end. But the end will not be in Korea, and that is the most important of all the facts which we have to get into people's heads today. That campaign may be short or long, cheap or costly, but that the combined forces of the United States and the British Empire supported by the United Nations can defeat the North Koreans, together with any reinforcements that Stalin may be able to send them, does not admit of a doubt. The danger does not lie there but rather in the possibility that after that victory people may be inclined to believe that the war is over when in fact it will have been hardly begun.

When the drums are beating, the flags are waving and the shooting is heard afar, it is easy to rouse the martial spirit of men and demand sacrifices which are cheerfully accorded. But it is

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when the battle is over, or seems to be, and the warrior is returning home, perhaps with a laurel wreath in his suitcase, and with the satisfaction of having done his duty and survived—that is the moment when appeals for further efforts are apt to fall upon deaf ears. The record of Great Britain and of the United States after two victories affords melancholy proof of it. When the war is on men will gaily lay down their lives for their country; when the war is over they will grudge every penny spent in taxation to pay for the forces required to give them security.

When people ask me whether I think there will be a war I tell them there is one already, and when they explain that they mean a world war I say that it has broken out. The war in Korea is not between Northern and Southern Koreans, it is an attack launched by the totalitarians against the forces of freedom. It is the first fought battle in a world dispute.

Victories in this war have been won already, but they were not fought. We allowed Stalin, as we previously allowed Hitler, to take Czechoslovakia without striking a blow; and we also allowed him, as we did not allow Hitler, to conquer Poland unopposed. We even aided and abetted him in the conquest. But now no doubt remains in the minds of reasonable men that the time has come to call a halt. Stalin told Eden years ago that Hitler's mistake was that he had gone too far. He has made the same mistake himself. Few dictators avoid it. Surrounded by flatterers, cut off from realities, intoxicated by power, they usually succumb sooner or later and commit the errors which deliver them into the hands of their enemies. Let us be thankful that it is so.

But at the same time let us remember the great advantages that the dictators possess. Stalin does not have to declare annually to the whole world how much he is spending on preparations for war, and how that expenditure is distributed among the various branches of the fighting services. His Ministers have not to face weekly a popularly elected assembly whose members can ask the most searching questions on any subject and demand an answer. He does not owe his position to the willing support of the majority of his fellow countrymen and of legislators who remind him daily that if he says this or does that they may lose the votes upon which their position and his must depend. A powerful politician whom he dismisses cannot give trouble afterwards, for he disappears forever from the land of the living. And whatever lie he chooses to utter is published without question in the press

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and accepted as gospel truth by his millions of subjects who never hear a whisper of news or opinion to the contrary. These are tremendous advantages in the preparation and conduct of war.

Let us not underrate our enemy, neither let us believe we can defeat him in a single campaign. Now therefore is the time, while the ugly facts of war are under our noses, to face bravely the whole issue, and to lay plans to which we shall remain committed when the immediate emergency has passed. We should consult together on the highest level, and without delay.

The first thing about which we should be properly clear in our own minds is against whom and what we are fighting.

When Mussolini attacked Abyssinia there were many people who felt that he was only doing what Great Britain had often done before, that the expansion of his colonial empire had rendered it necessary for him to teach a lesson to some backward, barbarous, slave-trading tribes and that the Abyssinian people themselves would probably benefit in the long run by coming under the control of a civilized modern government. This feeling was widespread in Great Britain and would have made it very difficult for the government to have gone to the help of Abyssinia.

It was a misapprehension—a very natural one, but it misled many. The twentieth century is not the same as the nineteenth. Different codes of conduct do, or should, prevail. The Abyssinian war was the first attempt by a self-appointed totalitarian dictator to impose his will by aggressive force on a fellow member of the League of Nations in defiance of the opinion of the civilized world as recorded by the League's vote. Had that issue been plainly understood at the time a different decision might have been arrived at, aggression and totalitarianism might have been nipped in the bud, and the Second World War might have been avoided.

Let us not repeat the error. Let us, at all costs, be clear in our own minds about the issue. Our quarrel is not with Koreans; if the name of Karl Marx means anything to most of the people of North Korea it means only the admirable weapons of war with which they have recently been furnished. They are not the enemy, nor when they have been defeated shall we be victorious. The enemy is the Kremlin—the men who from within it now control the fate of Russia and of all those satellite Powers over whom she has extended her dictatorship. With those men there can be no peaceful settlement any more than there could have been a

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peaceful settlement with Hitler. This is a hard saying and there will be many who will be reluctant to accept it. But in life, and in politics, it is always wiser to face the worst, for if things turn out better than could have been expected we shall have no cause to complain. The admitted aim of Communism is to conquer the world. Stalin has proved himself a faithful servant of this purpose. Neither the vast concessions made to him at Yalta, nor subsequent ones at Potsdam in the warm glow of a common victory, satisfied his appetite nor softened his intransigence. He and his associates have shown from the first that they were determined to wreck the United Nations association. They have now defied it. The quarrel is between the United Nations of free men and the forces of Communism throughout the world. Let this fact be generally accepted and deeply engraved upon the minds of all before we begin to consider the plans that we should make or the policy we should adopt.

In the first place it seems to me as plain as daylight that when, or before, the Korean campaign has been concluded, instead of asking Stalin to return to the United Nations, reinforced by a Communist representative of China, we should develop it into an association in which only those nations which maintain free institutions would be willing to participate or would indeed be admitted. To pretend that your enemy is your friend and to invite him to your council chamber seems to me to be the height of insanity.

This new association should lose no time in marshalling its resources. Had the forces against which Hitler was fighting at the end been united against him at the beginning, he would never have dared to go to war. The nations that are now held down under Communist tyranny, although their numbers have increased since the war, form still only a minority, and in many of them there are resistance forces praying and plotting for freedom. If the resources of the free countries are properly coördinated they will be found to be enormously superior to anything that their enemies can produce.

When the host has been numbered, and the weapons carefully tested and reviewed, the whole field of operations must be surveyed. It covers the habitable globe. We must not again be taken by surprise. Neither naked aggression as in Korea, nor cloak and dagger methods as in Czechoslovakia, must be permitted to give the enemy a stolen march. Wherever it seems possible that a

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Communist coup d'état may be in contemplation the existing government must be warned, and if necessary reinforced, so that it can deal firmly with the domestic menace. It might even prove possible to restore freedom to some of the countries that are now enslaved. The feasibility of insisting on the holding of free elections would be a matter for inquiry. Above all, we must give proof that we really believe in the thing that we are fighting for, and that our faith is as strong as that of our enemies.

If it can be shown, as I believe it can, that we not only possess overwhelming superiority in the resources of war, but also that we are determined to use them, then it should surely be possible to dissuade our enemies from ever having recourse to that desperate remedy. I have said that, as things are today, we cannot have peace with those who are determined to conquer the world and to destroy everything that we believe to be good. I do not mean that we are bound, of necessity, to embark upon a great war. I do mean that we should prepare now for such a war and hope by the scale of our preparations to deter the enemy from declaring or desiring it.

There was a time when Islam hoped to destroy Christianity and to convert the world. In those days there could be no peace with the Moslem. But there was not continual war; and in the course of centuries, although neither faith has compromised with the other, their adherents have learnt that the world is broad enough to hold them all and that they can even become the best of friends.

After the last war the United States and Great Britain disarmed beyond the limits of immediate safety. Disarmament has ceased. Rearmament must begin on the required scale. If the people are made to understand—as they can be made to understand, for they are not fools, the people of these great democracies —that vast and continuous sacrifices are demanded in the cause of security, those sacrifices will be gladly made. It is for America both to set the example and to insist upon that example being followed. She is in a position not only to make but also to exact her demands. By the courageous decision of her President she has grasped the leadership of the free world, but she cannot be expected both to finance and to fight for it unless her requirements are met.

The first requirement that America should make of her Allies is that they should understand that it is their war that she is

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fighting. The second is that it be understood that it is a war against Communist imperialism. Hence it must naturally follow that the Communists in our midst are enemy agents and should be treated as such. When we were at war with Germany we showed little, perhaps too little, consideration for German nationals within our territories. Yet all Germans were not loyal to Hitler as all Communists are loyal to Stalin. Nor was it a man's fault that he was born a German. Nobody is born a Communist. To become one is a voluntary act, for which a man must be prepared to accept the consequences.

The sacrifices in money that America has already made, the sacrifices in blood that she is making, will justify the demands that she must make on the free nations of Europe. She should ask of each of them the maximum contribution to the armed forces of the new union of free nations. She will be able to assist them in the equipment of those forces. When the full might of that host is known let it be published, and let the enemy be warned that the will to make full use of it exists. Let them be assured that the strength of the armed forces will not be diminished nor the will to use them relaxed until we are satisfied that the threat to freedom has passed away. Then it may well be that they will abandon their ambition to conquer or convert the world by force. When that time comes there can be peace with Communism, but not until then.

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CHINA IN STALIN'S GRAND STRATEGY

By Hu Shih

IN THE following pages I propose to study Stalin's grand strategy of world conquest as it can be discerned in China—its stages of experimentation and modification, of successes and failures, and its victories after long failures. The story covers 25 years, from 1924 to 1949, and culminates in the recent and, I trust, temporary conquest of continental China by the overwhelming military power of world Communism. I propose to use the history of the long and bitter struggle between Nationalist China and world Communism, between Chiang Kai-shek and Stalin, as source material for a new examination of that almost unbelievably successful strategy which has enabled world Communism to place under its domination immense areas of the earth and 800,000,000 of its population.

Nearly two years ago, there was published in *Foreign Affairs* a learned and very remarkable essay entitled "Stalin on Revolution," by an author who signed himself "Historicus."[1] It is a study of Stalin's theory, program, strategy and tactics of "world revolution," and is evidently based on careful research and documentation.

The author's method is literary and documentary, relying mainly on the published works of Stalin. This method has serious limitations which the author himself fully admits:

> As generals are not accustomed to publish their operational directives, so it is unreasonable to expect Stalin to publish his. From his writings it is possible to reconstruct certain main lines of strategy and tactics, but the writings also contain definite acknowledgment that "illegal" or underground activities play a major rôle in Communist operations. . . . Therefore it must remain a question to what extent Stalin's published views on Communist strategy and tactics are supplemented or modified by doctrine reserved for the Communist high command.

I believe, therefore, that the documentary method needs to be supplemented by the historical approach. Although "generals are not accustomed to publish their operational directives," an historian can reconstruct their strategy and tactics by following the details of their field operations and studying how these succeeded or failed.

[1] *Foreign Affairs*, January 1949.

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How did Stalin annex the Baltic States? How did he twice conquer Poland? How did Vyshinsky take over Rumania in February 1945? How did Communism take over Jugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary? What were the steps leading to the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in February 1948? What was Stalin's strategy in his conquest of Manchuria? And how did Stalin direct the campaign for the conquest of China and how did he finally succeed after 25 years of stubborn resistance by Nationalist China? Can we discern some similarity in the pattern of conquest? Can we reconstruct the strategical lines of the great Stalin from the fruits of these successful campaigns of conquest?

Toward the end of his essay, "Historicus" makes reference to "the technique of 'cold revolution' . . . illustrated recently in Eastern Europe." He seems to regard Stalin's conquest of Eastern Europe as "an exception to the general rule that revolutionary violence is necessary . . . in that it also dispenses with the need of overt violence." Does he really believe that "the technique of 'cold revolution' illustrated recently in Eastern Europe" is an "exception" to the Stalin strategy of conquest? I believe that from the historical standpoint, what has happened in Eastern Europe from 1945 to this day, just as what has happened in China from 1924 to this day, gives us the authentic subject matter for studying the real strategy and tactics of Stalinist Communism for the conquest of the world. "The technique of cold revolution" in Eastern Europe is no exception to the rule: it is the rule itself; it is the strategy in its more finished form.

All the strategical elements mentioned in the "Historicus" study are present in the Eastern European conquests just as they are present in the Asiatic conquests. There is always the Communist Party in full strength; there is always the maximum aid including armed force from the "base of Socialist revolution;" and there is, above all, the objective condition of revolution, namely, the greatest war in human history.

But there seem to be other equally important elements not revealed in a documentary research which can be clearly seen in a comparative study of the many Communist conquests extending from the Baltic Sea to China and Korea. First, it is not enough to have the conscious leadership of the Communist Party. To be an effective instrumentality of conquest, the Party must be fully armed: it must have a strong army of its own. Second, it is not enough to use Soviet Russia as a base for revolution. It is neces-

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sary first to make Soviet Russia the greatest military Power in the entire world, and then to achieve "revolutionary" conquests of *adjacent and contiguous territories by sheer overwhelming superiority* of military strength. Third, to avoid the appearance of "overt violence" or "revolutionary violence," it is necessary to bring about a "coalition government" with all the "democratic" and "anti-Fascist" parties or groups in a country. And lastly—and above all—there is the strategy of deceit which has been best expressed by the great Lenin: "We must be ready to employ trickery, deceit, lawbreaking, withholding and concealing truth."[2]

But there are also negative results that may be just as valuable as the positive findings. Such an historical study will show *what is not present* in this strategy. For instance, such a study will show that this strategy has nothing to do with such Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist economic theories as that of "Productive Forces vs. Productive Relations" which, according to "Historicus," is "an integral part of the bedrock of Marxist 'scientific' certainty about the future course of history on which Stalin evidently bases his entire life work."

Let us read such authentic historical records as the secret documents from the archives of the German Foreign Office, captured by the American and British armies in 1945, and published by the U.S. Department of State in 1948 under the title, "Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941." Let us note, for example, how in a nine-day secret negotiation, August 14–23, 1939, the whole relationship between Germany and Soviet Russia was reversed, they became allies, and the western democracies became enemies of both Germany and the U.S.S.R. As a result of these rapid negotiations, Soviet Russia acquired a free hand to annex the Baltic States and got the lion's share in the new partitioning of Poland. The record of the secret negotiations covers scores of pages, but there is no reference whatever to such economic theories as the contradictions of international capitalism or the interplay of Productive Forces vs. Productive Relations!

The same is true of that portion of the secret documents which deal with the German attempt to induce the Soviet Union to join the Three Power Pact of September 1940. Stalin and Molotov were tempted. They frankly indicated Soviet Russia's interest in Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, and her willingness to

[2] Lenin, "The Infantile Disease of Leftism." The translation here used is from Sir Norman Angell, "The Steep Places." New York: Harper, 1948, p. 73.

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participate in the division of spoils in the imminent breakup of the British Empire, and in particular her desire to designate "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf . . . as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." Neither Stalin, nor Molotov, in these protracted secret negotiations, ever makes reference to any of the "fundamental" economic causes such as the Productive Forces vs. Productive Relations.

In short, the whole strategy is no more and no less than a strategy of naked militarism aided from time to time by the most unscrupulous use of all possible forms of trickery and deceit. Such a strategy could never have succeeded in a world of peace and orderly international life. Its success has depended upon "the objective condition" of an unprecedented world war—a condition which the author of the strategy has sought by all available means to prolong and perpetuate.

II

There is one historical fact which differentiates the Chinese Communist Party from the Communist movements in any other country outside of Soviet Russia—a fact which is essential to a clear understanding of what has been happening in China during the last quarter of a century. It is that the Chinese Communist Party, partly by design and partly by extraordinary historical circumstances, has possessed a formidable army of its own almost from the very early years of its founding. Mr. Edgar Snow, sizing up the Chinese Communist Party at the end of 1937, said: "It is the strongest Communist Party in the world, outside Russia, and the only one, with the same exception, that can boast a mighty army of its own."[3] This unique feature of the Chinese Communist Party has been the most important source of its strength, which Stalin, the masterful strategist of world Communism, has been able to nurture, support, and in the course of 25 years develop into a most powerful instrumentality for subjugating China and thereby dominating the whole Asiatic continent.

Last year, on August 1, a special commemorative postage stamp was issued to mark the 22nd anniversary of the Red Army. Chinese Communist leaders proudly announced to the world that the Red Army, now renamed the "People's Liberation Army," had a regular strength of 4,000,000 men. A year later, August 1,

[3] Edgar Snow, "Red Star Over China." New York: Random House, 1938, p. 140.

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1950, the newspapers report that Communist China is celebrating the 23rd anniversary of the founding of the Red Army in China. A *New York Times* dispatch from Hong Kong says: "Preparing to mark their Red Army Day tomorrow, the Chinese Communists today described their 5,000,000-men force as 'one yet destined to play a significant rôle in defending the peace of East Asia and the world.' " This Red Army of 5,000,000 men, supported by a Russian-trained and Russian-supplied Air Force, is the ever-growing Asiatic arm of the militaristic power of world Communism today.

There seems no doubt that the organization of a Communist armed force in every country occupies a very important place in the grand strategy of Stalin and the Comintern for the ultimate success of the world proletarian dictatorship. In the program of the Communist International adopted by the Sixth World Congress on September 1, 1928, one of the eight most important special tasks that the Communist Party in every country must seek to accomplish is specified as "the organization of revolutionary workers' and peasants' armies."[4] In the same program, there is a section devoted to "The Fundamental Tasks of Communist Strategy and Tactics." One of these "fundamental tasks" is for the Communist Party to lead the masses to a direct attack upon the bourgeois state whenever the time is considered ripe for this final step of revolution. "This it does by organizing mass action. . . . This mass action includes: a combination of strikes and demonstrations, a combination of strikes and armed demonstrations, and finally the general strike conjointly with armed insurrection against the State power of the bourgeoisie. The latter form of struggle, which is the supreme form . . . presupposes a plan of campaign, offensive fighting operations and unbounded devotion and heroism on the part of the proletariat. An absolutely essential condition precedent for this form of action is the organization of the broad masses into militant units . . . and intensified revolutionary work in the army and the navy."

Among the 21 "Conditions of Admission to the Communist International," adopted at the Second World Congress of the Comintern, July–August 1920, the fourth condition reads: "Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be carried on in the army, where Communist groups should be formed in every military organization. Wherever, owing to repressive legislation, agitation becomes impossible, it is necessary to carry on such agi-

[4] "Blueprint for World Conquest." Chicago: Human Events, Inc., 1946, p. 121.

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tation illegally. *But refusal to carry on or participate in such work should be considered equal to treason to the revolutionary cause,* and incompatible with affiliation to the Third International."[5]

Since no country under normal conditions will permit either revolutionary propaganda and agitation in its army or the organization of an armed force by a revolutionary party, it was a most extraordinary opportunity for the Third International to be requested in 1923–1924 by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, leader of a revolutionary party and many times head of an independent regional government, to send political and military experts to China, not only to help reorganize his own party, but actually to organize a new army for a new revolution. It was equally extraordinary for Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in his sincere desire to "bolster the strength of revolutionary elements in the country," to admit Communists as regular members of his own Nationalist Party, thereby making it possible for Communists to influence the policy of the Nationalist Party and even to carry on revolutionary propaganda and agitation in the new army.

The Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921, had already affiliated itself with the Communist International. The three years of collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party (1924–1927) formed the period when the Comintern was making full use of a most unusual opportunity to try out its strategy of world revolution on a large scale in one of the most important strategical areas of the world—China.

This was the time when Stalin was formulating his thesis of the consolidation of Soviet Russia as the base for world revolution, a thesis which never meant abandonment of the cause of world revolution in favor of "Socialism in one country" but only emphasized the importance of effective aid that could come from a strong base. A political struggle for power was then going on in Russia between Stalin and Trotsky, but Stalin was already in full control of the policies of the Comintern. There is little doubt that Stalin was directing the Comintern's China adventure throughout those years of Nationalist-Communist collaboration.

The basis of this collaboration had been clearly defined in a joint statement issued by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and A. Joffe, a representative of Soviet Russia and the Comintern:

> Dr. Sun Yat-sen holds that the Communist order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced into China because there do not

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 67. Italics inserted.

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exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. This view is entirely shared by Mr. Joffe, who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count on the support of Russia.

Dr. Sun, the father of the Chinese Revolution which in 1911–1912 overthrew the Manchu Dynasty, abolished the monarchy and established the first republic in Asia, had long advocated a threefold platform: nationalism, political democracy and the people's livelihood. He was here, however, reminded by his Russian adviser that nationalism—especially the struggle "to achieve national unification and attain full national independence"—was still the most pressing issue. This joint statement practically defined the issue of the Nationalist Revolution: it was to achieve national unification by destroying the military power of the separatist war lords, and to attain "full national independence" by abolishing the special privileges enjoyed by the foreigner in China, by abolishing the "unequal treaties" which the foreign Powers had imposed upon the Chinese people. It was clear from the very beginning that this latter phase of the Nationalist movement had to be essentially an anti-foreign movement, a revolution against the imperialist Powers. Unwittingly, Dr. Sun's Party was being thus guided toward a possible international war.

The Communist International went all-out in giving aid to the Nationalist-Communist collaboration. Aid came largely in the form of matériel and expert advisers. The Comintern was able to send to China a remarkable group of political and military advisers, headed by Mikhail Borodin, one of the most brilliant and astute revolutionary organizers, and General Galen, who years later came to be better known as Marshal Blucher. Borodin soon became the dictator of the Chinese Communist Party and at the same time the most influential man in the new government, directing the policy and the strategy of the Revolution. The Whampoa Military Academy was established in Canton in June 1924, with General Chiang Kai-shek as its Director. The Russian military mission under Blucher was helping Chiang to train large numbers of new officers who were to be the nucleus of a new revolutionary army.

Chiang Kai-shek's future Army of Nationalist Revolution was organized on the model of the Russian Red Army and was under

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the political discipline and indoctrination of the political commissars, many of whom were trained Communists. In that way, Communists and Communism were able to exert much influence over the officers and men of the Nationalist Army. Important Communist leaders of the future, such as Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Lin Tsu-han (Lin Po-ch'u), etc., played important rôles in the government and in the army. These Communists helped to organize the masses, conduct propaganda and indoctrinate the officers and men of the army. The training centers in Moscow—the Lenin University, the University of the Toilers of the East, and, later, the Sun Yat-sen University—were sending back well-trained young men for work in the Party and in the Army.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen died in March 1925. In June 1926, the Army of National Revolution, led by Chiang Kai-shek as Commander-in Chief, launched the Northward Expedition from Canton. The progress of the revolutionary armies was almost an uninterrupted series of victories. The northern armies were incapable of effectively resisting an inspired army supported by powerful propaganda and organized masses. Changsha was taken in July, Hankow in October, Kiukiang and Nanchang in November. Early in 1927, the Revolutionary forces had reached the Yangtze Delta. The Chinese city of Shanghai was taken in March, and only strong forces of foreign marines protected the foreign settlement from the Nationalists.

Then came the great crisis of the revolution. On March 24, 1927, Nationalist troops entered the city of Nanking after the flight of the northern forces, savagely attacked foreigners in the city, looted and defiled foreign dwellings and consulates, and killed a few of the foreign residents, including the vice-president of the American missionary University of Nanking. Foreign gunboats stationed in the river were forced to fire a barrage to warn against further violence and to guide the fleeing foreigners to escape to the boats.

"The (Nanking) incident," says Professor Latourette, "so aroused the ire of foreigners that for a time extensive intervention seemed imminent."[6]

On the day of the Nanking incident, I was travelling from New York to Chicago, and I could sense that American public opinion which had up to that time been sympathetic toward the National-

[6] Kenneth S. Latourette, "The Development of China." Boston: Houghton, 1946, 6th revised ed., p. 260.

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ist Revolution had changed overnight and turned against the revolutionary cause. But I never fully realized how dangerously close this "extensive (foreign) intervention" was until nearly a month later, when I was in Tokyo and a Japanese friend in the Foreign Office was guiding me on a sightseeing tour. The *Tokyo Asahi* was holding an "Exhibition of Modern Journalism" in its new building. My Japanese friend said to me: "Dr. Hu Shih, I just want you to see one little room." The three walls of this small room were covered by the original cablegrams sent from Nanking and Shanghai to the *Tokyo Asahi* office on the looting of the Japanese Consulate in Nanking, the defiling of the portrait of the Japanese Emperor, the attempt of the Japanese captain of the Consulate Guards to commit hara-kiri because he was ordered not to resist, etc. There were over 400 urgent cablegrams in a single day, March 24, 1927. "You can even now feel how Japan must have felt on that fateful day," said my friend. He then told me that the Powers held serious consultations on the question of intervention in China, and that Japan, according to his information, was among those governments opposing intervention.

As we now look back, the Nanking incident seems to be the last of a series of deliberate anti-foreign moves designed to force the foreign Powers to resort to armed intervention and thereby to create a situation of a real "imperialist war"—which, we must remember, Stalin and the Comintern regard as the necessary "objective condition" for the victory of the revolution. The commanding general of the offending army in the Nanking incident was General Ch'en Ch'ien who is now with the Chinese Communist régime. And the man who was considered by the United States Government as being responsible for the whole affair was Mr. Lin Tsu-han, the chief political commissar of the Army. Mr. Lin is one of the most prominent Communist leaders today.

During this period of collaboration, the Chinese Communist Party was functioning efficiently, and the work of infiltration into the Government and especially into the Army was going on smoothly and successfully. What was lacking was a real war, a great imperialist war, without which, according to the Stalinist line of thinking, it was difficult to capture the whole of the Russian-influenced Nationalist Army and convert the Nationalist Revolution into another glorious "October Revolution." All the gigantic anti-British strikes and boycotts throughout 1925–1926 had been directed toward breaking British power in China and

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forcing Britain to armed intervention. But Britain chose not to fight back. Even after the British Concession at Hankow had been seized by force on January 4, 1927, the British Government persisted in its policy, and ordered its Peking Legation to send a mission to Hankow to negotiate a settlement with the Hankow régime which was under the domination of the Communists. The British Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang were officially returned to China as a result of these negotiations. But this non-resistant attitude of the British defeated the Communist strategy, which was to start an international conflagration in China by pushing the British to the wall. It is quite probable that the Nanking affair of March 24 was a deliberate strategical move to involve many foreign Powers in armed intervention, which, as I have shown, almost became a reality.

This danger of foreign intervention and a Communist Revolution was averted by the decision of Chiang Kai-shek and the moderate leaders of the Kuomintang to "split" with the Communists, end the collaboration, and "purge" the Nationalist Party of the Communists and their sympathizers. The "purge" began on April 12, 1927, in Shanghai and later in Canton. On April 18, Chiang, with the support of the Elder Statesmen of the Party, set up the National Government in Nanking.

III

Mr. Edgar Snow reports that as early as 1926 Trotsky began urging the formation of Chinese soviets and an independent Chinese Red Army.[7] Such advice from Stalin's opposition at least indicated a line of thought fairly current in Communist circles at that time.

After the moderate wing of the Kuomintang had brought about the "split" and the "purge" in the lower Yangtze Valley, and had set up the National Government at Nanking, the Kremlin sent a secret message to Borodin in Hankow ordering the Chinese Communists to demand majority control of the Kuomintang, confiscation of land of the landowners and the formation of a separate Workers' and Peasants' Army. Borodin did not want to present these demands, but Roy, the Indian representative of the Comintern, gave the message to Wang Ching-wei, chairman of the Left Wing Kuomintang Government at Hankow. Even the Left Wing Kuomintang could not tolerate such open violation of the

[7] Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

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terms of the collaboration. Borodin and the other Russian advisers were expelled from the Party and ordered to leave China. Eventually the Hankow régime collapsed and was merged with the Government at Nanking.

It is significant that the organization of a Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was actually ordered by the Kremlin and therefore constituted a part of the strategy of Stalin. And the order was carried out by those Communist leaders and army commanders—Chu Teh, Ho Lung, Yeh T'ing, Mao Tse-tung, Li Li-san and others—who wanted to carry on the Chinese Communist Party but who realized that, after the 1927 coup d'état, the Party must have an armed force of its own. It was these men who started the Nanchang Uprising on August 1, 1927, and the Autumn Crop Uprising in Hunan in September, and who after their defeat and retreat into the mountains, pooled their remnant forces to form the first Red Army.

The Red Army probably began with less than 10,000 men. In the course of a few years, it grew in numerical strength and in fighting experience. Its mobile units carried on insurrections mainly in the provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, and the border areas of Fukien. By 1930, the Red Army was said to number about 60,000 men.

Toward the end of 1927, the first "soviet" was set up in Chaling, in Hunan. The soviet form was extended to larger areas and early in 1930 a Provisional Soviet Government of Southern Kiangsi was proclaimed. In August 1931, the Executive Committee of the Communist International advised the Chinese Communist Party to establish in some secure region a full-fledged "central Soviet Government" and to carry out a "Bolshevik national policy."[8] Such a "Central Soviet Government of the Soviet Republic of China" was set up in December 1931, with its capital at Juichin, Kiangsi, near the border of Fukien. Mao Tse-tung was elected Chairman of the Central Soviet Government, and Chu Teh, Commander of the Red Army.

There is no authentic record regarding the highest numerical strength attained by the Red Army in those years of the Kiangsi Soviets. At the 13th Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern held in December 1933, Wang Ming (Ch'en Shao-yu), the Chinese delegate, reported that in the territory of

[8] David J. Dallin, "Soviet Russia and the Far East." New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948, p. 109.

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the Chinese Soviet Republic, "the regular formations of the Red Army numbered 350,000 men; the irregular forces, 600,000."[9]

At the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in Moscow in 1934, Dmitri Manuilsky, reporting on the progress of Communism in China, paid this tribute to the Chinese Party and its Army: "The young Communist Party of China is becoming one of the best sections of the Communist International, also because both they and the Red Army have passed through the years-long school of civil war."[10]

This Red Army was essentially a guerrilla force, having terroristic control of the rural area which is the source of food supply and manpower. It was a fighting force of great mobility. Snow[11] has made famous these slogans of Red Army tactics:

1. When the enemy advances, we retreat!
2. When the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble them!
3. When the enemy seeks to avoid a battle, we attack!
4. When the enemy retreats, we pursue!

The declared object of the Army at that time was "to overthrow the Kuomintang régime and destroy its military power." Even the outbreak of Japanese aggression in Manchuria in September 1931 and its rapid expansion into North China and Shanghai did not stop or even diminish this fierce antinationalist insurrection. The National Government issued an appeal for unity against Japan. But the Communists responded with the manifesto of September 30, 1931, in which they vehemently condemned the talk about "a united front against the external enemy" as "ridiculous, absurd, and lying inventions." They declared: "The Communist Party of China is and remains the irreconcilable enemy of the imperialists and the Kuomintang."[12] And in Moscow the Executive Committee of the Comintern adopted a resolution in September 1932, emphasizing that "the Communist Party of China must fight for the overthrow of the Kuomintang, the agent of imperialism."[13]

The Communists in the Red areas of Kiangsi did in February 1932 send out a circular telegram "declaring war" against Japan

[9] Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 111. *Cf.* Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 290, quoting a Red squad leader: "In our Kiangsi Soviets we had a population of only 3,000,000, yet we recruited volunteer partisan armies of 500,000 men!"

[10] Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 111–112.

[11] Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

[12] Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 126, quoting Mif et al., "Okkupatsiya Manchzhurii," p. 153.

[13] Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

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in the name of the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Republic of China. Yet in the same month, when a part of the Fifth Army of the Nationalist Government was ordered from Kiangsi to fight the Japanese in the "First War of Shanghai," the withdrawing troops were attacked at Kan Hsien, Kiangsi, by the Communist armies from the rear and suffered heavy losses.

In 1933, the Communists issued a proclamation which, while still attacking Chiang Kai-shek and the imperialist Powers, announced that the Chinese Communists were ready to "coöperate with any White army on three conditions: (1) cessation of civil war and of attacks on the Chinese Soviet area, (2) guarantee of civil liberties and democratic rights to the people, and (3) arming the masses for an anti-Japanese war." Note that the offer was made only to any White army—that is, any government army that was blockading or attacking the Red area.[14]

From 1930 to 1934, the National Government forces under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek carried out a number of military expeditions against the Communist armies. By the fall of 1933 the Red districts were being narrowed down to a relatively small area in the border regions between Kiangsi and Fukien. To counteract the mobility of the partisan warfare, the 1933–34 campaign (which is often termed the Fifth or Last Campaign) relied mainly on a combination of military encirclement and economic blockade. This campaign lasted over a year and is said to have involved the mobilization of nearly 1,000,000 men. By means of a network of military roads and thousands of small fortifications, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's strategy was designed to build around the Soviet districts a kind of Great Wall "which gradually moved inward. Its ultimate aim was to encompass and crush the Red Army in a stone vise."[15]

The encirclement and the economic blockade proved so effective that the Red Army and Government were forced to adopt the bold strategy of retreat—to escape annihilation by retreating westward, then southwestward, then northward, and then northeastward, finally reaching their destination in northern Shensi. This retreat has been called "the Long March," which lasted for a whole year and covered about 6,000 miles.

The Long March, in Mao Tse-tung's own words, "was begun in

[14] Mao Tse-tung, "On Coalition Government," April 1945, p. 23; Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 166; Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
[15] Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

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October 1934. . . . By January 1935, the main force of the Red Army reached Tsunyi in Kweichow. For the next four months the army was almost constantly moving and the most energetic combat and fighting took place. Through many, many difficulties, across the longest and deepest and most dangerous rivers of China, across some of its highest and most hazardous mountain passes, through the country of fierce aborigines, through the empty grasslands, through cold and through intense heat, through wind and snow and rainstorm, pursued by half the White armies of China, through all these natural barriers, and fighting its way past the local troops of Kwangtung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Yunnan, Sikong, Szechuan, Kansu and Shensi, the Red Army at last reached northern Shensi in October 1935, and enlarged the present base in China's great Northwest."[16]

How great were the casualties suffered by the Red Army in the battles and in the Long March? Mr. Snow tells us that Chou En-lai admits that "the Red Army itself suffered over 60,000 casualties in this one siege" (*i.e.*, the long blockade of 1933–34). Mr. Snow also records that "the main forces of the Red Army" at the start of the retreat from Kiangsi, October 1934, were "estimated at about 90,000 men," and that in October 1935, at the end of the trek, they numbered "less than 20,000 survivors."[17]

But the most significant fact is that the Red Army had survived the great extermination campaign of 1933–34, had survived the one-year-long heroic march, and was now joined by the Communist forces that had already established a small Soviet base in Shensi in 1933. Here, in northern Shensi, just below the Great Wall, the survivors of the Red Army and the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party now settled down to build up their new base as close as possible to the borders of Soviet Russia—the base of revolution.

No record is preserved of the discussions at the Red Army Conferences at Juichin in 1934, which finally made the decision to withdraw from the Kiangsi-Fukien border-region and to transfer the nucleus of the living forces of the Red Army to some new base in the west or the northwest. But in later years when Chinese Communists could freely associate and converse with their non-Communist friends it was reliably reported that leading Com-

[16] Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

[17] Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 174, 175, 194. *Cf.* Dallin, p. 112: "Of the approximately 100,000 men who left the former Soviet area, less than half reached the final destination; the rest were killed or left behind."

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munists attributed the success of the Long March to what Stalin had taught as "the strategy of retreat." For it was Stalin who, in his best known work, "Problems of Leninism," had laid down the strategical line of "a manœuvring of reserves designed for a correct retreat when the enemy is strong and when retreat is inevitable, when we are beforehand aware of the disadvantages of engaging in battle which the enemy imposes on us, when, given the ratio of forces, retreat is the only means of preventing a blow on the vanguard and of maintaining the reserves behind it." Here Stalin quoted Lenin for support: "The revolutionary parties must complete their education. They have learned how to attack. Now they must understand that it is necessary to supplement this by a knowledge of how best to retreat. They must understand (and the revolutionary class learns to understand by its bitter experience) that victory is impossible without learning both how to attack and how to retreat properly." "The object of this strategy," concludes Stalin, "is to gain time, to decompose the enemy, and to assemble forces so as to take the offensive later."[18]

So, according to my source of information, it was this Lenin-Stalin doctrine of "correct retreat" that had influenced the military thinking at Juichin in 1934 and had resulted in the Long March and the survival of the Red Army.

IV

But the remnant Red Army settling in northern Shensi—one of the poorest areas in the whole of China—was still facing the danger of being once more surrounded and destroyed by the superior military power of the National Government, which had become increasingly strong in the years 1934–36. One of the unexpected results of the Long March of the Communists was the fact that the National Government, in following the trail of the Red Army, was able to consolidate its political control over such southwestern provinces as Kweichow, Yunnan and Szechuan, which had previously succeeded in maintaining a degree of regional autonomy. The rich and economically self-sufficient inland province of Szechuan, for example, when it was invaded by the Red Army in 1935, sent a representative delegation to Nanking to request the Government for adequate military aid to help the pro-

[18] Stalin, "Problems of Leninism." This translation is taken from William C. Bullitt, "The Great Globe Itself." New York, Scribners, 1946, Appendix III, p. 299. This passage was quoted *in toto* in Chang Hao (Lin Yü-ying), "The Tactical Line of the Chinese Communist Party," p. 28.

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vincial armies combat the Red forces. It was, therefore, the Red Army's Long March which enabled Chiang Kai-shek to consolidate the great southwest as the future base in the long war against Japan. And the Generalissimo was determined to exterminate the military power of Chinese Communism before he had to face the greater war of resistance to Japan.

Stalin and the Communist International were then to play another and even more important rôle in protecting and preserving the Red Army strength and providing it with ample opportunities for growth and expansion. The new strategical line was to be the "united front."

Even when the Red Army was fighting its way to the northwest, the policy of the Communist International underwent an important change. The Seventh World Congress, held in Moscow from July to August 1935, officially proclaimed the policy of a "united front" against the rising dangers of aggression by the "Fascist" Powers. The Congress called upon Communist Parties in all countries to coöperate or seek coalition with bourgeois governments and political parties willing to fight Fascism. Special attention was paid to China and the Chinese Communist Party. It elected Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Wang Ming to the Executive Committee of the Comintern; and Wang Ming, who was stationed in Moscow as the Party's resident delegate, was also made a member of the International Presidium. The Party was, however, censured for having "not yet succeeded in carrying out these tactics [of the united front] really consistently and without mistakes."[19] One of the great mistakes specifically singled out was the failure of the Chinese Communists to unite with the leaders of the Nineteenth Route Army who had rebelled against the Nationalist Government and set up a People's Government in Fukien in 1933. The quick collapse of the Fukien rebellion enabled the Nationalist Government to enforce a more effective blockade against the Communist area in the following year.

The Comintern policy of the "United Front in China" was intended as a scheme to protect the greatly weakened Red Army from renewed attacks by Nationalist forces. But the Chinese Communist Party which had fiercely fought Chiang Kai-shek over eight long years could not yet bring itself to a public retrac-

[19] Department of State, "United States Relations with China, 1944–1949." Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949, p. 46, quoting Wang Ming, "The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial Countries, Report to the VII World Congress of the Communist International, August 7, 1935" (New York, 1935). Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 128–129.

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tion of its avowed objective of "overthrowing the Kuomintang and destroying its military power." It was proclaiming such slogans as "Chinese don't fight Chinese!" "Stop all civil war!" "Unite all parties, all groups, all armies, in our common fight against Japan!" and "Down with all Traitors!" Nevertheless it was still demanding the downfall of the "arch-traitor," Chiang Kai-shek, and his régime. In Communist literature of the time, the "United Front" was described as one of "resistance to Japan and opposition to Chiang."

Under this new party line, the Chinese Communist Party was organizing all kinds of front organizations such as "The Association for National Salvation and Resistance to Japan," "The People's United Association against Japan," and so on. These associations were carrying on antigovernmental agitation under the cloak of anti-Japanism. They demanded immediate war against Japan and immediate cessation of the civil war against the Communists. In the summer and autumn of 1936, seven well-known leaders of the National Salvation Societies were arrested, and that, of course, gave cause for more agitation against the Government. Throughout the winter of 1935–36, student strikes and student demonstrations broke out in Peiping and other metropolitan centers of education. Hundreds and even thousands of young students, boys and girls, would often block railway transportation by lying down on railroad tracks and demanding free passage to Nanking to petition the Government to fight Japan.[20]

These anti-Japanese demonstrations and the popular demands for a united front against Japan could not fail to affect the psychology of the Government troops who were sent to Shensi to fight the remnant Red Army. This was particularly true of the Tungpei (Northeast) Armies, which had retreated from Manchuria after the Japanese invasion and were now under the command of their former leader, the "Young Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the campaign against the Red Army in Shensi, with his headquarters at Sian, the capital of Shensi Province. The propaganda slogans against these armies were especially effective: "Go back to Your Old Home and Fight the Japanese Devils!"

Before long, the "Bandit-Suppression Army Officers" were be-

[20] Years later, Communist leaders like Mao Tse-tung openly claimed that the Chinese Communist Party was responsible for organizing this mass action of the students. December 9, the date of the first big demonstration in Peiping in 1935, is now named "Students' Day" in Communist China.

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ginning to fraternize with the "bandits." By the summer of 1936, some kind of secret understanding was reached between the Communist leaders in Northern Shensi and Chang Hsueh-liang and his Sian colleague, General Yang Hu-ch'eng, Pacification Commissioner of Shensi Province. The war against the Reds was slowing down, thereby giving the Red Army a much-needed opportunity to rest and recuperate.

Chang Hsueh-liang, the Young Marshal, then in his middle thirties, was a spoiled child who never matured intellectually. Born to wealth and power, he was ambitious and vainglorious. Being patriotic and intensely anti-Japanese, he was easily persuaded to lend his support to the work of anti-Japanese agitation and demonstration by the National Salvation Societies and student bodies. The Nanking Government began to hear reports that the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Bandit-Suppression Campaign, second only to Chiang Kai-shek in command, was financing the antigovernment front organizations. He was drifting into a position where he could imagine himself at the head of the anti-Japan and anti-Chiang "United Front."

It was against such a background that the "arrest" of Chiang Kai-shek by Chang Hsueh-liang took place in Sian on the morning of December 12, 1936. Because of the almost complete absence of authentic records, the story of the Sian affair has never been, and may never be, fully told. But the following facts seem to be of importance.

First, Chiang Kai-shek went to Sian with the full knowledge that he was going into the territory of the conspirators. Dr. Wong Wen-hao, my geologist friend who was serving as Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan, told me in Nanking at least five days before the coup that the Generalissimo was fully aware that the Young Marshal was plotting a revolt against the Government. Then why did Chiang go? The answer has to be a conjecture. Chiang was a prodigal son turned Puritan Christian at a mature age, and the world must try to understand him in that light. He probably wanted to win back his wayward "younger brother," Chang Hsueh-liang, by convincing him that he still had complete trust in him. He not only went to Sian practically unguarded; he actually called a military conference to meet at Sian to which all his highest ranking generals were summoned. The conference began on December 7. So what actually happened on the morning of December 12 was the arrest of Chiang Kai-shek and of prac-

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tically all the best-known generals of Nationalist China, the only notable exceptions being Ho Ying-ch'in and Ku Chu-t'ung.

Why did he call the military conference? Chiang probably wanted to convince the conspirators how futile it would be for them to attempt any revolt in face of the overwhelmingly strong position of Government forces in Loyang and along the Lunghai railway. He probably also wanted them to see how the Government could carry on the anti-Red campaign even without their help. In short, it was possible that the military conference was called at Sian for the purpose of convincing the conspirators that the Government had nothing to hide from them.

Second, Chang Hsueh-liang must have planned the whole affair by himself. He was fully capable of quick decision and cold-blooded murder, as he had shown in his killing of two of his father's ablest and most trusted generals—Generals Yang Yu-t'ing and Ch'ang Yin-huai, when the victims were dinner guests in his own home. And he must have planned it as a part of a rebellion under the banner of "the Anti-Japan and Anti-Chiang United Front." This is shown by the announcement on December 14 of the formation of the United Anti-Japanese Army, to consist of the armed forces of the Red Army, the Northwest Army of Yang Hu-ch'eng and the Northeast Army of Chang Hsueh-liang. And the Young Marshal was "elected" chairman of the United Anti-Japanese Military Council.

Third, for a time, Chiang Kai-shek's life was in real danger. He could have been killed in his residence when Chang's troops opened fire before daybreak and 30 of his bodyguard were killed. During the fortnight of his captivity, there were persistent demands for his execution or for his public trial. All the finely mimeographed news-sheets of Communist or "National Salvation" underground that I could obtain in Peiping during those days were unanimous in demanding Chiang's death.

Fourth, the many reports about the "intrigue for capture of the hegemony of power" in Nanking are not true. The Kuomintang, the National Government and the Military Commission held an all-day conference on December 12. Every Elder Statesman who knew his history pointed to the historical parallel of the Sixth Emperor of the Ming Dynasty who was captured in battle by a Mongol tribe in the year 1449. The statesman Yu Ch'ien proposed that, in order to forestall the Emperor's being held as hostage for impossible terms of peace, the Heir Apparent should be pro-

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claimed Emperor and the Government should carry on as before. His proposal was adopted and the captive Emperor was returned in a year. So on December 12, 1936, Nanking decided that the manifold duties of the Generalissimo should be temporarily taken over by his colleagues in the Government, the Party and the Military Commission, so that all these organs could go on in the absence of the Generalissimo.

Fifth, the Government's decision to move a number of divisions of troops to the Honan-Shensi border quickly and to send squadrons of airplanes daily over Sian was the result of careful consideration and was clearly motivated by the desire to hasten Chiang's safe return and to make the conspirators realize the gravity of their own situation. Chiang Kai-shek fully understood this: he wrote in his diary that he was very glad when he heard the airplanes over the city.

And, lastly, the all-important question: Why was Chiang Kai-shek able to fly back to Nanking on Christmas Day? What had happened to make that possible? Miss Agnes Smedley, who was in Sian at the time, reported that after Chiang's party had left Sian a group of young Northeast officers and National Salvation leaders said to her: "We have been betrayed! The Red Army induced the Young Marshal to release Chiang."[21] Edgar Snow believes that the Communist delegates (Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying and Po Ku) whom Marshal Chang summoned to Sian were "most effective" in bringing about Chiang's release.[22]

The United States Department of State and David J. Dallin seem to agree that the release of the Generalissimo was apparently ordered by Moscow. "The Chinese Communist Party . . ." says the Department of State, "at first favored the execution of the Generalissimo, but, apparently on orders from Moscow, shifted to a policy of saving his life. The Chinese Communist concept, inspired from Moscow, became one of promoting a 'united front' with the Generalissimo and the National Government against the Japanese; this concept seems to have played a considerable rôle in saving the life of the Generalissimo."[23]

Mr. Dallin, however, points out that, before the Sian incident, Moscow and Nanking had already made progress in negotiating "a new nonaggression pact of momentous importance." This new

[21] Agnes Smedley, "Battle Hymn of China." New York: Knopf, 1943, p. 149.
[22] Snow, *op. cit.*, p. 420.
[23] Department of State, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

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pact (not signed until August 1937) was to serve as the basis for future Russian aid to China in the early years of the Sino-Japanese war. So Dallin believes that "Moscow . . . valued a pact with Chiang more highly than one with the irregular forces of the insurrectionists," and that this probably explains why Moscow "adopted an unequivocally hostile attitude toward the Sian rebellion."[24] As evidence of this "hostile attitude," Dallin quotes the editorial from *Izvestia* of December 14, the very first day that the news of the Sian rebellion was published in Moscow. "Under whatever slogans and program the Sian insurrection be conducted," says the *Izvestia* editorial, "this move . . . represents a danger not only to the Nanking government, but to all of China. It is clear that despite Chang Hsueh-liang's anti-Japanese banner, his move can benefit only Japanese imperialism. *So long as the Nanking government conducts a policy of resistance to the Japanese aggressors, the united popular front against Japan is understood by all its participants to mean not a front against Nanking, but a front together with Nanking.*"[25] Mr. Dallin's conclusion, therefore, is that "there is no doubt that the position taken in Moscow had a decisive influence on the course of events in Sian and perhaps did save Chiang's life." But, Dallin adds, "in the last analysis Chiang owed his rescue to Japan's vigorous offensive on the Asiatic continent, and to the reality of the Japanese menace to both Russia and China." In other words, the Kremlin was worried about the Japanese menace and was convinced that Chiang Kai-shek was capable of offering greater resistance to Japan than any of the insurrectionist groups who talked loudly about "immediate armed resistance to Japan." For reasons of her own security, Russia wanted China to be in a position to fight Japan. Hence the secret negotiations for a nonaggression pact between China and Soviet Russia. Hence the hostile attitude of Moscow toward the Sian rebellion.

While the above conclusions may be correct in general, I am inclined to think that, in the light of the future trend of events, Stalin's strategy was probably greatly influenced by his solicitude for the future of the Chinese Red Army, which, we must remember, was one of his own creations. My friend, the late Agnes Smedley, may be more revealing than she meant to be when she quoted a young Army officer as saying, one hour after Chiang Kai-shek

[24] Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 67–69.
[25] *Izvestia*, Moscow, December 14, 1946. Quoted by Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 69. Italics inserted.

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and Chang Hsueh-liang had left Sian by air: "The Red Army induced the young Marshal to release Chiang." The Reds knew that the newly-formed "United Anti-Japanese Army" could not stand the furious attacks of the advancing Nationalist armies that were already surrounding Shensi on all sides. And they knew what opportunities for expansion there would be if their Army were to become a part of the National Army.

From one of the secret pamphlets issued by the Chinese Communist Party after the Sian affair we can learn that there was so much criticism and dissatisfaction after December 1936 that explanation "lectures" had to be prepared in order that the Party and the Army might fully understand the action at Sian. In these secret explanations, it is interesting to note that the central argument was that the Party must obey the directives of the Comintern which were motivated by considerations for the "larger benefits" and "greater victories" in store for the Communist Party. The following passage is most revealing:

> When the December [1935] Resolution was issued, the policy was "Fight Chiang and Resist Japan." Now it is "Ally with Chiang, and Resist Japan." If we want to resist Japan, we must unite with Chiang. If the Communist Party wants to secure greater victories, it must fight Japan.
>
> In the Sian Affair, Chang Hseuh-liang and Yang Hu-ch'eng and the other militarists were really more interested in opposition to Chiang than in resistance to Japan. The Communist Party saw this clearly and used all its power to advocate a peaceful settlement, for internal fighting would only benefit Japan, and would injure our Party. Moreover, if the Sian Affair should arouse the wrath and dissatisfaction of the other militarists against the Communist Party, a war would be disastrous [for us]. Therefore our tactical line was: "Peaceful settlement of the Sian Affair!" and "End all civil wars!"
>
> *Because the Chinese Communist Party is an International Party and the directives we received from the Third International also said that a peaceful settlement would be right and profitable, it was decided that for the greater benefits of the future, we must have peace.*[26]

So once more it was Stalin's strategy which brought about a peaceful settlement of the Sian Affair and saved the lives of Chiang Kai-shek and practically all his highest ranking generals.

The Generalissimo returned to Nanking amidst the really spontaneous rejoicings of the Chinese people. He left Sian without having to sign any terms. But this Puritan Christian was won over, probably for the first time in his life, by a masterful stroke of strategy. Of all the things Stalin has ever done, that act came

[26] Chang Hao (Lin Yü-ying), "The Tactical Line of the Chinese Communist Party" (probably 1937), p. 48. Italics inserted.

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closest to statesmanship. The Generalissimo felt reassured that he could take in the Chinese Communists as partners in the common fight against the Japanese aggressor. The war for the extermination of the Red Army was ended. The Red Army was saved.

Seven months later, in July and August 1937, China took up the fight against Japan. The Second World War, which had actually started on September 18, 1931, in Manchuria, and which Chiang Kai-shek had for six years tried to avoid, often under most humiliating circumstances, was now in full swing.

Another month later, in September 1937, the Red Army was incorporated as the Eighth Route Army of the National Army. It was now sent to the war front in Shansi, where it looked forward to a future of unlimited growth and expansion.

V

When the Red Army was first incorporated in the National Army in September 1937, its numerical strength was officially estimated at 25,000 men. Seven years later, in September 1944, Lin Tsu-han, a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, reported to the People's Political Council that "In the course of more than seven years of war, the Communist military force has developed along the right tracks and consists now of an army of 475,000 men and a people's militia force of 2,200,000 men."[27] And a few months later, in April 1945, Mao Tse-tung presented a 50,000-word report to the Seventh Congress of the Communist Party, held at Yenan, in which he said: "As I am preparing this report, our regular army has already expanded to 910,000 men and our people's militia force has increased beyond 2,200,000 men."

So, in the course of eight years' war against Japan, the Communist armies, instead of suffering heavy losses, were able to achieve a 3,540 percent increase! And should we include the 2,200,000 "people's militia force," the increase would be 12,340 percent. That, said Mr. Lin Tsu-han, is because "the Communist military force has developed along the right track."

From 1935 to 1937, the Communists on the Shensi-Kansu border area occupied only 21 or 22 counties. According to their own estimate, the population was about 1,500,000. But in April 1945, Mao Tse-tung claimed that "the Liberated Area now extends

[27] Department of State, *op. cit.*, p. 545.

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from Inner Mongolia in the north to the Hainan Island in the south, extending into 19 provinces and containing 95,500,000 people." "In most of the territories occupied by the Japanese enemy," said Mao, "there will be found the Eighth Route Army, or the New Fourth Army, or some other people's armies carrying on partisan activities." The 19 provinces mentioned by Mao include Liaoning, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Shansi, Hopei, Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhui, Kiangsi, Hupei, Hunan, Kwantung and Fukien.

The Chinese Government has expressed doubts about the figures of Red Army strength. According to its estimate, Communist forces of 25,000 in 1937 were increased at the end of the war to 310,000.[28] Mr. Dallin also considers Mao Tse-tung's figure of 910,000 men as much exaggerated. Dallin thinks that the real strength of the Chinese Communist armies in 1945 probably amounted to from 300,000 to 350,000.[29]

That was a small army scattered over 19 provinces. And it was poorly armed and poorly supplied. After 1941 it had practically ceased to receive monetary subsidy or allotment of ammunition from the National Government. Soviet Russia tried to act properly during the years of the war: the military supplies under the Sino-Soviet barter arrangement were delivered to the Central Government. The amount of ammunition that could come through from Soviet territory to the Communist area in the northwest must have been very small.

American aid and arms for the Communists in China never materialized. Even President Roosevelt's attempt in 1944 to place General Joseph W. Stilwell in command, under Chiang Kai-shek, of all Chinese forces, "including the Communist forces," did not succeed. The President had said to Chiang Kai-shek: "When the enemy is pressing us toward possible disaster, it appears unsound to reject the aid of anyone who will kill Japanese." But Chiang Kai-shek was opposed to it. His position was supported by the American Ambassador, Patrick J. Hurley. So General Stilwell was recalled. The Chinese Red Army remained poorly armed and ill-equipped. It remained a guerrilla force of great mobility and skill, but as late as the last year of the war, it had not attained the stature of an established army that could face the Japanese enemy or the Government forces in open battles.

[28] "China Handbook: 1950." New York: Rockport Press, 1950, p. 262.
[29] Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

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Then came the sudden end of the Pacific war in August 1945. On August 9, Soviet Russia declared war on Japan. On the same day, the Soviet Army began to move into Manchuria. On August 14, Japan surrendered. Air landings of Soviet troops were made at Mukden, at Kirin, and at Changchun. Before the end of August, Soviet Russian troops were in complete control of Manchuria—of its railroads, of the great naval base of Port Arthur, of the great port of Dairen, and of all the other ports and cities.

On August 11, General Chu Teh, commander-in-chief of all Communist forces, issued an order to four Communist Army Groups to march on to the northeast into the provinces of Chahar, Jehol, Liaoning and Kirin.

Within two or three months large numbers of Chinese Communist troops were in control of many important sections of Manchuria. Many of these Communist soldiers came into Manchuria camouflaged as unarmed "civilians" and uniformed "Nationalists," who upon their arrival inside Manchuria, were quickly and fully armed and equipped from the huge military stocks left over by the surrendered Japanese Kwantung army.

With the invading Soviet armies there also came the Chinese Army that had been organized on Soviet soil out of different Chinese detachments which had left Manchuria in the 1930's. "A considerable number of Chinese Communists who had spent years in Russia came with them. This force . . . brought with it technical and administrative skill, discipline, and loyalty to Russia; it was to play a primary rôle in the future of Manchuria."[30]

The Soviet Army did not withdraw until the end of April 1946. During the nine months of occupation in Manchuria, every facility was given to the Chinese Communists, while serious obstacles were placed in the way of Nationalist troops that were being slowly transported into Manchuria with the logistical support of the United States Government.

In October 1945, Vice-Admiral Daniel E. Barbey's fleet was ordered to escort Chinese Government troops to Manchuria. But all the seaports on the Manchuria coast were closed to them. At Hulutao, Communists on shore fired upon a launch from Admiral Barbey's flagship. The American task force and transports turned away. On October 29, Marshal Malinovsky, the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet forces in Manchuria, agreed that Chinese Nationalist troops could land at the port of Yingkow, and that Soviet

[30] Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

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troops would leave the port by November 10. But on November 6, Admiral Barbey learned that the Russians had deliberately evacuated five days ahead of schedule and left the port in the hands of the Chinese Communists who threatened to open fire on the American convoy. Once more Admiral Barbey's flotilla turned away. The Chinese Government troops were eventually landed at the port of Chinwangtao, inside the Great Wall—from which point they commenced the long march overland into Manchuria, which the outside world considered already lost to world Communism.[31]

In June 1946, the Chinese Communist broadcast announced to the world that the People's Liberation Army now numbered 1,200,000, in its regular formations. In a speech broadcast on December 25, 1947, Mao Tse-tung said that "from 1937 to 1947, in 11 years, the Chinese Communist Party has developed a Party membership of 2,700,000 and a People's Liberation Army of 2,000,000 men." A Communist broadcast dated October 14, 1948, placed the Red Army's strength at 3,000,000. On August 1, 1949, it was 4,000,000. On August 1, 1950, it was 5,000,000.

In December 1947, Mao Tse-tung presented a report to the Central Committee of the Party under the title, "The Present Situation and Our Duties." In this lengthy report, he painted a glowing picture of the military successes of the Red Army:

> The Chinese People's Revolutionary War has now come to a turning point. The People's Liberation Army has smashed the offensive war of Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary armies, and has now started its own offensives. In the first year (July 1946–June 1947), our Armies defeated Chiang's offensive attacks on several fronts, and forced him to take a defensive position. In the first quarter of the second year (July–September 1947) our Armies have turned to offensive attacks on a nation-wide scale.

Out of Manchuria, Communist armies, newly equipped and reconditioned, were pouring into Shantung across the sea, and into North China by land. By September 1948 Shantung was lost. By November, Manchuria was lost. By early 1949, North China was lost. Through a most astute and wicked stroke of strategy, Stalin had taken Manchuria and made it the contiguous base for the new military strength of Chinese Communism, behind which lay the unlimited support of Soviet Russia, now the mightiest military Power in the whole world.

[31] George Moorad, "Lost Peace in China." New York: Dutton, 1949, p. 91–92. Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

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A conference of the Big Three had been held at Yalta in February 1945. The conference lasted seven days. At one of the very last sessions, Prime Minister Churchill was not present, and President Roosevelt, according to Harry Hopkins' record, "was tired and anxious to avoid further argument." At this meeting, Stalin proposed the conditions for Soviet Russia's entry into the Pacific war. The resulting agreement was kept secret from China until June 14 when Ambassador Hurley informed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking that on February 11, 1945, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, on behalf of their Governments, signed at Yalta a secret agreement. The following is the text:

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

(1) The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved.

(2) The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, *viz.*:

(a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union.

(b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in the port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored.

(c) The Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being understood that the preëminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria.

(3) The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

By these very loosely worded articles, the fate of Manchuria, and of China as a whole, and of Korea (although she is not mentioned here) and very possibly of the whole continent of Asia, was

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sealed and history was set back 40 years. Of the three signatories, apparently Stalin alone had remembered his history well. For on Japan's surrender, Stalin issued a proclamation in which he depicted his four-day war with Japan as Russia's revenge for her defeat in 1904–05 at the hands of Japan. "The defeat of Russian troops in 1904, . . ." said the proclamation, "left bitter memories in the minds of the people. It lay like a black spot on our country. Our people believed and hoped that a day would come when Japan would be smashed and that blot effaced. Forty years have we, the people of the old generation, waited for this day."[32]

That is the historical meaning of the principal clause in the secret agreement that "the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored." It was in this historical light of Russia's revenge that Stalin appealed for the support of Roosevelt. According to Hopkins' record, "Stalin said to Roosevelt that if his conditions were not met, it would be very difficult to explain to the Russian people why they must go to war against Japan. . . . However, Stalin said, if the required political conditions were met, then it would not be difficult for him to explain to the Supreme Soviet and the people just what was their stake in the Far Eastern war."[33]

The whole affair was a strategy of deceit. China was not a participant, but the President was to take measures in order to obtain China's concurrence. Even this undertaking by the President was not enough. Stalin insisted that this agreement must be put in writing and must contain the statement: "The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated."[34] That is to say, Soviet Russia must have these claims fulfilled even if China refuses to give the concurrence!

That Stalin was deliberately deceiving and blackmailing Roosevelt, I have not the slightest doubt. For years past, Stalin and Molotov had taken every occasion to impress on the American leaders that Soviet Russia had no interest in supporting Chinese Communists, because they were not Communists at all. The Soviet leaders had insisted that Chiang Kai-shek was a great man and deserved support, and that the United States must take a leading part in giving aid to China. Molotov in August 1944 even

[32] *Bolshevik*, No. 16, Moscow, August 1945, quoted in Isaac Deutscher, "Stalin, A Political Biography." New York: Oxford, 1949, p. 528.
[33] Robert E. Sherwood, "Roosevelt and Hopkins." New York: Harper, 1948, p. 867.
[34] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 867.

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told Ambassador Hurley and Mr. Donald Nelson the "inside" story about the Generalissimo's imprisonment at Sian in December 1936, and assured them that it was "the political and moral support of the Soviet Government" that saved Chiang's life and returned him to the seat of his government.[35]

Henry Wallace, Hurley and Hopkins had all told President Roosevelt of this friendly concern and political and moral support which Soviet Russia and Stalin had for Chiang Kai-shek. In the Department of State version of the Yalta Agreement on the Far East, there is a very revealing footnote which quotes Ambassador Harriman's comment on the clause relating to the "lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R." Mr. Harriman says: "I believe President Roosevelt looked upon the lease of Port Arthur for a naval base *as an arrangement similar to privileges which the United States has negotiated with other countries for the mutual security of two friendly nations.*"[36]

Mr. Harriman's comment brings my memory back to a September day in 1939, when I was calling on President Roosevelt in my official capacity as Chinese Ambassador. The war had broken out in Europe, and the President was worried. He said to me: "I have been thinking about mediating for a peace between China and Japan. The most difficult question, of course, is Manchuria. I have a new formula: I can settle this question of Manchuria on the same basis as the new agreement we have just signed with Britain regarding the joint interest and control over the two islands in the Pacific: the Canton and Enderbury Islands. Some such arrangement can be made with regard to Manchuria for the benefit and security of both China and Japan."

When I left him, I tried to find out more about these two coral islands. I subsequently found that Canton Island was nine miles long and 500 yards at the widest. Its population was 40. Enderbury Island was three miles long and one mile wide, and had a population of four persons! Manchuria, of course, has a population of 33,000,000, and an area of about 413,000 square miles.

I am sure that at Yalta in 1945 President Roosevelt had in mind his favorite case of the Canton and Enderbury Islands which were placed under a United States-British condominium for a period of 50 years by an agreement between the two Governments concluded on April 6, 1939.

[35] Department of State, *op. cit.*, p. 71–72.
[36] Department of State, *op. cit.*, p. 114. Italics inserted.

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History will not forgive the man who played such deliberate tricks on the generous idealism of a great humanitarian.

VI

Such, in brief, is the story of the unfolding of Stalin's strategy of conquest in China. The heart of this strategy has been the creation, preservation and nurturing to full strength of the Chinese Red Army. It has taken nearly a quarter of a century for the Red Army to achieve sufficient power for the conquest of continental China. This Red Army was many times defeated, broken up and nearly annihilated by Chiang Kai-shek's armies; and Stalin and world Communism might never have succeeded in China if the greatest war in human history had not intervened.

Stalin himself has summed up the China situation in one sentence: "The special characteristic of the Chinese revolution lies in the fact that it is an armed people fighting an armed counter-revolution."[37] In plain language, this formulation meant that the Communist conquest of China by armed force had up to then been successfully resisted by the armed force of Nationalist China. Because of this successful resistance by the Government, the whole Chinese Communist movement came to be conceived by Mao Tse-tung and his fellow militarists as essentially an armed struggle for power. "In China," said Mao in a 1939 speech, "there is no place for the proletariat without armed struggle; there is no place for the people without armed struggle; there is no place for the Communist Party without armed struggle; and there is no victory of the revolution without armed struggle."

The pattern of conquest is therefore the same in China as in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. It is the pattern of conquest by force and violence projected from the contiguous Russian base. What seems to differentiate China from the seemingly much easier conquests in Central and Eastern Europe has been the much greater complexity and difficulty of the conquest, which made it necessary for Stalin to resort to the most cunning forms of secret diplomacy in order to overcome the resistance that Nationalist China had been able to summon for over two decades.

[37] Quoted with enthusiastic approval by Mao Tse-tung in his article, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," November 1939, p. 19.

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CLAUSEWITZ AND SOVIET STRATEGY

By Byron Dexter

THERE is in train today a development without parallel in history—a war which has as its frank objective the overthrow of all the parliamentary governments of the world and their replacement by Communist dictatorships centrally controlled in Moscow. The distinguishing characteristic of the campaign is the interchangeability of political and military weapons. A "peace offensive" in Moscow, a cultural conference in Warsaw, a strike in France, an armed insurrection in Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Greece and Korea by fully equipped troops—all are instruments of one war, turned on and turned off from a central tap as a gardener plays a hose up and down a piece of land on which he is nurturing a crop, watering some plants lightly, some heavily.

The theory of a "unified" war directed by a supreme central intelligence, in which political and military instruments are used indifferently to suit a particular object in the pursuit of a gigantic plan, was first and most comprehensively advanced by the German general, Carl von Clausewitz in his book, "On War," in the early nineteenth century. It is not surprising that in an effort to understand the current Soviet campaign and to find a means of thwarting it, Americans have turned to Clausewitz for such illumination as he may offer, and that references to his aphorisms on the relation of war and politics are everywhere heard.

The concept that underlies the whole of Clausewitz' discussion of the nature of war is, quite simply, that "war is an act of social life"—that is to say, that it is not an act performed by military men only, but is an expression of the conflict of ideas, objectives and way of life of an entire society with those of some other society. Conflict by high explosives is thus merely one aspect of a war, and is resorted to when and if it helps achieve some particular objective which cannot be achieved in any other way.

Clausewitz elaborated this idea at length, and expressed it in various ways. In his best known passage he put it thus: "We see, therefore, in the first place, that under all circumstances War is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history. This

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is the only means of unlocking the great book and making it intelligible. Secondly, this view shows us how Wars must differ in character according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed."

From this Clausewitz reasoned that, generally speaking, there are two kinds of wars—those in which the object is the overthrow of the enemy, and those in which the object is merely to make some conquests on the frontier of his country or to win booty of some kind and gain advantages in negotiations.

Obviously, this is a point of view, not a set of answers to concrete political and military questions, and there is room for much misunderstanding in these generalizations. "On War" is unfinished, an elaborate treatise on strategy and tactics written before the day of railroads or even of the rifled gun barrel, and largely out of date in its strictly military aspects. Though the work is full of sharp insight into the nature of war, expressed in many striking phrases, long stretches of the eight books which comprise it are dull reading today. It has never been published in full in the United States.[1] The upshot is that Clausewitz' ideas tend to be discussed in terms of famous quotations, all too often with little regard for the meaning he intended to convey. Thus one historian recently cited Clausewitz to prove that final decisions in war must be made on military grounds, though Clausewitz wrote the eight books of "On War" in order to prove the opposite. And, in what is surely one of the most remarkable feats of interpretation on record, Ellsworth L. Raymond quoted a passage from the work of the Soviet strategist Marshal Shaposhnikov, author of the book, "The Brain of the Army," which has exerted much influence upon the rulers of Russia, in order to show that "a revolutionary change" in military philosophy had turned the Soviet Union away from Clausewitz. The quoted passage was in fact a tissue of phrases from Clausewitz, including his premise that war is an act of social life. Rear Admiral Zacharias apparently took over Mr. Raymond's interpretation in his book, "Behind Closed Doors." The costly popular assumption that Soviet doctrine had separated "political" from "military" instruments of war and was depending solely on the political was a result of failure to estimate correctly Clausewitz' place in Soviet strategy.

[1] An excellent abridged edition was published in the Modern Library in 1943, now out of print. The work was first published in English in a translation by Colonel J. J. Graham in 1873, (London: Kegan Paul). Quotations in this paper are from the 1940 edition.

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Furthermore, since Clausewitz makes no attempt to distinguish between "right" and "wrong" in his study of war, his amoral tone, with its connotations of aggressive militarism, has understandably enough caused a great many people to dismiss his ideas out of hand, as the very embodiment of evil in modern times. And for the group of writers represented by the British military critic, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, Clausewitz has come to typify the major obstacle to a program of "limiting" and humanizing war—a question which bears very importantly on aspects of United States policy.

Before attempting to pass judgment on Clausewitz, then, let us try to understand as clearly as possible what it was he really said, or intended to say; but let us also try to get our minds around it as it might seem from the angle of the Kremlin—that is to say, as it would seem today to a group of implacable men prosecuting a world-wide insurrection.

II

To say that Clausewitz' body of ideas provides the best description there is of the Soviet Russian method of making war is not to imply that the Soviet leaders adopted this objective, and developed the instrument of "unified" war for achieving it, because they had at some time read the book written by this German Major General. Nonetheless, we do know that the Russian Marxists have studied Clausewitz with care, and have appropriated his ideas, and even his actual words, very freely. Engels, Karl Marx's great collaborator—called "the general" by his associates—was a devoted student of Clausewitz. Lenin seems to have come upon Clausewitz' work about the time the First World War was beginning, and the notebook which he kept is evidence of the zest with which he devoured it. Long excerpts, stabbed with marginal notations and interlineations, are included alongside the extracts from Marx and Engels. The Soviet Government published Lenin's notebook on Clausewitz in 1933. It is interesting to see that though Lenin paid little or no attention to the military detail—the chapters on "Camps," "Marches," "Cantonments," etc., he paused at and copied the passages dealing with the need of boldness in war. Of the axiom about war as a continuation of policy he said: "The Marxists have always considered this axiom as the theoretical foundation for the meaning of every war."

But the most interesting and recent evidence of the significance

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which the Soviet strategists attach to Clausewitz today is the letter which Stalin wrote to the Soviet military historian, Colonel Razin, in 1946, in order to define the Communist line toward Clausewitz with unimpeachable authority. The letter was published in February 1947 in the magazine *Bolshevik*. Because of Stalin's peculiar talent for making plain things seem contradictory and confusing, while at the same time bringing to bear upon them a good deal of horse sense, it must be read in some detail to be understood:

Respected Comrade Razin!

I have received your letter of January 30th on Clausewitz and your brief theses on war and military art.

1. You are inquiring whether Lenin's propositions evaluating Clausewitz are obsolete?

In my opinion, the question is incorrectly formulated.

Under such a formulation of the question it is possible to think that Lenin analyzed Clausewitz' military doctrine and military works, gave them a military appraisal and left us a heritage of a set of guiding propositions on military problems, which we have to accept. Such a formulation of the question is incorrect for, in fact, there do not exist any such "propositions" by Lenin on Clausewitz' military doctrine and his works.

In distinction to Engels, Lenin did not consider himself an expert in military matters. . . . During the civil war, Lenin had obliged us, then young comrades in the Central Committee, "to thoroughly master the knowledge of military art." As for himself, he frankly declared to us that it was too late for him to study military art. In this lies the proper explanation of the fact that in his references to Clausewitz and remarks on Clausewitz' books, Lenin did not touch upon the strictly military problems, such as the problem of military strategy and tactics, and of the inter-relationship between advance and retreat, defense and counteroffensive, etc., etc.

What did interest Lenin in Clausewitz, then, and what did he praise him for?

He praised Clausewitz first of all, because, as a non-Marxist, Clausewitz, who enjoyed the reputation of an expert on military art in his time, had confirmed in his works the familiar Marxist thesis that there is a direct connection between war and politics, that politics gives birth to war, that war is the continuation of politics by violent means. The reference to Clausewitz was necessary for Lenin in this connection in order once more to convict Plekhanov, Kautsky and others of social-chauvinism, of social-imperialism.

Further, he praised Clausewitz for confirming in his works the thesis, which is correct from the Marxist viewpoint, that under certain unfavorable circumstances the retreat is as appropriate a form of strife as the advance. Lenin needed the reference to Clausewitz here in order once more to refute the "left" Communists, who did not recognize retreat as a legitimate form of struggle.

Consequently, Lenin approached Clausewitz' works not as a military man, but as a politician, and was interested in those problems in Clausewitz' works which demonstrated the connection between war and politics.

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Thus, in the question of criticism of Clausewitz' military doctrine, we, Lenin's heirs, are not bound by instructions from Lenin limiting our freedom of criticism. . . .

2. Should we criticize Clausewitz' military doctrine in accordance with its substance? Yes, we should. From the viewpoint of our interests and of those of military science of our time, we are obliged to criticize not only Clausewitz, but also Moltke, Schlieffen, Ludendorff, Keitel and other bearers of military ideology in Germany. . . .

What must be noted in particular about Clausewitz is that he is, of course, obsolete as a military authority. Strictly speaking, Clausewitz was the representative of the hand-tool period of warfare. But we are now in the *machine* age of warfare. The machine age undoubtedly demands new military ideologists. It is ridiculous to take lessons from Clausewitz now. . . .

In our criticism we must be guided not by separate propositions and utterances of the classics, but by the famous instruction which Lenin gave us in his time:

"We do not regard Marx's theory as something completed and untouchable; we are convinced, on the contrary, that it has merely laid the cornerstone of that science, which Socialists *must* move further in all directions, unless they want to be left behind by life. . . ."

This approach is even more obligatory for us with respect to the military authorities.

3. Because of the schematic character of your brief theses on war and military art, I am able to offer only some general remarks. The theses contain too much philosophy and too many abstract propositions. Clausewitz' terminology for the grammar and logic of war grates on the ear. The problem of the party aspects of military science is put too primitively. Dithyrambs in Stalin's honor grate on the ear—it is simply awkward to read them. Consideration of the *counteroffensive* (not to be confused with the counterattack) is absent. I am speaking of the counteroffensive after a successful enemy advance which, however, failed to yield decisive results, during which the party on the defensive collects forces, launches a counteradvance and inflicts upon the antagonist a decisive defeat. I think that a well-organized counteroffensive is one of the most interesting forms of offensive. As an historian, you should take an interest in this. . . .

J. Stalin

February 23, 1946.

Obviously there is a good deal of counterpoint in this composition, but the major theme is sounded at the beginning. Stalin carefully reformulates the question that has been put to him—whether Lenin's propositions evaluating Clausewitz are obsolete—in order to distinguish between Clausewitz' "strictly military" doctrines and his view of the relation of war and policy. The latter is thus saved from attack. Though Stalin probably underestimates Lenin's knowledge of military problems, he is

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quite right in saying that, as we have noted, Lenin paid no attention to the chapters of "On War" dealing with strictly military matters. Stalin's references to the " 'left' Communists who did not recognize retreat as a legitimate form of struggle" is, apparently, a shot at Trotsky, and an unjust one; and Stalin's blunderbuss attack on German military science, which brings down Moltke, Schlieffen, Ludendorff and Keitel in one bag, is also rather unreal. (Schlieffen is distinguished among these generals precisely for his disregard of Clausewitz' doctrine; and Keitel's relationship with Hitler is still another story.) But we need not follow those involutions of Stalin's thought. It is plain that Stalin has chosen to emphasize three things about von Clausewitz: 1, that his strictly military precepts are out of date; 2, that his theory of the relation of war and policy is relevant and important; and 3, that his views on the counteroffensive are worth special attention. No better estimate of the timeliness of "On War" could be made. Let us, therefore, examine these particular aspects of Clausewitz' work which Stalin recommends to our attention.

III

To see Clausewitz as he was, it is necessary to see him against the background of his own time. Despite the associations that cluster about his name, he is not an unattractive figure. Carl von Clausewitz was of Polish descent, from a family in East Silesia. His father was a doctor, and an officer in the army of Frederick the Great. His patent of nobility, by which he was enabled to hold a commission in the Prussian Army, was of doubtful validity; Clausewitz never felt that he was one of the Prussian Junkers, nor did they. His portrait, drawn in his thirties apparently, shows a man with a sensitive, open face and a mass of curly hair—with features rather resembling the poet Shelley. He is far from being Shelley—but he is also quite unlike the conventional figure of the bullet-headed German general.

He was born in 1780, and entered the Prussian Army as a cadet at the age of 12. He fought in the wars of the monarchical coalition against France, and then the Napoleonic Wars, and was wounded and captured. His quickness and intelligence caught the attention of General Scharnhorst, and after 1807 he was closely associated with Scharnhorst and Field Marshal Gneisenau in the effort of reform of the Prussian Army which followed the cataclysmic de-

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feat of Prussia at Napoleon's hands on the battlefield of Jena.

Gneisenau and Scharnhorst (neither of them Prussians, incidentally) were men of vision, and they perceived that a revitalized Prussian army could be created only on the basis of a revitalized nation. With the collaboration of the statesman, Baron Stein, they sought to bring the Prussian peasant out of his feudal condition and to introduce some degree of self-government in the Prussian state. They succeeded partially, but their effort at reform was overtaken by the reaction which followed the downfall of Napoleon. General von Clausewitz, their protégé, fell under the suspicion and, in fact, the open enmity which the Prussian nobility entertained for these reformers. When he was appointed director of the Prussian War School in Berlin in 1818, through the interposition of Gneisenau, the hostility of the nobility was too strong to permit him to carry out the changes in curriculum which he envisaged. He was not permitted even to lecture. Like not a few famous writers, he took to the pen because all other activity was closed to him. It was at this period that he wrote "On War." He died suddenly, of cholera, in 1831 and the book, much of which he considered only an outline of the volume he intended to write, was prepared for publication by his wife.

"On War" is a work of genius. The wonder is not that it has infusions of dialectic, but that, considering the scope of the subject which it undertakes to treat, it is so unpedantic and sensible. Some of the detail that seems wearisome today was, indeed, inserted reluctantly by von Clausewitz in order to dispose of the intricate ratiocinations of the eighteenth century military writers, who had reduced warfare to a geometrical science—so they thought—and developed a marvellous jargon for elucidating its mysteries. (In pursuit of the concept of the "key position" of Europe, for example, supposedly the highest source of its waters, one strategist had found himself ensconced triumphantly on the tallest peak of the Swiss Alps with his troops—fortunately creatures of paper and ink only. "In general," said Clausewitz dryly, "the best key to the country lies in the enemy's Army.") And he apologized for the unspectacular nature of his own demonstration: "The reader expects to hear of angles and lines, and finds instead of these citizens of the scientific world, only people out of common life, such as he meets with every day in the streets."

That is the measure of the originality of his book. "On War" deals with human beings. It is the first study of modern war in

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which the factor which we know by the term "morale" is held to be almost everywhere decisive.

Clausewitz addresses himself to those who are, or who intend to be, the commanders; and he will permit them to set for themselves nothing but the highest standards. He is dealing with war, and he does not paint a pleasant picture. "It is the whole feeling of the dissolution of all physical and moral power, it is the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice which the Commander has to contend with in himself, and then in all others who directly or indirectly transfer to him their impressions, feelings, anxieties and desires," he says. But what makes this self-command possible, he continues, is, simply—intelligence: "This counterpoise [to the "excited passions"] is nothing but a sense of the dignity of man, that noblest pride, that deeply-seated desire of the soul always to act as a being endowed with understanding and reason." This is not rhetoric; Clausewitz develops the theme with insight into the strengths and weaknesses of men. "Men who have little intelligence can never be resolute," he repeats. "There is nothing more common than to hear of men losing their energy on being raised to a higher position, to which they do not feel themselves equal; but we must also remind ourselves that we are speaking of preëminent services." He was looking for greatness.

It is for this reason that he emphasizes the importance of theory. He puts it thus: "In real action, most men are guided merely by the tact of judgment which hits the object more or less accurately, according as they possess more or less genius. This is the way in which all great Generals have acted, and therein partly lay their greatness and their genius, that they always hit upon what was right by this tact. Thus also it will always be in action, and so far this tact is amply sufficient. But when it is a question, not of acting oneself, but of convincing others in a consultation, then all depends on clear conceptions and demonstrations of inherent relations." In short, if you want other men to take over your ideas, you have to have an intelligible theory.

Many misunderstandings of Clausewitz stem from a failure to note the method by which he develops his argument. His procedure is, first, to trace the lines of the "absolute"—by which he means the abstract—concept of whatever aspect of strategy he is considering; then to show how, in practice, things are likely to be different from this abstract picture of them; and then to return to the theoretical perfection to see what lessons it offers for im-

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proving practice. Thus *in theory,* says Clausewitz in Book VIII —"Plan of War," which is the heart of his doctrine—war is an unceasing act of "utmost violence," which starts in full fury, rages without pause in a series of increasingly desperate combats, until it comes to the climax, which is the annihilation of the enemy. But, *in fact,* once the "probabilities of real life" take the place of abstractions, the act of war is different. There is in actual warfare little direct movement to the goal, and there is usually a vast confusion of purposes. "The normal act of war is doing nothing;" and, moreover, there are wars of all degree of importance and energy, from "wars of extermination" down to the use of an army merely for intimidation.

Obviously, something intervenes to alter the "absolute" picture of war. Clausewitz points out that in practice two factors thus intervene. On the battlefield there is "friction"—the word he gives to rain, snow, mud, fatigue, timidity, false reports—everything that goes wrong. But, more importantly, there is politics. Clausewitz never uses the term "politics" in the sense in which it is common in Anglo-Saxon countries, with the invidious connotations of patronage, pull, "ward politics." The political element for him is the purposive element—human reason as contrasted with blind, brute rage. Politics thus is responsible for the cross purposes, the clash of plans, the inefficiency, the uncertainty of aim. It is likewise responsible for whatever intelligence there is in war.

Clausewitz points out that except among complete savages, war can never be an act of utter senselessness. The object of war remains combat: "the bloody solution of the crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's force, is the firstborn son of War." But it is also true that: "If we speak of the destruction of the enemy's armed force, we must expressly point out that nothing obliges us to confine this idea to the mere physical force; on the contrary, the moral is necessarily implied as well, because both in fact are interwoven with each other, even in the most minute details, and cannot be separated." In short, the distinguishing characteristic of a "perfect" war would be that both political and military means were used harmoniously for the accomplishment of one, great, clear plan. In order that they may be so used, the political must predominate. Policy uses war. That is Clausewitz' principal contention. He concludes thus:

> If War belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from thence.

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If policy is great and powerful so also will be the War, and this may be carried to the point at which War attains to its absolute form.

It is only through this kind of view that War recovers unity; only by it can we see all Wars as things of one kind and only thus can we attain the true and perfect basis and point of view from which great plans may be traced out and determined upon.

There is upon the whole nothing more important in life than to find out the right point of view from which things should be looked at and judged of and then to keep to that point, for we can only apprehend the mass of events in the unity from *one* standpoint, and it is only the keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency.

These are passages copied and underscored by Lenin, to whose mind they were congenial.

Lenin underscored, too, the passage in which Clausewitz summed up his argument: "War is to be regarded as an organic whole, from which the single branches are not to be separated and in which therefore every individual activity flows into the whole." Or, as we might say—hot or cold, it is still one war.

IV

What shall we say of this doctrine? How shall we criticize it?

It is apparent that the search for the perfect war is a dangerous ideal. Clausewitz was not seeking to glorify war, and long before Tolstoy or Shaw had debunked war he derided the popular notion that the symbol of the battlefield is a hussar at full gallop brandishing a sword over his head. "Usually before we have learnt what danger really is, we form an idea of it which is rather attractive than repulsive," he remarked caustically. But for all his good sense, he was, at the end, carried away by the enchantment of his own investigation—the possibility of finding the man who could make war in fact as perfect an instrument for the realization of state purposes as it can be shown to be in theory. Book VIII—"Plan of War"—is the clearest directive ever written for the waging of aggressive war. It is not surprising that, for Clausewitz, only one man had succeeded in laying hands on this shining instrument—Napoleon, "the very god of war," as he called him. Nor is it surprising that in the nineteenth century Clausewitz' greatest disciple became Bismarck, and in the twentieth, the leaders of the three Great Power dictatorships which have destroyed the peace of the world—the Imperial Japanese, the Nazi German and the Communist Russian. What is perhaps astonishing is the candor with which the Soviet weekly journal *New Times* for De-

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cember 21, 1949, celebrating the 70th birthday of Marshal Stalin with an article "Stalin's Military Genius," by Major General F. Isayev, uses as the yardstick for measuring Stalin's military achievements the very criteria which Clausewitz in "Plan of War" employed to exalt the genius of Napoleon.

General Isayev's remarkable encomium repays examination in more detail; but first, let us note that the distinction between the two kinds of war, on which Clausewitz laid so much emphasis—"absolute" war which seeks the overthrow of the enemy, and "limited" war, which seeks to use an army to win booty or concessions of some kind—has tended to disappear in our time. But it has done so precisely because, as Clausewitz insists, war *is* an act of social life—and because, as a result of the technological developments of the past 50 years or so, society has now come to be world-wide. Clausewitz never foresaw the industrialization of society, or guessed the degree of bitterness and horror with which this would endow the act of war. There are, indeed, "small" wars even now which do not become world-wide, as we have seen and no doubt always shall see; but no one dares draw an easy breath until they have been terminated. Unpalatable though the idea may be, Clausewitz' premise remains irrefutable. For 1950 even more plainly than for 1812, the recognition that war is a social act is the key that unlocks the great book and makes it intelligible. The scope of the political objective is the measure of the scope of a war. "If policy is great and powerful, so also will be the War."

In the shadow of the Soviet world insurrection, some who are very sincere, and some who are not, suggest that the nations of the world can at least mitigate these dangers by an agreement to return to "limited" warfare, following the precedents of the eighteenth century. No one will deny that of all the wars in history, the "languid and parsimonious" wars of the eighteenth century are the least repellent. But the problem for democratic nations is not merely how to obtain from the Politburo an agreement that will be kept; the problem of reverting to an eighteenth century kind of war is the problem of reverting to an eighteenth century kind of society.

We may note in this connection that Clausewitz' patron, Field Marshal Gneisenau, served as a young officer with the German mercenaries in the American War for Independence, and was deeply impressed by the contrast between the "open order" combat of the Americans and the "line" of the German and British

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troops. The seed of Clausewitz' concept of war as a social act lies in the contrast. The Americans fought from behind trees and stone walls, not because they held a particular political theory, but because that was the most effective tactic for untrained soldiers and skilled marksmen in such country; but the use of such tactics nonetheless was a direct expression of their own social order. They were able to adopt them because they were fighting of their own volition, for their own farms and their own country—in their eyes one and the same thing. The Hessians could not adopt such tactics for the simple reason that if the soldiers were once permitted to disperse they would never come together again.

At this time, European armies were still organized on the principles of Frederick the Great, whose armies were composed of mercenaries, serfs or vagabonds. Frederick was capable of inspiring devotion and great feats of endurance from his men, yet the primary fact of the army organization was that the soldiers would instantly desert if they got the chance; forage parties could never be allowed, for example, and night encampments were never made near a wood. Discipline was ruthless and terrible (Frederick's officers were instructed to make the troops fear the "corporal's cane" more than the guns of the enemy) and when these troops lined up, elbow to elbow, for volley firing, an officer or non-commissioned officer stood one pace behind them, instructed to plunge his sword or bayonet into the back of any man who stepped from line. Eighteenth century war "by code" was an expression of an hierarchial, pastoral society, plus an exact but momentary balance of power in Europe which prevented any one nation from pushing its conquests beyond a certain point. To talk of limiting war in this way in 1950 is to play with abstractions. The concept of limited war has meaning only for the aggressor, who of course would prefer to destroy his victims one by one. The present threat to civilization does not lie in the nature of the atom, but in the nature of Communist policy.

In a passage of Book VI, "Strategic Defense," Clausewitz discussed the paradoxical fact that fighting between armies does not begin until the country which is attacked resists the invader. He wrote acidly: "A conqueror is always a lover of peace (as Bonaparte always asserted of himself); he would like to make his entry into our state unopposed." Lenin had copied this in his notebook, and beside it put the delighted notation: "Ah! Ah! Witty!" It is

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significant to note that in his interview with H. G. Wells in 1934, Stalin remarked that "Communists do not in the least idealize methods of violence. . . . They would be very pleased to drop violent methods if the ruling class agreed to give way to the working class." Like many another humorist, Marshal Stalin was borrowing his joke. Clausewitz, however, was less cynical than the instigator of the Korean invasion and the Stockholm "peace petition." Is it not precisely because of this final irony by which, under the law of the jungle, the victim will be punished for resisting, that civilized society has no choice but to insist that the use of aggressive war as an instrument of policy is a crime?

V

The second aspect of Clausewitz' thought that Marshal Stalin recommended to our attention is his study of the counteroffensive. In the concrete illustrations for the argument of "On War," Clausewitz ranges widely, but his major sources of examples are two—the wars of Frederick the Great and the wars of Napoleon; and of them all, the Russian campaign of 1812 (in which Clausewitz fought as one of the "free German" corps on the Russian side) is the most often and most importantly cited. "On War" is the great, doctrinal expression of that triumph of Russian arms.

Marshal Stalin is not unaware that his own strategy in the defense of Russia against German attack, at Moscow and at Stalingrad, has already become a classic instance of the validity of Clausewitz' principles of the counteroffensive—in brief, to trade space for time, to raise new armies, to enlist the people against the invader in guerrilla warfare, to recognize the culminating point of the enemy's advance, and then to advance against him. Clausewitz thought of the defensive not as a passive method of resisting the enemy but as an active strategy for destroying him, and so the Soviet command employed it.

In Major General Isayev's article on the occasion of Stalin's 70th birthday last December, Clausewitz' name nowhere appears; nor does Shaposhnikov's. The Russian leaders are not in a mood for passing credit around (one reason, among others, for Stalin's circumlocutions in the letter to Colonel Razin). But we may note that in the chapter of Book VIII which he called "Interdependence of the Parts in War," Clausewitz spelled out his prescription for the waging of an "absolute" war (*i.e.*, one that is theoretically perfect) in the following particulars:

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1. At the commencement of every war its character and main outline shall be defined according to what the political conditions and relations lead us to anticipate as probable.

2. The whole series of combats must follow one another in rapid and mounting succession.

3. The Commander should have clearly in view "the object to which every line must converge."

4. The Commander must possess the art of selecting from among an infinite multitude of objects and relations the "center of gravity" of the enemy's strength, *i.e.,* whether it be the enemy's army, his capital, "the unity of interests" (as in a confederacy), public opinion (in an insurrection), etc. The genius of the Commander lies in his ability to locate this center of gravity and direct his blows against it.

5. "If the enemy loses his balance, no time must be allowed for him to recover it. There must be a continued and irresistible following up of victory."

For Clausewitz, only Napoleon possessed the genius for carrying on war in this way: "We might doubt whether our notion of its [*i.e.,* war's] absolute character or nature was founded in reality, if we had not seen real warfare make its appearance in this absolute completeness just in our own times," he says. "After a short introduction performed by the French Revolution, the impetuous Bonaparte quickly brought it to this point. Under him it was carried on without slackening for a moment until the enemy was prostrated, and the counter stroke followed almost with as little remission."

In his article, "Stalin's Military Genius," General Isayev takes as his premise the interdependence of political and military (in accordance, of course, with Marxist dialectics no less than with Clausewitz): "Unity of political and military strategy is one of the most characteristic features of J. V. Stalin, both as a great statesman and a great leader of armies. In Comrade Stalin alone does modern history see for the first time a great leader who combines the genius of a statesman and military leader of the new type." More concretely, in his view, Stalin's leadership is marked by the following characteristics:

1. His farsightedness and breadth of vision in planning the war as a whole. ("How far into the future peered the eagle gaze of our great leader.")

2. His ability to deal the enemy blows of "*mounting force.*"

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3. His elaboration of a "new type of strategy, which supplanted the old and obsolete linear strategy."

4. The use of surprise against the enemy.

5. The use of the method of active defense in depth, while at the same time mobilizing the main forces, thus enabling Russian armies to pass to the counteroffensive.

6. Above all, the ability to choose the right direction for the main blow. "The unsurpassed faculty displayed by Comrade Stalin both in the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War of properly selecting the direction for the main strategic blow is the basic characteristic of the Stalin school of military leadership."

Whether General Isayev had actually looked up Clausewitz' "Plan of War," in his desire to place Comrade Stalin's military accomplishments in as magnificent a frame as possible, and deliberately modeled his composition upon it, or whether he drew on Shaposhnikov or on some other Soviet writer who had borrowed from Clausewitz, we need not try to guess. The evidence of Soviet enchantment with the Napoleonic lineaments in the 33rd year of the Bolshevik Revolution is all the more revealing if unwittingly offered.

It seems evident that Soviet strategic thought has hardened into a pattern. In the official view, the Soviet Union is the one nation in the world, led by the unique military genius of modern times, which has succeeded in turning what it professes to believe is an invasion-proof defensive position into an irresistible weapon of attack. It alone possesses a strategy of a new type, in which the entire economic, moral and military potential of the nation is enlisted for the attainment of a clear and overriding goal. "The Anglo-American warmongers are plotting a new world war with the aim of establishing their supremacy over the whole world," concludes General Isayev. "But their strategy is as defective as was the strategy of the German-Fascist invaders. The time has long passed when the leaders of the bourgeois armies could contribute anything new and progressive in the sphere of strategy. They cannot, because their aims in war run counter to the development of human society."

If there is no hope of persuading the rulers of the Soviet Union to change their minds, then at least there is stimulus for our own thinking in knowing the outline of the early nineteenth century doctrine which governs their strategy.

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INDO-CHINA AND KOREA: ONE FRONT

By Jacques Soustelle

THE glow from the Korean battlefields lights up the whole Asiatic front from Manchuria to Malaya. On certain sections of this front calm reigns—in appearance at least. On others, for example in the Philippines and in Burma, guerrilla warfare is endemic between the native governments and rebel forces. Finally, along two portions of this immense arc, the cold or tepid war has given place to, simply, war. There two Western Powers have engaged their armies. The United States has been fighting in Korea since June 26, 1950, and France has been fighting in Indo-China since December 19, 1946.

The two conflicts differ from each other in many ways. However, each clearly has a place in the same strategic and political complex. They share a basic common factor. Each results from the expansion of Soviet power toward the sea, pushing its satellites ahead, and exploiting against the West the nationalism, even xenophobia, of the Asiatic masses. There is another common factor also. The Government of President Syngman Rhee can no more withstand the assault without external aid than can the Government of Emperor Bao Dai.

It is not by chance that France was the first to have to resort to force in Asia. The United States emerged from the Second World War with formidable military strength and unprecedented prestige. Great Britain, even after such terrible reverses as the fall of Singapore, nevertheless had appreciable forces in the Far East at the time the Japanese Empire collapsed. France, however, had barely regained possession of her own country and was absent from Asia in 1945. Today we know that at Yalta Stalin made strenuous efforts to bring President Roosevelt to eliminate France from the concert of the Big Five. General de Gaulle, then head of the French Government, asked America for ships in order to transport French troops for the occupation of Indo-China after the Japanese surrender, but he was unable to get them. Thus a vacuum was created in Southeast Asia which, it became evident, was favorable to Russia's long-term plans. When the Japanese capitulated there were no French forces in the Far Eastern theatre. The task of disarming the Japanese was turned over to the

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British in the southern part of Indo-China and to the Chinese in the north.

After the fall of France the French administration in Indo-China had remained on the side of the Vichy Government, and with more or less difficulty had endured the Japanese occupation for four years. However, French and Eurasian[1] patriots had formed secret anti-Japanese organizations—for instance the "Bocquet" network—which were in radio communication, via Calcutta and Kunming, with the Provisional Government of General de Gaulle. Free French "missionaries" were parachuted clandestinely into Indo-China, among them the Governor of Langlade. At the beginning of 1945 a large number of French military and administrative cadres rallied to the government of liberation set up in Paris. Unfortunately the Japanese suspected this clandestine activity and decided to crush it at its very inception. This was the origin of the *coup de force* of March 9, 1945. The French were all arrested by the *Kempeitai,* some were tortured and massacred, others thrown into concentration camps. Thus it came about that when the Japanese themselves were forced to acknowledge their defeat, there were no more French cadres, no organized French force, either in Asia (near Indo-China) or in the interior of Indo-China itself.

This combination of circumstances accounts for the importance suddenly assumed by the Viet-Minh. Under this name, and under the leadership of an Annamite chieftain named Ho Chi Minh, a political movement of Communist inspiration, strong especially in Tonkin, in the north, had been set up during the Japanese occupation. Its attitude toward the Japanese was wavering. Indeed, not one act of resistance on the part of the Viet-Minh during the occupation can be cited. However, it succeeded in forming contact with certain American services then in China and obtained arms from them. The Viet-Minh also received arms, and in large quantity, from the Japanese when the latter realized that they had lost. Many Japanese officers and non-commissioned officers joined the Viet-Minh armed forces after the imperial proclamation of capitulation.

In the southern part of the peninsula the French quickly succeeded in assembling certain civil and military elements and were able after not too long a time to take the place of the British

[1] The Eurasians, a mixture of French and Annamites, number about 150,000. Practically all of them have adopted French nationality.

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forces. In the north the Chinese troops of General Lu Han were less occupied with administration than with extensive profiteering. At this point the Viet-Minh made its appearance, proclaimed the "Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam"[2] and set about intrench-



The territory of Indo-China is now divided into three states associated with the French Union—Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam. The last-named comprises Tonkin, Annam and Cochin China.

ing itself and digging in at Tonkin before the French should return. This operation was effected in the chaotic situation produced by the disappearance of all the French cadres, the collapse of the Japanese and the presence of the Chinese. Hundreds of thousands of peasants perished by drowning or through starva-

[2] "Viet-Minh" is an abbreviation of the Annamite expression meaning "League for the Independence of Viet-Nam."

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tion when the abandoned Tonkinese dikes gave way to the flood that ravaged the overpopulated delta.

Further, the government of Ho Chi Minh was scarcely installed at Hanoï when, launching a policy of armed expansion at the expense of the non-Annamites (the Thais) of the peninsula, it invaded Laos and forced its king to flee the capital, Luang-Prabang. The nationalist reaction of the mountain-dwelling Laos took the form of guerrilla warfare against the Viet-Minh. As a result of this policy of aggression the Thais of Laos and Cambodia turned towards their former protector. They concluded treaties with France according to which the two states "associated themselves" with France within the French Union.

Such was the situation at the end of 1945. In the south, Cochin China had again become French territory. In the north, Tonkin and Annam had fallen under the domination of the Viet-Minh during the period of the Chinese occupation. In the west, Laos and Cambodia were proceeding toward the status of associated states.

Before continuing further, we must give a brief résumé of France's rôle in Indo-China for the preceding 80 years, and show what kind of policy the French Government of 1945 intended to follow. Too often there is a tendency to believe that France had done little or nothing for Indo-China and the Indo-Chinese. In fact, the economic development of Indo-China had made great progress since the beginning of the century. A few figures will give an idea of this development. There were constructed 3,053 kilometers of railroads, 3,000 kilometers of canals, 32,000 kilometers of roads and 16,000 kilometers of telephone lines. Rice production in Cochin China went from 300,000 tons in 1865 to 3,180,000 tons in 1945. The figure for the whole of Indo-China was 7,000,000 tons. (Indo-China is one of the rice granaries of the Far East; she exported 480,000 tons a year in 1885, 1,570,000 tons in 1935.) Rubber went from 200 tons in 1911 to 76,000 tons in 1941; coal, from 250,000 tons in 1900 to 2,500,000 million tons in 1940. Production of electricity rose to 80,000,000 kwh. in 1941. Traffic in the port of Saïgon went from a million tons in 1900 to 2,854,000 tons in 1939; that of Hai Phong, from 250,000 tons to 1,679,000. And private capital investment in Indo-China rose from 40,000,000 piasters in 1935 to 286,000,000 in 1940.

The real problem is to determine whether these achievements benefited only a few French promoters and local favorites or

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whether they produced helpful results for the indigenous population as a whole. It is a grave problem, moral as well as political, and I do not intend to evade it. My reply will be in three parts.

II

If we compare the material and intellectual status of the peoples of Indo-China in 1887, the date of the creation of the Indo-Chinese Union, and in 1939, on the eve of the Second World War, no impartial observer can deny the progress which had been accomplished. The suppression of civil strife; the guaranty of free movement for people and things; vast public works (43,000,000 piasters in 1940) mainly for irrigation and the dredging and channeling of rivers; the creation of 1,000 hospitals and sanitary centers, which in 1938 provided nearly 14,000,000 consultations for 23,000,000 inhabitants; the replacement of the traditional usury, ruinous to the Annamite peasant, by a system of farm credit under state guaranty; the establishment of a responsible administration and regular courts of justice in place of the arbitrary measures of the old régime; the adoption of progressive social legislation under which industrial enterprises and plantation owners were obliged to construct decent living quarters, infirmaries and schools for laborers—such, among others, have been the concrete improvements that marked the transition of Indo-China from the archaic state in which she still existed 50 years ago to the level of a modernized country. It cannot fairly be denied that this progress has benefited the many, and not only an oligarchy of French origin. In this connection, one more figure of considerable significance must be quoted: out of a total of 2,261,500 hectares of land granted by the French administration after clearing, 1,299,500 hectares were allotted to indigenous farmers.

France did not neglect her duties toward the Indo-Chinese in the cultural field. The routine, oral Chinese teaching was replaced by a method of modern teaching based on the written Annamite language, in Latin characters, the *quôc ngu*. The budget for education was raised from 5,500,000 piasters in 1923 to over 29,000,000 in 1944. This program aimed to improve all levels of teaching, from the primary and elementary schools (666,000 pupils in 1943) to the higher groups. The Indo-Chinese University at Hanoï, the École Française d'Extrême-Orient, the school of medicine and pharmacy, the fine arts school, the Pasteur institutes, the geophysical observatory at Phu-Lien, the oceanographic in-

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stitute at Nha Trang, are only a few examples of the vital scientific and educational activities of French Indo-China. In the field of what is called in France "secondary" education, there were seven large French and French-Indo-Chinese *lycées* (at Saïgon, Hanoï, Hué, Dalat, Pnom-Penh) and ten colleges in less important cities. Technical schools were open to young people of 14–18 years. Nothing, therefore, could be more incorrect than to suppose that the French abandoned the natives to ignorance. And it is to be remarked that these French educational activities gave large scope to primarily Indo-Chinese subjects, such as the Annamite or Cambodian language, the history of the country and Buddhist civilization and religion.

Where, then, is the dark side of the picture? In my opinion it is not to be found in the administrative or cultural fields but in the field of politics. France did all that was in her power for the people of Indo-China, often more than she did for her own people—all except to open to them the road to self-government. Every year the universities of Indo-China and France conferred diplomas upon Viet-Namese doctors, engineers and lawyers. These members of a new enlightened class who wanted to exercise leadership discovered that they were caught between the family and the traditional communal cell on the one hand (scrupulously respected by the French) and the higher administration on the other. It is paradoxical but true to say that the French carried their respect for the historical and local structure to excess. What they should have done, before the war, was to modernize not only the administration (which they did) but also the methods of government, which were stamped more with Asiatic paternalism than European democracy.

To sum up, I believe that no one, even the Indo-Chinese themselves, could have done for Indo-China what France has done. But a tragic inadequacy in the growth of the political structure of the country created discontent within the new native élite. This Communism has been able to exploit.

It is not generally known that General de Gaulle's Government understood this perfectly and defined a new policy based upon it. On March 24, 1945, the Provisional Government of France published a declaration, of which I was one of the authors. This declaration was comprehensive. It laid down the following principles:

1. Indo-Chinese citizens shall be citizens of the French Union and shall have access to all positions and work in Indo-China and

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in the Union, "without discrimination of race, religion or origin."

2. Indo-China shall have a federal government composed of ministers who may be Indo-Chinese or French residents of Indo-China.

3. "Freedom of thought and of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and democratic liberties in general, shall form the basis of Indo-Chinese laws."

4. Each of the countries of Indo-China shall have its local government.

5. Indo-Chinese military forces shall be created in which all ranks shall be open to Indo-Chinese.

6. *The Indo-Chinese Federation shall enjoy economic autonomy.*

Such were the principal provisions envisaged at that time by the Provisional Government of France. I am firmly convinced that only the irruption of Communism into the void which was created by France's absence from Indo-China during the crucial months of 1945 prevented this peaceful and legal revolution from going into effect.

Here an important question may be raised: Can the Viet-Minh be accurately described as a Communist movement? Communist propaganda, aided by various fellow travelers, had made considerable efforts to deny it. It has been claimed that Ho Chi Minh is really a nationalist and not a Communist. His personal history completely refutes this. Under his real name—N'Guyen Ai Quôc—the head of the Viet-Minh has always been a Communist, whether in Indo-China, in Paris, or in Moscow, where he was trained at the famous School of Asiatic Peoples. In one sense he is even more "orthodox" than Mao Tse-tung, who at times seems to have had whims of ideological independence from Russian doctrine.

The objection will be made that even if Ho Chi Minh is a Communist, the Viet-Minh is a coalition containing non-Communist nationalities. This is true only in so far as it concerns the troops. But to believe that the direction of the Viet-Minh is not entirely in the hands of the orthodox leadership is to fail totally to recognize Communist methods. The Viet-Minh is similar to those popular or national "fronts" which have been seen at work in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania, and even in France during a short period in 1944. Under a nationalist camouflage, all the levers of command are in the hands of the Communists. In particular they

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control the instruments of political domination, ideological indoctrination, the armed forces and propaganda. This is exactly the case with the Viet-Minh. One of their foremost endeavors since 1945 has been to exterminate the parties (V.N.Q.D.D. and Dong Minh Hoi) which were truly nationalist and were not suspected of sympathy for France. The facts must be recognized. The Viet-Minh is the pawn which the Kremlin is moving up on the Indo-Chinese chessboard.

To recall how the present war in Indo-China broke out is to make plain Ho Chi Minh's intentions and methods. In March 1946 an initial agreement was concluded between the representative of the Republic of France and Ho Chi Minh. This agreement recognized the "Republic of Viet-Nam" as "a free state, having its government, its parliament, its army and its finance, belonging to the Indo-Chinese Federation and to the French Union." A few months later Ho Chi Minh was received officially in Paris as a Chief of State, and in September he signed a *modus vivendi* intended to complete the agreement and implement it.

On December 19, his armed forces nevertheless attacked the French troops at Hanoï. This *coup* had been carefully arranged. For days secret passages had been prepared between houses so that the Viet-Minh elements could move without passing through the streets; pseudo-invalids had succeeded in entering French hospitals; material for barricades had been prepared; railroad cars had been brought to grade crossings to obstruct them. Finally, at the very moment when their forces were ready to launch the attack and when their government had already left Hanoï, Ho Chi Minh and his minister of war, Giap, delivered conciliatory letters to the French authorities. In other words, having obtained what it demanded from France, the Viet-Minh took the initiative and, by a *coup de force,* broke the agreements it had made.

This action cannot be explained by any purely local motivation. Ho Chi Minh acted as an agent of a global policy, the double purpose of which was and remains, first, to weaken France *in Europe* by forcing her to deflect a large part of her forces and resources to the Asiatic theatre; and second, to open a first breach in the Pacific front.

III

At the time I write, the general situation in Indo-China may be summarized as follows:

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1. The Indo-Chinese peninsula is divided into three states associated with France within the French Union: the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Kingdom of Laos and the State of Viet-Nam. The latter has as its head the Emperor Bao Dai, who was emperor of Annam until 1945. These three states are represented in Paris by their delegates to the Assembly of the French Union. An "interstate" conference is being held at Pau to regulate the relation between the three countries and to organize common services.

2. Laos and Cambodia as a whole enjoy fairly normal life. Representative institutions have been put into operation. Internal quiet is only slightly disturbed.

3. In Viet-Nam, on the other hand, the Emperor's authority and that of the central and local governments[3] are still weak. The French authorities have transferred all available services to Viet-Nam, including police and security. But today's drama lies in this, that though Viet-Nam has recovered internal sovereignty, she cannot exercise it without the presence of French armed forces. The Viet-Nam army is still embryonic. Its strength probably is not more than a third of that of the Viet-Minh army. In other words, left to itself Viet-Nam would have difficulty in withstanding for long the assault of Ho Chi Minh's partisans.

4. The military situation remains extremely tense. It improved in Tonkin as a result of the winter campaign; it is good in the south of Annam and on the plateaus. But the Viet-Minh controls extensive territories from the Sino-Tonkinese frontier and in the anterior of Annam, and guerrilla activity continues without interruption in Cochin China. The Viet-Minh forces, estimated at 100 battalions, are inferior in number to the French and Viet-Nam troops, but they benefit by the tactical advantages of guerrilla warfare in a tropical country full of dense vegetation and marshes. Their armament (contraband from the Philippines, Indonesia and Siam) is constantly increasing.

5. The mass of Annamites, in reality, follow neither Ho Chi Minh nor Bao Dai. Tired of war and insecurity, in each zone they rally to whatever authority is in power. However, it should be noted that the villagers in zones recently recovered from the Viet-Minh, having undergone long months of that régime, are spontaneously organizing their own defense against a return offensive of the Communists. Ho Chi Minh appears not to have succeeded

[3] There are four governments: a central government for the country as a whole, and local governments in Cochin China, Annam and Tonkin.

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in winning over the population of the territories which he occupies; the activities of his political police create a reign of terror but do not result in securing adherents. Taking everything into account we can say that the rural masses will lean to the side where they find a promise of peace, security and an acceptable daily life. However, the results of the immense effort accomplished under French authority in the past—public works, dikes, irrigation, sanitation, rehabilitation of the soil—are certainly compromised for a long time to come. The very delicate balance between the needs of a growing population and the barely sufficient production of the agricultural districts has been broken.

During the past four years the war in Viet-Nam has cost France considerable losses in manpower and an enormous financial burden—200 billion francs in 1950. This unsettles French public opinion and seriously undermines the country's strength and influence in Europe. The Communist victory in China and now the Communist aggression in Korea have also complicated the problem. Mao Tse-tung may intervene to support Ho Chi Minh in ways that are not clearly visible but nevertheless very important. He may provide matériel, furnish air support, and even throw in Chinese units disguised as "volunteers." Such intervention could counterbalance the slow but real improvement in the military situation in Indo-China witnessed in recent months. The Korean affair has tied down all the American forces available in the Pacific, and this may continue for an unforeseeable length of time. It will bring its recompense, however, if it demonstrates that the entire strategy of the West in Asia must be conceived as a whole and that it would be foolish to consider Korea and Indo-China separately. President Truman understood this, and increased the aid promised to the French and Viet-Nam forces.

IV

However, further steps must, I think, be taken. If the front held by France in Indo-China were destroyed, the position of opponents of Communism in Malaya and the Philippines would quickly become untenable. The policy of the Communist Party in France shows how crucial Moscow considers that front to be. Through propaganda and sabotage of war material the Communists aim at bringing about the retreat of the French forces from Indo-China. Such an evacuation is in any case impossible, for it would be accomplished by the massacre of French and Eurasian

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civilians and of all the Indo-Chinese who recognized the authority of Bao Dai. Outside of Indo-China, it would sound the knell for all resistance to Communism in Asia. All the many "nationalists" who rallied to the Japanese after Pearl Harbor would rally to the new triumphant force in Asia. It would be an Asiatic Munich.

The conflict in Indo-China thus is not between France and the Viet-Minh. That is only a local manifestation of the resistance of peoples on the periphery of Asia to the Soviet expansion from the heart of the continent, directed toward the peninsulas of the Pacific. For four years France has made a major effort there. It strains her resources to the utmost. But it is vital to the United States and to the whole free world that this effort continue—and if it is to continue it must be supported. Great aid in matériel and credits is needed if the French soldiers who are battling in most difficult conditions are to deliver blows against the Communist forces and, if necessary, discourage Red China's intervention.

I have not concealed what I believe to have been errors and inadequacies in French policy in Indo-China. However, with the world in its present condition, I am certain that the threat to the independence and well-being of the peoples of Indo-China comes not from France but from Ho Chi Minh and the system which he represents. I believe that the Viet-Minh is exploiting legitimate national aspirations of the Indo-Chinese to the profit of a new crude imperialism which will in turn crush them as it has already crushed all national life in half of Europe. A chance to develop the policy of association with France as defined in 1945 by the de Gaulle Government seems to me both more realistic and more liberal than one which would deliver weak and defenseless nationalities to Communist rule and Russian domination.

It has turned out that France was the first in line on the new front in Asia. Some of her aims and actions in the past have been misunderstood. Now that the United States is engaged in the same conflict these misunderstandings must be cleared up. The undertakings of the two nations should be directed in concert and in a full and reciprocal assessment made of the results. It would be salutary if the common purposes were defined publicly before world opinion, above all in a way that the Asiatic people themselves will hear and understand them. The struggle will be won or lost depending on whether or not the West succeeds in coördinating its efforts and in mobilizing on its side all native resistance forces.

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THE U. N. AND TRYGVE LIE

By Thomas J. Hamilton

WHATEVER else may result from the Security Council's decision to defend the Republic of Korea, the fact that this action was strongly recommended by the Secretary General of the United Nations will have lasting consequences for Trygve Lie and his successors. Mr. Lie's statement at the opening of the June 25th meeting—he insisted on speaking before Mr. Gross presented the United States' demand for action—was important if only because of the fact that it was the first time that he had used the power given him by Article 99 of the Charter to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." But its significance went far beyond mere technical considerations.

Mr. Lie's statement that "I consider it the clear duty of the Security Council to take steps necessary to reëstablish peace in that area," brought him back to the original San Francisco conception that the United Nations, under the leadership of the Great Powers, must act vigorously to enforce peace. What was new, both for Mr. Lie and the world, was that action should be taken not merely in the absence of one of the two super-Powers, but against one of that Power's satellites—and not a "satellite" merely in a manner of speaking, but one that clearly could not have launched its aggression without its patron's full approval.

During the four and a half years between his election as Secretary General and the invasion of South Korea, Mr. Lie had operated on a different concept. For the first two years he still hoped that it would be possible to make the United Nations a league to enforce peace on the basis of some approach to harmony among the Great Powers. By 1948 he had been forced by a series of shattering events to lay aside such hopes, and he had turned instead to mediation and conciliation as the most that the United Nations could accomplish, apart from its long-range program for economic and social progress. Meanwhile, however, he had done what he thought lay within his powers to compose the differences between the Great Powers, and particularly those between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the early months of 1950 the Soviet walkouts threatened the very existence of the United Nations.

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Mr. Lie, who until that time had been timid about exercising the special powers granted him by the Charter, then started a campaign to meet the Soviet demand by admitting Communist China to the United Nations.

This unquestionably marked an increase in Mr. Lie's efforts to assert his powers. Formerly he had drawn back when he met serious opposition. On China he did not draw back, although his moves aroused increasing disapproval in the United States and some of the other democracies, approval in others, and hosannas of praise from Communist organs throughout the world. Then came the invasion of South Korea, and Mr. Lie, laying aside his inhibitions about the use of his powers and at the same time dropping his campaign to get the Soviet Union to return, went all-out for a maximum military effort.

Some of his actions in support of the Security Council decision were mistaken, in particular his cable requesting additional armed forces, "particularly ground forces." This met with a poor response, mainly because he had failed to take the indispensable step of inquiring in advance whether the governments most likely to provide them were in a position to do so immediately. However, his initial statement to the Council, if nothing else, was valuable because it probably resulted in winning the votes of India and his native Norway for the cease-fire resolution. His stand on Korea was an answer to the type of American thinking represented by Senator Knowland, who had charged only a month before that Mr. Lie was "selling a 1950 brand of appeasement."

Mr. Lie, however, had not entirely abandoned the one-world concept. In his report to the 1950 session of the Assembly he said that his "twenty-year peace plan"—which would involve the admission of Communist China—would be still more necessary after the Korean question had been settled. He thus left the way open for a resumption of his campaign to make the United Nations work through the coöperation of all the Great Powers. Despite his position on Korea, he was not in accord with the growing feeling that since the Soviet Union had torpedoed the work of the United Nations its departure from the organization would be good riddance. This feeling had gained much strength from the resentment aroused by Mr. Malik's tactics following upon his return to preside over the Security Council—and to block any further action on Korea—during August. Thus it appeared that if Mr. Lie were reëlected, the political powers of the Secretary Gen-

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eral would be confirmed, but upon the understanding that if he intervened again he would do so on the side of the majority.

Prior to his intervention on Korea Mr. Lie had supported Soviet moves in the "cold war," and criticized those of the United States, more often than he had supported the United States. This has given rise to the canard that Mr. Lie is a stooge of the Kremlin and that he was foisted upon the United States and the United Nations on the basis of false representations as to his impartiality. Actually, he was a compromise selection by the United States and the Soviet Union after each had blocked the candidate of the other. These negotiations now seem lost in geologic time, for in London in January 1946, it still appeared possible that Russia and the West would be able to maintain reasonably friendly relations. Lester B. Pearson, then Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, was the United States candidate; Stanoye Simich, Jugoslav Ambassador to Washington, was the Soviet candidate, with Wincenty Rzymowski, Foreign Minister of Poland, second choice. Even in those relatively halcyon days it was, of course, impossible for the United States to agree to a Slav Secretary General. The Soviet Union, while offering no objection to Mr. Pearson personally, refused to accept him on the ground that the headquarters of the U. N. was to be in the United States, and a North American Secretary General would be too much.

This produced a deadlock which ended only when the United States proposed Mr. Lie, who as a Norwegian Socialist was not in either camp; and the Soviet Union immediately accepted him. Since both countries had supported Mr. Lie for President of the General Assembly this seemed a good omen. Great Britain, France and China then accepted him, and after having been nominated by the Security Council and elected by the General Assembly, he began his five-year term on February 2, 1946. Some time before the General Assembly ends its 1950 session this fall, the Security Council and the General Assembly should in normal course either reëlect Mr. Lie or choose his successor. If necessary to avoid a Great Power veto, the General Assembly could extend his term of office for another year or two.

II

The office of Secretary General was, of course, modeled upon that of the corresponding official of the League of Nations, and on that analogy the Charter states that the Secretary General "shall

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be the chief administrative officer of the Organization." However, it assigned to him additional duties and prerogatives which made clear the intention that he should exercise political influence in his own right. There appears to be no confirmation of the story that Roosevelt and Churchill each expressed the hope that he might end his career as Secretary General. Nevertheless it symbolizes the challenge that the position offered.

For various reasons, including the absence at the start of several of the major World Powers, the League of Nations was dominated throughout most of its existence by Great Britain. This made it only natural that a British civil servant should be Secretary General; and Sir Eric Drummond exercised that function throughout the time that the organization had any real influence. The United Nations, however, was created in the belief that the five Great Powers should control it and that no one of them should have a preponderant influence. Obviously, therefore, the actions of the Secretary General had to be acceptable to them all, and by the same token it was impossible to give an office of such importance to a citizen of any one of them. The Secretary General must be provided by one of the smaller Powers. However, before Mr. Lie's election the Big Five had divided up his cabinet in much the same way that the Great Powers of the nineteenth century had set up their spheres of influence in Africa.

Out of the eight departments, each headed by an assistant secretary general, the Soviet Union took security affairs, the United States administrative and budgetary affairs, Britain economic affairs, France social affairs, China trusteeship affairs. On this basis, no one could say that at this stage the United States was grasping. The Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and Chile, as representatives of Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Latin America respectively, were given the three remaining departments. Each of the Great Powers chose the individual who would take over the department which it had been assigned.

These arrangements were an effectual protection against the possibility that the Secretary General might try to incite the small Powers to rebel against the Big Five. But they made no provision for the situation that actually developed—a split among the Big Five themselves, with the Secretary General trying to follow a middle course to the extent that Norwegian ingenuity would permit. The solidarity of the Big Five was of course intended to be the foundation of the entire United Nations structure, and it

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is ironical to recall the fears of the small Powers at San Francisco that the combined power of the five policemen, symbolized by the principle of unanimity in the Security Council, would enable the Great Powers to run rough-shod over the rest of the world. They conceived of the General Assembly as their principal refuge. They also put some trust in the Secretary General, however, and their proposal to make his interventions in the Security Council mandatory just missed being included in the Charter.

III

Before taking up Mr. Lie's record as an independent political figure we must examine his record as "the chief administrative officer of the Organization," as his duties are described in Article 97. Similar activities took up three-fourths of the time of Sir Eric Drummond, and although Mr. Lie has delegated considerable responsibilities to Mr. Price, the efficient Assistant Secretary General, they are a considerable burden. Whereas the League of Nations Secretariat never employed more than 700 people, the United Nations has 4,000 on the payroll. In addition to regional offices and commissions there are more than a dozen "specialized agencies" with which it is necessary to maintain liaison.

The larger scale of United Nations activity is symbolized by the fact that whereas the Palais des Nations provided office space for the entire League Secretariat, it is not big enough for even the branch offices and specialized agencies of the United Nations located at Geneva. The World Health Organization is now erecting a separate building. In addition, Mr. Lie has had to deal with the complicated problems arising out of the decision to establish the headquarters in New York. Construction of the permanent headquarters at one time seemed to present insoluble difficulties because of the organization's shortage of dollars, but thanks in part to Mr. Lie's efforts, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., donated the site, the City of New York carried out the necessary improvements, and the United States made an interest-free loan of $65,000,000 to pay for the building. Thanks to the loyal support given by Mr. Lie to Wallace K. Harrison, the director of planning, there has been no repetition of the bickering which delayed the construction of the Palais des Nations. Mr. Lie has not tolerated any interference with Mr. Harrison's superb design. His contribution toward making it a reality is perhaps sufficient excuse for his decision to move into New York from Lake Success next January, before some of

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the buildings are completed, so that, whether he is reëlected or not, he will be able to say that as the first Secretary General he established the United Nations at "United Nations, New York."

Apart from this unquestioned success, there are mixed feelings about Mr. Lie's ability as an administrator. It is difficult to make a comparison, but the general opinion is that the caliber of the Secretariat of the United Nations is below that which served the League. Some of the Assistant Secretaries General are inadequate for their responsibilities. But the Great Powers have not attempted to pack the Secretariat, and the strongest demands for jobs—which sometimes, in the best Congressional tradition, are coupled with a reminder that Mr. Lie will need votes to get his budget through the General Assembly—come from the small countries. The Charter says that while the "paramount consideration" in appointing the staff shall be efficiency, competence and integrity, "due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible." As a result, Mr. Lie had to establish a quota system whereby the number of Ruritanians on the staff is proportionate to Ruritania's contribution to the United Nations budget. The quotas are not rigidly enforced, but they interfere with efficient administration.

Mr. Lie has other behind-the-scenes duties which were well described by Mr. Austin in an address to the General Assembly when it held its first meeting in the United States in the autumn of 1946. After referring to Mr. Lie's political functions, Mr. Austin continued: "Less obvious, but perhaps equally important, is the function of the Secretary General and his staff to serve as a cohesive and coördinating force in the preparation of studies and proposals for the several organs, by suggesting compromises or techniques for dealing with matters under discussion, and by acting as an intermediary or conciliator. Many of these activities will never be a part of the official record, but the ability of the Secretary General and of his staff to function effectively in this manner will have an important bearing on the development of the United Nations."

These functions are particularly important in the General Assembly, since most of its members arrive only a day or so before it convenes, and advance arrangements have to be made regarding the election of officers. The arrangement of details is mostly handled by Andrew W. Cordier, Mr. Lie's executive assistant. Mr. Lie and Mr. Cordier also have a hand in drafting many of the

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resolutions presented to the Assembly. Furthermore, Mr. Lie is consulted on the selection of administrators for commissions created by the Assembly, and sometimes is authorized to appoint them outright. The net result of these activities is that Mr. Lie has an excellent opportunity to influence decisions of the Assembly from behind the scenes, and he has been more active in this field than in his public interventions. As examples, he was successful in advocating the Palestine partition resolution in 1947 and the decision in 1949 to grant independence to Libya; but he failed to defeat the decision last year to go ahead with the complete internationalization of Jerusalem. Also, he failed to defeat the election of Jugoslavia to the Security Council over Czechoslovakia.

IV

Important though these activities are, Mr. Lie's place in United Nations history will rest upon his efforts to influence delegates and world opinion by public statements. His principal instrument has been his annual report to the General Assembly, published two months before the Assembly convenes. He also addresses the Assembly at the opening and close of each session. He seldom intervenes in General Assembly debates, except to defend his budget, and even less frequently in the Security Council. In the latter body, his interventions on Iran and Korea are the principal exceptions to his usual habit.

In April 1946, after spending two and a half months recruiting the United Nations staff and moving it to New York, Mr. Lie made his abortive intervention in the Iranian question. Iran had withdrawn its complaint against Soviet Russia for her failure to evacuate her troops from Iranian territory as agreed, and both Iran and the Soviet Union proposed that the Council remove the question from the agenda. This was opposed by the United States and a majority of the Council, who felt that the withdrawal of the Iranian complaint had been extorted by Soviet pressure. Mr. Lie supported the Soviet Union, arguing that in view of the withdrawal, and the Council's failure to take action under the Charter provisions for the settlement of disputes, the case should be dropped. Despite the passage of the years, the Council's records reveal the anger of its president, Dr. Quo of China, who reminded Mr. Lie that Article 97 referred to him merely as "the chief administrative officer" and who tried to have the Council proceed with the vote as though Mr. Lie had remained silent. Mr. Stet-

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tinius, the United States representative, said nothing at the meeting, but there is a plausible tradition that he gave Mr. Lie a dressing-down afterwards. Mr. Gromyko, however, quoted Article 99—South Korea was years off—to support Mr. Lie. The intervention came to nothing, for Mr. Lie's statement was referred to the Council's Committee of Experts and was heard of no more. The Council kept the Iranian question on its agenda, where it still is despite the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops. Mr. Lie's two primary aims were to assert the powers of the Secretary General, and restore harmony among the Big Five policemen, but the results were not promising. The precedent that nations should be held to the performance of their obligations under the Charter was more important.

Three years later Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, then Australian Minister for External Affairs, commented that despite the rebuff on the Iranian question Mr. Lie should proceed with his interventions. Nevertheless for a considerable time thereafter Mr. Lie showed great caution. He did urge the 1947 session of the General Assembly to take steps to obtain compliance with a resolution adopted the year before, which requested the withdrawal of ambassadors and ministers from Franco Spain. But the Assembly not only did not accede to his request, it failed to reaffirm the resolution. This must be noted as one of the factors that has greatly impaired the prestige of Assembly resolutions, which are in fact mere recommendations, without legal force. A few months later Mr. Lie came under criticism from Arab delegates because the United Nations legal department, which was of course expressing his views, had circulated a memorandum holding that the Security Council had no right to alter the Palestine resolution. As administrative head of the organization, if nothing more, Mr. Lie was obviously responsible for the memorandum. He disavowed it, however, saying that when he wished to express his personal views he would do so direct to the Council—which he never did.

In the meanwhile, Mr. Lie made many speeches defending the United Nations, and insisting that it was necessary for the Great Powers to work together if the United Nations was to succeed. He emphasized the need to establish international atomic control and place armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council, but gave top priority to the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan. However, as the intensity of the cold war increased, he did not take a public stand for or against any major

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move by either East or West. Although he felt very strongly about President Truman's decision in the spring of 1947 to send military aid to Greece and Turkey without attempting to act through the U. N., Mr. Lie made no comment for the record.

In the summer of 1948, however, Mr. Lie resumed his interventions and at the same time brought forward a more modest goal for the United Nations of mediation and conciliation. By this time, many felt, on the basis of the Soviet attitude toward the civil war in Greece and the Berlin situation, that the U.S.S.R. intended to defy the U.N., to hamstring it by the veto, and to use armed force to gain its end. To them, Lie's attitude seemed a relinquishment of the position of neutral judge which he had held earlier. Nevertheless, his report to the 1948 session of the General Assembly endorsed the Marshall Plan, and urged the creation of a United Nations guard, which in fact, if not in name, was to be the first step toward his new plan to provide the United Nations with military force to carry out its decisions. Both statements were strongly attacked by the Soviet press, but a few weeks later, when Mr. Lie went to Norway for his annual vacation, he made a speech at Bergen criticizing regional defense pacts, and attacking the claim that they are authorized by Article 51 of the Charter, which safeguards the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack. The United States held that Article 51 justified our defense treaty system with Latin America, and the North Atlantic Treaty was already being seriously discussed, so the target of the speech was obvious.

Later in the year Mr. Lie joined with Dr. Evatt, who was President of the Assembly, in urging the Great Powers to make one more effort to reach agreement on the Berlin question. This was after the Soviet Union had vetoed a Security Council resolution requesting it to lift the blockade, and after publication of a newspaper dispatch saying that the Lie-Evatt statement played into the hands of the Kremlin was inspired by the State Department official who was dealing with the Berlin question. Trygve Lie afterwards joined the "neutrals" on the Security Council in proposing a solution for the Berlin currency question, which ostensibly was the reason for the Soviet blockade; but it was rejected by the Western Powers. From then until his intervention over China Mr. Lie's most controversial statement was an endorsement of President Truman's Point Four program. In fact, this was not very controversial because the Soviet Union, despite

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its growls, joined in the unanimous vote at the 1949 session of the General Assembly endorsing an expanded United Nations technical assistance program.

The extent of the change in Mr. Lie's position since then may be judged by the fact that when he went to Norway on his vacation in August 1950, after Korea, he announced that he supported the North Atlantic Treaty.

For reasons of space the above account has necessarily given only the bare outlines of Mr. Lie's political interventions, or lack of them, and has omitted much of the background, including the failure of the Security Council to act effectively even when, as in the case of Palestine and Indonesia, the East-West issue was not directly involved. I believe that Mr. Lie was right in doing what he could in the early days to restore good relations among the five policemen, and that he was right in shifting his emphasis to conciliation and mediation when it developed that the policemen would keep on quarreling. He probably was right again when he urged that one last effort be made to get the missing policeman to come back to the station house. And certainly he was both correct and courageous in urging united action when it developed that the missing policeman had actually incited a hold-up.

Mr. Lie himself would probably be the last to claim that he is a great political thinker, and his principal service to the United Nations may well have been his understanding of the desire of ordinary men and women for peace, and his ability to act as a symbol and as a spokesman for that longing. Both his virtues and his vices reflect his earlier career as a trade-union negotiator. And yet, despite differences in age and background, Mr. Lie and Mr. Austin have many points in common. Mr. Lie, in fact, is the nearest Europe can come to producing a United States Senator, and had he been born in this country there is little doubt that by now he would have become senior Senator from Minnesota, if no higher. Mr. Lie unfortunately has never been invited to address the United States Congress, but if he had been he could have said with Mr. Churchill that he might have gotten there on his own.

Any assessment of Mr. Lie's record as Secretary General must take into account both his personal background and the geographical position of Norway, which has the unenviable distinction of being the only party to the North Atlantic Treaty that shares a frontier with the Soviet Union. As a Social Democrat Mr. Lie was brought up to see evils in both Communism and capital-

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ism, and as a citizen of a country exposed to Soviet reprisals he has been understandably reluctant to commit himself irrevocably to the anti-Communist side. It is now obvious that Mr. Lie—like his friend Jan Masaryk and many other democratic leaders in Eastern Europe—was too slow in awakening to the fact that Soviet imperialism, precisely because it marches under the banner of peace and the common man, is an even more dangerous foe than Nazi imperialism. But until very recently this was a fact hidden from others besides Mr. Lie, and it should be enough to recall that after the war both Britain and France tried for a time to act as a "bridge" between the United States and the Soviet Union, and even the State Department has been slow to realize the danger that threatens the free world. After all, the entire United Nations concept was based on the willingness of the Soviet Union to coöperate with other countries, and from the nature of the office it was inevitable that its Secretary General should try to follow the middle way until Korea made this impossible. Moreover, such actions as the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine demonstrated that the United States did not always take into account the necessity of working through the United Nations, and the world needed someone to speak for the organization as a whole.

The criticism that Mr. Lie has been timid in asserting his powers, and has made tactical mistakes once he has committed himself, is more justified. Some delegates are extremely antagonistic to him, holding that the United Nations would be a different sort of organism if it had had a different Secretary General. They also hint that Mr. Lie's burst of activity in his final year in office was inspired at least in part by his desire for reëlection. Mr. Lie has of course announced that he will not be a candidate, but it is supposed that he could be drafted, and his supporters insist that in spite of his errors both of omission and commission, he has achieved as much as anyone could have done in view of the Great Power split after San Francisco. There is no provision in the Charter, incidentally, which makes it possible to remove a Secretary General before his term expires. There is force in the argument that a more able or courageous spokesman might have split the organization apart.

It cannot be said that Mr. Lie has given the office of Secretary General a commanding position. His part has been rather that of the chorus in a Greek tragedy, explaining events and sometimes predicting the inexorable workings of Fate, rather than controlling them. Perhaps it is true that no man could have done more.

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HOW STRONG IS THE HEARTLAND?

By W. Gordon East

IT IS virtually a generation since Sir Halford J. Mackinder first averred that "Who Rules the Heartland commands the World-Island," yet, despite the apparent mutability of international affairs, this proposition raises the most momentous question of our times. Since the Soviet Union now controls almost all of the Heartland of Mackinder's conception, his proposition, translated into contemporary terms, invites, as a matter of no mere academic importance, the inquiry: How strong is the Soviet Union? The successive or concurrent phases of the now ironically named "cold war"—in Greece, Berlin, Malaya, Indo-China and Korea—are significantly located, in Mackinder's terminology, beyond the Heartland, and beyond its bordering transitional zones, in the outer coastlands themselves. But it is both fitting and necessary, as Isaiah Bowman emphasized,[1] that in a world of rapid technological progress the geography of territory, since it is ever changing, should be continually revalued. It is important, too, to be ready to discard old geopolitical concepts if, with the passage of time, they can be shown to have lost their validity. While it must be admitted that Mackinder's geopolitical philosophy has not become irrelevant to the international world of today, it is nevertheless clear that it contains generalizations and assumptions which scarcely withstand close analysis. And if, as must be assumed, one of the possibilities of the near future is the renewal of war on a grand scale, it is well to reëxamine his sweeping prognostications to determine their present worth.

Prediction, a normal function of the experimental sciences, is more difficult and more unusual in the social sciences. A prediction of a political geographer, originally foreshadowed in 1904, developed in a book in 1919, restated in this journal in 1943[2] and reiterated in 1945, has attracted and must continue to attract wide and serious attention. This is due not merely to the rarity of such oracular utterances but to Mackinder's position as elder statesman among British geographers, and to the world-wide importance of his prophecy. This he expressed in his "Demo-

[1] Isaiah Bowman, "The Strategy of Territorial Decisions," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1946.

[2] Sir Halford J. Mackinder, "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1943.

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cratic Ideals and Reality" in 1919, and repeated during the war of 1939–1945, in the following dramatic propositions:

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.

What is most remarkable about these affirmations is the extent to which they have been accepted—the geopoliticians of Nazi Germany and Japan certainly tried to apply them—and the fact that they appear largely to have escaped critical examination. This daring and unnerving pronouncement of a single mind, albeit one maturely philosophic, steeped in the study of history and geography and sharpened in the world of affairs, still appears challengingly to define the inescapable destiny of the deeply-riven world political structure. The Delphic Oracle, it may be recalled, was often successful in its prophecies, for it had behind it what we should now call a good intelligence organization. Sir Halford Mackinder had a sound knowledge of the world in its spatial and historical aspects upon which to base his prediction. But this was essentially a long-term forecast and, although it was subjected under his eyes to the partial test of an era which included two world wars, it belonged of course to that kind of prediction not easy to gainsay, since the chance of its being literally and exactly tested was small.

The world which Mackinder studied, as he was quick to see, was, and so it remains, a single "Going Concern," a delicate interlocking mechanism, susceptible to jarring by actions at any point. But this world, finite though it is in its areal contours of land and sea, is for its human occupants rapidly and ever changing. Indeed, "geography changes as rapidly as ideas and technologies change;" we have continually to make new maps and newly evaluate the geography of land and sea areas. Notably our whole conception of mobility and accessibility, considerations to which Mackinder attached prime importance, have been revolutionized by the internal combustion engine and the airplane. No less, too, have science and technology in their applications to industry and to the art of war wrought changes to which no end can be seen. The advent of a new offensive weapon, the atom bomb, in itself makes it ever more necessary to reëxamine time-honored assumptions of geopolitical thinking. In the world of international relations, rooted although these are to a physically unchanging

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planet and conditioned as they are by a rich and perhaps too well remembered history, it is surely both unwise and dangerous to accept, as a predetermined end, the prediction that world hegemony must, on certain assumptions, inevitably pass to the rulers of one specified portion of the earth. It is unwise, because neither history nor geography, either singly or in combination, given the indeterminate character of social behavior, warrants predictions of this precise kind. Dangerous, because the acceptance of his prophecy as valid, unless it can be demonstrated beyond doubt, would stultify all our efforts toward the creation of a freely organized international society.

Let us look more closely at Mackinder's theses and the assumptions upon which they rest before considering their relation to the Soviet Union and their validity in the world of today.

II

Mackinder's concept of the "World Island" raises no problems: by this effective shorthand he embraced the land-linked continents of Europe, Asia and Africa and emphasized their relation to the oceans. "East Europe," which he distinguished from "West Europe," also raises little difficulty: it was that broadening zone of Europe, dominated numerically by Slav-speaking peoples and continually a zone of political instability, which extended eastward of the peninsulas of Jutland and Istria as far as the Azov Sea, the Don and the Volga above Stalingrad. Northward it included Sweden and southeastward Asia Minor. Berlin and Vienna lay within its western confines. The Heartland is a somewhat more complicated geographical concept although a remarkable achievement in generalization.

Mackinder conceived the Heartland in two ways: in terms of the area of internal drainage in Eurasia and also in terms of that area of Eurasia which was (under the ruling conditions of the time) inaccessible to sea power. He regarded the Arctic Ocean east of the White Sea as virtually a physical barrier to human movement, as comparable with the Caspian Sea and lakes Aral and Baikal, that is as basins of internal drainage affording no outlets to the routeways of the world oceans. On either basis the Heartland amounted territorially to much the same area. A colossal sub-continental entity, it was separated and almost barred off by transitional zones from the peripheral seaward lands of Europe and monsoon Asia. The seclusion and natural security

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of the Heartland, it will be recalled, were attributed to facts of physical geography: to the north, the Arctic Ocean, frozen almost everywhere the whole year through, and to the south and east, mountain chains and vast desert plateaus. In contrast, on its western flank the Heartland had easy contact with the well-settled lands of European Russia—with "Russia" in the strict sense. The components of the Heartland, itemized in terms of regional geography, were the Volga basin, Kazakhstan, Siberia, Central Asia, the Iranian and Tibetan plateaus. Politically the Heartland was largely Russian or Chinese, together with the semi-independent buffer states of Afghanistan and Persia.

Now it may well seem paradoxical, in view of its remoteness, its climatic rigors, its vastness and its relative emptiness of human beings, that the Heartland should possess marked geopolitical significance. Vast it certainly is—the equivalent of no less than five-ninths of Asia's area or of nearly one-fifth of the whole habitable earth. Virtually empty it was, and to a lesser extent, still is. Its total population may be estimated today at 100,000,000—less than one-twentieth of the world's population, although probably three times what it was when Mackinder first, and so emphatically, directed attention to it. Clearly his appreciation of the Heartland did not spring from demographic considerations, although he was the first to publicize the concept of "manpower" as an index of productivity and military power. The Heartland derived importance from its sheer extent. What mattered no less was its natural security and its median position in Eurasia. Nature, he argued, had endowed it not only with remarkable defensive strength, but also with command of interior lines of overland communication. So, curiously to us, with memories fresh of the fundamental rôle of economic potential in modern war, Mackinder was little concerned here with either manpower or wealth, actual and potential. Geographical position, physical remoteness from the world oceans, natural security from attack afforded by the frozen Arctic seas and by the mountain-desert-steppe expanses of Central Asia, and space —so much space as virtually to defy the logistics of an enemy approaching from without: all these considerations seem to have entered into Mackinder's evaluation of the Heartland as a citadel for defense and as a secure base for offensive warfare.

That certain important and inescapable geographical realities entered into Mackinder's conception of the geopolitical rôle of

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the Heartland is abundantly clear. Whether so much can be deduced from the inert facts of physical geography is no less clearly a matter of doubt. It is true that Mackinder found in history, in the recurrent theme of the movements of nomad horsemen from the steppes of Asia into the adjoining lands of Europe, Asia Minor, India, Manchuria and China, evidence of the pressure extended outward from the Heartland into the settled agricultural periphery. Within the southern areas of the Heartland, the horse caravan did indeed provide much mobility along the almost endless road of the steppe. So far as it went, the historical record served to support Mackinder's theses in that the Heartland played an active and positive part in the history of the settled peninsular lands of Asia and Europe. Yet the theme of nomadic migrations from Central Asia has been perhaps overemphasized: there were forceful movements into the Heartland which show at least its penetrability. Witness the expansion of China under the Han dynasty (202 B.C.–226 A.D.) to Sinkiang and beyond the Pamirs to the shores of the Caspian Sea, and the penetration of the Russian boatmen, seeking furs, which started the Russification of Siberia. Some of the native peoples of northwest Siberia may have reached there from northern Russia or Finland rather than the Ural-Altai region; and in more recent times Japanese expansion into Manchuria and Inner Mongolia marked a successful approach at least to the threshold of the Heartland.

Let us return to the three assertions which summarize Mackinder's views. With the third dictum that "Who rules the World-Island commands the World," there might appear little ground for critical comment. Given this hypothetical situation, the Americas and Australasia, even if assumed to be wholly united in an all-out military effort, might well hesitate before continuing so unequal a struggle, seeing their only chances of success in their margin of scientific, technological and aero-naval superiority, in the possible retention of bordering islands of the Old World, and in the inevitably large chinks in the armor of the World-Island empire at those points where the writ of its rulers failed to run. But at the most this eighth of the world's population could not hope to stage more than a defensive war.

Similarly Mackinder's first assertion—"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland"—appears valid. The events of this century indeed have increasingly confirmed it, although

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it has been challenged—when (in 1918–20) Allied forces, supporting White Russians, invaded Russia in Asia and in Europe, but failed to wipe out Bolshevism; and by the expansion of the Japanese empire into Korea, Manchuria and China. For this assertion Mackinder had good geographical and historical warrant. Had the coastlands of the Siberian Arctic been accessible to the seamanship of the great age of geographical discovery, as were those of the White Sea and Hudson Bay, the British or other West Europeans might well have sailed up the Ob or Yenisei rivers, sought Siberian sables direct, set up trading companies there, and made good political claims to Siberian territory. But navigation of the Arctic is a delicate and highly seasonal art, which only the technological achievements of this century have made possible. Control over the Heartland could practically be sought and established only from its marginal lands. It might conceivably have come, as partially it did come at certain periods of history, from Southwest Asia—witness the conquests of Alexander the Great and of the Arab Empire. It was much more likely to be achieved from the populous bases of either Eastern Europe or China proper. The main base of the Mongol Empire, which was created in the thirteenth century, was China proper, although its original nucleus of power was the Mongolian steppes: this is an interesting historical instance of a Heartland Power, based not on East Europe but on part of monsoon Asia, which penetrated but failed to hold much of East Europe, still less the European coastlands or the World-Island, despite its advantages of mobility, firepower, good intelligence, and a wave of terror which spread before its advancing armies.

The control of the Heartland by the principal state of East Europe, Russia, had at the time of Mackinder's book been long established. With the emergence of medieval Muscovy in north and central Russia, the eclipse of Mongol ascendancy, and the organization of the Russian state in the sixteenth century, Russians began to penetrate Siberia in search of furs and to make good their control of this vast northern land. The Russian boatmen, using the river ways and equipped with firearms which the scattered semi-nomadic population could not withstand, made their way through the coniferous forests and later pressed southward to control the wooded and treeless steppes of Siberia and the steppes and semi-deserts of Kazakhstan which they called,

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with ethnographical inexactitude, the Kirghiz steppe. In this way Russia won a new pioneer land for colonization, so successfully that today Russians make up all but a tiny fraction of the population of Siberia and fully half of that of Kazakhstan. In the Caucasus and in those deserts and oases east of the Caspian and south of Kazakhstan, now known as Soviet Central Asia, Russia intervened in search of, not so much new lands for colonization, as new fields of economic opportunity. This intervention in the second half of the nineteenth century took the form of military expeditions, difficult to execute because of great stretches of arid country. In Siberia the building of the Trans-Siberian railway (1891–1903) bound Siberia and its Pacific coast in no uncertain way to the Russian homeland in Europe; at the same time it permitted immigration into, and settlement of, Siberia at a new and faster pace, and projected Russia into the theatre of Far Eastern politics.

In Central Asia, too, as necessary instruments of conquest and consolidation, railways were built, notably the Central Asian line from Orenburg (now Chkalov) to Tashkent, and the Trans-Caspian line from Krasnovodsk (on the Caspian) to Merv, Bukhara and Tashkent with an off-line to Kushka on the Afghan frontier. Quite apart from their internal value for government and trade, these railways had their international aspect. British "Mervousness" at the possible threat to India, a threat not so much of direct invasion as of internal disorders such as the Indian Mutiny of 1857, was attributable to the new railways and their possible strategical implications. There can be no doubt that at the time Mackinder was developing his geopolitical ideas the Heartland had become very much a field of Russian control. Not quite completely, because China still held, though loosely, Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet. But China's power was declining, and her hold on these borderlands, beyond the limits of a slender railway system, was weakening, the more so as her attention, too, was engaged on her maritime margins by the rising sun of Japanese imperialism.

III

At the present time the political control of East Europe and the political control of the Heartland by the rulers of East Europe are more exactly established than they have been at any other time. In the first place, the Soviet Union, whose western bounda-

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ries were withdrawn eastward by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1917), has expanded westward in Europe as a result of the Russo-German war of 1941–45, by the incorporation of the Baltic States, part of East Prussia, eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabia and parts of eastern and southern Finland. Not only that, but her power and influence range farther west over a tier of states—Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania—beyond which she holds her zones of military occupation in Germany and Austria. With only a few exceptions—Sweden, Asia Minor and Jugoslavia with her independent Communism of Marshal Tito—East Europe in Mackinder's sense falls effectively under one rule. Moreover, if we turn to the Heartland as it now appears politically, it is evident that Soviet control has overflowed the U.S.S.R.'s borderlands into the greater part of what remains of the Heartland. The former Chinese-controlled territory of Tannu Tuva, which contains the headwaters of the Yenisei, was quietly incorporated into the Soviet Union a few years ago. China's titular rights in Outer Mongolia were renounced in 1945, and the nominally independent Mongolian People's Republic is now, less nominally, a Soviet preserve. In Sinkiang, too, Russian influence is preponderant: the Turkestan-Siberian railway, built in the 1930's, opens up a new approach to the historic road through the "dry strait" of Dzungaria to central China. Further, Soviet prestige stands high among the medley of backward peoples of Central Asia, largely as a result of what the U.S.S.R. has achieved in its own Central Asian republics by irrigation works, hydroelectric undertakings, mining operations, factory building and the operation of air services. All that remains of the Heartland which is not clearly under Soviet control are Tibet, Persia and Afghanistan.

The first statement of Mackinder's triplet thus describes a situation which at the present time very nearly obtains. The U.S.S.R., as ruler of East Europe, commands nearly all of the Heartland. The word "commands" has of course its shades of meaning. If it is interpreted as "controls," it might well be argued that the Soviet command falls short in some important areas of the Heartland, markedly in Persia, and also in Afghanistan and Tibet. If "command" means only "has at disposal" or "has within reach," the Soviet command does not appear so limited, for, as Mackinder foresaw in 1943, the destruction of German and Japanese armed forces leaves the U.S.S.R. the greatest military power in the world.

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Two of the Heartland areas outside the U.S.S.R., although within her field of special political interest, are, and have long been, geopolitically significant. British foreign policy has always sought the maintenance of the independence of Afghanistan and Persia as buffers essential to the defense of the Indian sub-continent, for the one provides the difficult but main highways toward the Indo-Gangetic plain, while the other conveniently holds the U.S.S.R. back from the Indian Ocean and guards one of the thresholds of Southwest Asia. But it may well be argued that the weakening of the U.S.S.R.'s command of the Heartland due to the survival of the states of Persia and Afghanistan is more than counterbalanced by other extraneous sources of Soviet strength. For the Soviet Union, thanks to the Yalta Agreement, enjoys a specially privileged position in Manchuria, and cannot fail to find satisfaction in the emergence of a Communist régime in China.

The crux of Mackinder's prediction—that part of it which is of greatest immediate moment in international affairs and is most susceptible to criticism—is his proposition that "Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island."

Now it must be clearly realized that the events of the last 25 years have greatly increased the internal strength of the Heartland as a citadel of power. No less than an economic and social revolution has been effected in that part of the Heartland which falls strictly within the Soviet Union—namely the Volga-Ural region and Soviet Asia beyond it, which together the Russians conveniently refer to as "the eastern regions." In pursuit of an objective set by Lenin, the U.S.S.R. has sought, by means of successive five-year plans, not only to achieve economic self-sufficiency but also to effect a geographical redistribution of the Union's resources by developing its Heartland area. Alike in agriculture, mineral exploitation, industry, and railway and airfield construction, substantial progress had already been effected there before the Germans fell upon Russia in 1941. One effect of enemy occupation of wide areas of European Russia was only to hasten the pace of economic development in the Urals and beyond. And, although one main purpose of the five-year plan now ending (1946–50) was the restoration of the economy of war-devastated areas, there is no suggestion that the development of the Ural and Asiatic regions has been discontinued. In short, these areas, as they have received settlers from Russia, extended food production, fostered urban development, and built up heavy metallurgi-

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cal and armament industries, have acquired manpower and economic potential at a rate and to an extent unforeseen when Mackinder wrote his book. The industrial region of the southern Urals is the outstandingly major component; Kuzbas, on the basis of its great coal resources, forms another, but smaller, industrial base; while others in Kazakhstan, Central Asia, Eastern Siberia and the Far East will continue to be developed. The Trans-Siberian railway has been double-tracked, and its duplication by the South Siberian Trunk line and the Baikal-Amur line partially accomplished. The Soviet bloc of the Heartland is no longer an inert appendage of European Russia, although it is directed from Moscow; it now contains surplus food resources (in western Siberia and Kazakhstan), sources of power (oil, coal and hydroelectricity), steel, aluminum and nitrate plants, and factories for motor and aircraft assembly and for locomotives and wagons. The mining of uranium among other rare metals, mainly in Kirghiz S.S.R., should provide in due course atomic energy for large-scale use in irrigation and mining undertakings. Indeed, the vast field for economic development in Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia could well occupy the major energies of the Soviet Union for at least a generation. Given, however, the ideology and policy of Soviet Communism, such a diversion of energy to solely internal projects can hardly be assumed.

It is important to grasp the fact that the geographical distribution of the Soviet economic potential has strikingly changed. Before the Russo-German war began in mid-1941, it would still have been true to emphasize that the main sources of Soviet power, whether measured in terms of manpower or of industrial output, lay preponderantly in European Russia west of the Volga. This area accounted for about two-thirds of each. With the destruction and removal of much of the economic capital of western and southern Russia in the war, the Heartland sprang into a position of preëminence, the more so when 1,300 large industrial plants, evacuated from the west, were reëstablished there while the war still raged. The U.S.S.R. has claimed that "the eastern regions" became then "a powerful base of supply of ammunition, weapons, tanks and aircraft for the Red Army," so that, between mid-1941 and mid-1945, their industrial output doubled while that of war industries increased five to sixfold. The nature, tempo and scale of industrial growth in the Soviet Heartland are clear enough: without its mounting production the Red Army's suc-

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cessful advance from the winter of 1942–43 onward could not have been achieved, even when full allowance is made for the substantial and well selected supplies shipped from the United States and the United Kingdom. But whereas in 1940 "the eastern regions" (*i.e.* the Heartland) had only 34 percent of total Soviet industrial production, the proportion will rise to 51 percent if the 1946–50 plan is fulfilled.[3] It should not, however, be inferred that the economies of the Heartland and of Russia west of the Volga are not in many ways interdependent: witness the inter-regional shipments of Baku oil, of central Asian cotton, of west Siberian wheat, of east Siberian tin and ore, and of nickel from Petsamo and the Taimyr peninsula. Nor should it be inferred that population east of the Volga has so increased as to account for as much as half of the all-Union total.

The fourth five-year plan for the "rehabilitation and development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R." aims not only to repair major war damage inflicted on the railway system, mines and power and industrial installations of western Russia, but also to effect by 1950 an over-all 48 percent increase in industrial output above the 1940 level. Although hopes to realize "the 1950 levels by 1949"—as a Soviet slogan put it—were not fulfilled all along the line, gross industrial production reached 53 percent above that of 1940 in the fourth quarter of 1949, when the 1950 target for rolled metal, coal, oil and electric power was exceeded. Owing in part to new accessions of territory and population, the U.S.S.R. now commands a labor force of 34,000,000, 15 percent greater than that of 1940. Malenkov has stated that by the end of 1949 the war-damaged areas, including the Donetz coalfield, attained their prewar levels of industrial output. The 1940 figures for the production of pig iron, steel and most of the non-ferrous metals were exceeded last year, and agriculture, if exception be made of livestock, is reaching its production targets. The plan calls for a production in 1950 of 35,400,000 metric tons of oil, 250,000,000 tons of coal, 19,500,000 tons of pig iron, 25,400,000 tons of steel and 82 billion kwh. of electric power. While any great over-fulfilment of the plan this year appears unlikely, for many important items in the economy the goals set have been already, or will soon be, reached. Over-all fulfilment of the plan does not, of course, imply that there may not be some failures to record, and

[3] Cited by A. Bergson, J. A. Blackman and A. Erlich in "Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Development in the U.S.S.R.," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May 1949, p. 53.

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such weak spots are the more serious in a planned economy which seeks to attain a high degree of self-sufficiency.

IV

Emphasis has been put on the changing scale and distribution of Soviet economy, for it is clear, in retrospect, that, owing to prejudice and ignorance, its strength was underestimated before the outbreak of World War II. Yet it would be equally wrong to exaggerate the U.S.S.R.'s present might and wrong to conclude that, should another major war ensue, the dice are as heavily weighted in favor of a combined East Europe and Heartland as Mackinder asserted. Soviet industrial output, viewed comparatively or expressed in terms of output per head of population, appears modest enough. And economic potential apart, there are a number of considerations which challenge Mackinder's belief in the great offensive and defensive strength of the vast area which now falls under Soviet control.

The conquest of polar air by modern long-range aircraft introduces a new factor since Mackinder first made his ominous pronouncements. During the honeymoon period of American-Soviet relations late in World War II, as Henry A. Wallace has told, useful air routes were established in high latitudes between Alaska and Soviet Asia. Indeed the ferrying of American aircraft by this route stimulated the development of ground facilities on both sides of the Bering Strait, while the activities of Dalstroi, seeking gold, tin and other metals in the Kolyma basin, also focused Soviet attention on northeast Siberia where it draws close to Alaska, which the Soviet press described recently as "Soviet territory in the hands of an alien Power." Just what the possibilities of the Arctic regions are as a theatre of war—cold desert, in contrast to the hot deserts in which valuable experience has already been gained—is not yet clear. Trans-polar flights to worthwhile objectives in Eurasia and North America, since the return flight must normally be assumed, would strain the present range of non-stop flight and involve serious navigation difficulties. Air strikes and airborne and seaborne landings, using the shorter distances across the Bering Strait, certainly appear practicable, for example in operations designed to achieve limited objectives or to divert and divide the military energies of adversaries. In any case, the U.S.S.R. can no longer militarily ignore her extended northern seaboard, leaving it safely secured by nature as Mack-

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inder originally assumed; nor, given the vast distances and deficient means of surface transport, could she hope easily to protect all her scattered airfields, populated centers and ports. Indeed, the general point emerges that, whatever value may attach to vast spaces in military strategy, in air defense they raise very serious difficulties. The task of defending from hostile aircraft the great length of the land and sea frontiers of the U.S.S.R. appears truly formidable, in striking contrast to that presented in a small state such as the United Kingdom.

Further, there arises the problem to what extent the use, in a major war, of the newest weapons—notably the atomic bomb—injects a wholly revolutionary factor into geopolitical assessments. It is abundantly clear that dictatorial régimes and aggressor states enjoy the great military advantages of swift action and surprise: they are on the spot because they alone know beyond doubt where it lies. Yet it must be assumed that the Western Powers are well aware that in certain vitally important areas—Western Europe, the Mediterranean, Southwest Asia and the Far East—military force must be ready to resist sudden aggression. It is in this context that the existence of atomic bombs challenges Mackinder's views, for he assumed that expansion outward from the Heartland and East Europe would leave the victor able to enjoy the fruits of victory and thus to increase his war potential. Armed with a superiority in atom bombs and in long-range aircraft, the Western Powers now possess a means of depriving an enemy of economic and military assets on a greatly enlarged scale. There are objectives in and around the Heartland, accessible from peripheral bases in Britain, the Middle East and the Far East, which it would appear necessary, on strictly military ground, to deny to a Heartland enemy. To enumerate some of the most obvious of such objectives, there are the Baku oilfields, which account for one-half of the U.S.S.R.'s oil production, on which depends not only her military and civil motor transport but also her industries and the food supplies derived from a highly mechanized agriculture; the Ruhr industrial region, untroubled development of which would add greatly to the military strength of its possessor; the Rumanian oilfield; the heavy industry of the Ukraine and of upper Silesia; and so on in descending order.

There are other considerations, too, which the Mackinder thesis does not take fully into account. The industrial potential of the Soviet Union and of her East European satellites, despite

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its growth in recent decades, is less than that of the Marshall Aid states of Europe, behind which lies the towering industrial strength of the United States. The possibilities of direct invasion of coastlands under aero-naval cover, in the light of World War II, are now more seriously to be reckoned with by a continental enemy. Is it also to be believed that the advantages of the U.S.S.R.'s territorial extent and geographical location—now somewhat impaired by the new skyways and by the increasing range of aircraft—can more than offset the primacy of the United States in technology and industrial capacity? And in a geopolitical power equation surely some increase in military effectiveness must be allowed to the West European states for the measures which they have already taken toward the integration of their military and economic resources—measures very difficult to effect yet practicable, thanks to the external danger which underlines their community of interest.

Expansion from an East European and Heartland base would involve a war not on one but on many fronts and create a situation for the U.S.S.R. unlike that which obtained in World War II, when Russia turned against Japan only after the war in Europe had ended. Such widespread belligerency, despite the U.S.S.R.'s much vaunted advantage of interior lines of transportation, would impose a severe strain on her railway system, on which the movement of men and matériel so largely depends. Although the mileage of the Russian railways is about double that of 1913 and the Soviets have sought to reduce the strain upon them by creating regional bases of population and industry, the fact remains that the railroads are heavily burdened even in peacetime and would become in wartime, if subjected to air attacks, a highly vulnerable part of the war machine. The railway system would appear most vulnerable at Moscow itself, since it is at once its chief node and the mainspring of a highly-centralized economy. In Soviet Asia beyond the Urals, where roads are underdeveloped and often useless during the spring thaw, great importance attaches to the skeletal railway system. There is no real network, in particular for the double-tracked Trans-Siberian and the remaining single-track lines. It is true that the Red Army is distributed regionally and organized from bases toward the frontiers—from Tbilisi for South Caucasus, Alma Ata for Central Asia, Irkutsk and Chita for Eastern Siberia, and Khabarovsk for the Far East—but the supply of these widely-spaced theatres in wartime

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would involve long hauls of men and equipment from the major sources of supply. The Soviet Union's interest in the aggression of North Korea, whatever else it may include, cannot be unrelated to the vulnerability from air attack of the Trans-Siberian life lines which diverge from Manchouli toward its Pacific ports of Vladivostok and Port Arthur.

Mackinder paid no attention to the question of morale. In a defensive war, it would seem, Soviet morale can be relied on, for Russian nationalism is a powerful auxiliary to Soviet sentiment: that at least is the lesson of the Russo-German war of 1941–45. But in a war of world conquest, far from the Soviet borders? It is perhaps significant that the start of the U.S.S.R.'s short war against Japan—a war of offense—evoked little popular support in Russia. An aggressive war might at least strain the ideological solidarity of the numerous peoples of the Union, by revealing (what they are never told) the actual conditions of life in other countries. The solidarity, too, of Moscow's East European satellites might not prove too reliable: after all, the task of insulating the Soviet Union might prove very unenviable in time of war. Further, Mackinder did not envisage what is involved in an attempt to command or control that diversified half of humanity which occupies "Asiatic" or monsoon Asia. Certainly this is a formidable task from which even ardent political planners might shy—unless, by methods of ideological propaganda and long-range infiltration, they had already imposed their will on these peoples by first conquering their minds. It is surely a gross oversimplification to conceive of monsoon Asia, as Mackinder did, as a merely littoral fringe of Eurasia, automatically subject to the command of either the Heartland or the sea. And lastly, did Mackinder sufficiently appreciate that Africa, though part of the World-Island (since it is insular and almost wholly dependent politically on Western Europe), might well prove defensible even against continental power in Europe and Southwest Asia?

German authorities on the art of war have continually emphasized the "invulnerable hugeness of Russia" in the belief that space strengthens defensive as it weakens offensive warfare. But this is a traditional belief that does not reckon with the mobility of modern mechanized warfare. It has already been suggested that space can be a major difficulty in air defense, and in military campaigns long lines of communication from bases of supply can prove an embarrassment to either side. Certainly the interior

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lines of the East Europe-Heartland bloc would be greatly stretched in a war of expansion and expose themselves to possible flank attack by air, land or sea forces developed from the periphery. Such vantage points are easily seen on a globe: the Baltic and Black Sea entries, the head of the Adriatic (hence Soviet interest in Albania which commands the seaward approach), Greece, Turkey, Iraq, Persia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Japan.

Even though Mackinder's assertion that "Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island" can no longer be sustained, it is scarcely necessary to insist that his geopolitical thinking is still relevant to the task of winning the peace. A strong believer in the British Empire and distrustful of Russian designs in Asia, he called attention to the danger of overweening continental power, noting in particular the defensive strength and strategical possibilities of a linked East Europe and Heartland. It is refreshing and perhaps even surprising to recall that the weight of Russian power has been thrown with effect against attempts at world domination in the three major wars of the last 140 years: against Napoleon, against the German Empire and against Nazi Germany and Japan. In the last-named struggle, the foodstuffs, oil, coal, steel and armaments of the Heartland were indispensable to victory. If the pessimists are proved right, however, and another world war breaks out, Sir Halford Mackinder's predictions will be more severely tested than ever before. What have been called here his "predictions," he would have urged rather as "warnings." That the Western Powers have heeded these warnings seems clear enough when the geographical aspect of their recent foreign policies is studied. There remain areas—great and small—outside and even within the Heartland, the retention of which is vital to the containment of the U.S.S.R. and loss of which might well upset the existing uneasy balance. These areas, accessible to sea power, may be grouped under three heads: the Marshall Aid states on the western and southern flanks of Europe; Southwest Asia, with its rich oilfields and world crossways; and Japan, her rôle now recast as an advanced base from which to resist aggression. But though consideration of the Heartland concept in relation to the Soviet Union and to the geopolitical realities of the present time reveals certain geographical advantages of the U.S.S.R. in warfare, it does not justify Mackinder's implied prediction about the future mastery of the world.

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THE INTEGRATION OF EUROPE: DREAMS AND REALITIES

By Paul-Henri Spaak

EVERYWHERE there is talk of the "integration" of Europe. There is a tendency to use the word as a panacea for all the problems of the Continent; and for many people the idea of "integrating" Europe implies the realization of the age-old dream of reconciliation and human fraternity. But though integration is not a panacea, a profound transformation of Europe certainly is necessary, and I am one of those who believe that such a transformation must include not only organization of Europe's resources but eventually the union of the European countries.

The Europe of which I speak is, alas, a mutilated continent, cut by the iron curtain. As a result of Russian policy and Soviet Communism, the Continent is now, more than ever, a "cape of Asia." "Europe" is merely a long strip of land stretching from Stockholm to Ankara. But this Europe possesses a magnificent tradition and represents an impressive sum of spiritual values. Examined closely, it also represents a great material force. Individually and collectively, however, the Western European countries no longer hold the place they occupied at the end of the last century. In absolute figures, their production and trade are still considerable, but proportionally their share in the world's total wealth is becoming smaller and smaller. Their political and military importance, as well as their intellectual influence, are likewise declining.

Militarily, the distinction between the Great Powers of Europe and other European countries no longer has much meaning. Even in concert the European countries cannot defend themselves from attack from the East unless the United States gives them powerful assistance. Moreover, since the First World War, Europe has managed to maintain itself economically only with the help of the United States. Those who believe that the Marshall Plan is an innovation are grossly mistaken; actually it is only the most recent manifestation of a policy that has been in effect since World War I. During the period between the two wars, the United States invested in Europe, or gave or loaned, more than 100 billion dollars, of which approximately 20 billion dollars were returned,

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the remaining 80 billion dollars being swallowed up in the Continent's misfortunes. But it is no less true that without Marshall aid, Europe would have suffered an economic crisis worse than anything it experienced in the worst days of the war, and would very probably not have been able to prevent the Communist wave from spreading to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

Those who believe that in the long run it is impossible for Europe to solve its problems by grace of American generosity seek to organize the forces of the different European countries in order to utilize their maximum power. This task of organization has recently made rapid progress in the creation of the O.E.E.C., the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty and the establishment of the Council of Europe, but large obstacles remain. Americans sometimes imagine that the problem is the same as the one which confronted the authors of the American Constitution, and tend to attribute the refusal of Europeans to follow that precedent to a lack of good will.

The question is not as simple as that, however. There are points in common between America at the end of the eighteenth century and Europe today, and I believe that the farsightedness and courage of Hamilton, Madison, Jay and the others hold great lessons for Europeans. But the two situations are not analogous. We must not minimize the importance of the absence of a common language in Europe, of the existence of age-old national traditions and of the memory of rivalries expressed down the centuries in long, bloody and often cruel wars.

With good will, obstacles such as these would be surmounted, but economic obstacles offer a greater difficulty. In recent years it has been pointed out, in all sorts of conferences, that the prosperity of one country depends upon the prosperity of others; but it is one thing to accept this truism in principle, and another to accept the immediate consequences of putting it into practice. Europe must be rebuilt; but to rebuild Europe means, at the beginning, injuring certain legitimate interests. It may mean creating unemployment in some places for a period of time. It may mean ruin for certain individuals and certain groups. To create a new and better economic balance in Europe we must first destroy the old one. The implications of this are formidable, and those who are not aware of them or deny that they are important make the solution of the problem more difficult. Indeed, such an attitude can lead only to bitter disappointments all around.

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For example, those who oversimplify things ask: "Why doesn't Western Europe at least organize itself into a customs union?" I can speak on this point with some authority, since one of the things that I am most proud of in a rather extensive political life is the share that I had in constructing the Benelux economic union among Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg in London during the war. Two of the three countries—Holland and Belgium—are practically identical in size, and two—Belgium and Luxembourg—had previously been joined in an economic union. They possess economies which may be said to be complementary, in so far as this is possible today. Yet there have been many difficulties since the union was decided upon in principle in 1944, and a great deal of patient work has been needed. At the start of our efforts, we saw that an economic union required not only the abolition of customs duties among the participating countries, but the adoption of a single tariff for all other countries. We saw, moreover, that the interests to be protected were not always the same; indeed, the more the economies of two countries complement each other, the more their interests differ. Above all, we very soon realized that in order to make our economic union a reality, we had to harmonize not merely the financial and economic policies of the member countries, but even their social policies.

I do not say that such policies must be identical, for that would be impossible; but they cannot differ too greatly. Thus, the plans for Benelux were delayed by the fact that very soon after liberation Belgium abandoned her wartime rationing while the Netherlands was obliged to retain these restrictions. A liberal economy and a directed economy are incompatible, and it took a long time to work out the mutual concessions which eliminated the most striking differences. Then after making our customs duties uniform, we had to standardize our excise taxes, and in this field we encountered difficulties born of deeply-rooted habits. In Belgium, for example, beer is favored as a beverage over liquors; in the Netherlands, the preference is the opposite. The Netherlands has a salt tax which, in Belgium, was one of the causes of the Revolution. The regulations affecting gasoline and sugar industries, agricultural policy, production subsidies—all were different and had to be studied and changed to achieve harmony.

Now we are reaching our goal. The fact should inspire confidence and serve as an example. But if, instead of building an economic union of three countries, we had been obliged to build

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one of ten or twelve, the attempt would very likely have failed.

II

It is incorrect to assume that an economic union is the only means of improving Europe's position. It is the extreme, ideal solution, but apart from this there are all sorts of intermediate steps that can be taken with great benefit. One thing, surely, is clear. The organized international life for which we are working cannot be realized unless we destroy the dogma of the absolute sovereignty of states. A real international organization and absolute national sovereignty are contradictory and irreconcilable ideas. Either we accept a world of anarchy based upon force, or we build a world where peace and order are possible. If we choose the second goal, we must abandon the old idea that any one country, great or small, can do as it pleases. But once we accept this principle that national sovereignty is subject to limitations, we must allow day-to-day experience to determine the concrete measures which will take us to the objective of a world governed by law. If tomorrow we asked the people of the great European countries, or even of the small countries, whether they would allow an international organization to regulate their economic policies, the answer would very probably be in the negative. But what cannot be achieved by frontal attack can be done by dividing the problem and laying before the people a series of concrete steps that call for a gradual renunciation of sovereignty. Actually, every time a country concludes a treaty, it voluntarily limits its rights. In joining the United Nations each state, despite the veto, accepts a limiting set of rules and regulations, and theoretically, at least, renounces war and accepts the complicated processes of arbitration. If it is sincere it gives up its exclusive control over a whole series of things which, less than 50 years ago, every state considered natural and legitimate expressions of its sovereignty.

The Western European Governments are incapable of explicitly yielding up their sovereignty over particular economic matters, but in fact they are moving along a path that leads indirectly to this result. The problem which is insoluble if posed in absolute and theoretical terms is being solved by practical action.

M. Robert Schuman's recent bold proposal is a clear illustration of the thesis I am advancing. The French Foreign Minister has approached the question of state sovereignty in a practical way. In order to solve a specific problem—the pooling of Europe's

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coal and steel production—he has proposed a system that necessarily implies a supranational authority. This system also has the enormous merit of defining precisely the political aims it seeks to achieve. They are extremely important: what is in question is a permanent settlement of the problem of Franco-German relations and the explicit integration of Germany with Western Europe.

The Schuman proposal places inescapable responsibility on every government which professes itself interested in the common welfare. None can minimize the seriousness of the issue that has been raised. We have reached a decisive moment in the history of Europe. Even among the governments which at bottom disagree with the plan, none dares openly oppose the idea, for no government wishes to be responsible for causing it to fail. So far-reaching an economic development as this requires for success not only a radical transformation of our old ways of thinking, but the creation of new administrative organs. Obviously, they must cross national boundaries. If they did not, the very essence of M. Schuman's proposal would be nullified. Henceforth the need is not for the enunciation of noble ideals, but for the readiness to take action. The Schuman plan implies that the living standards of the workers in the participating countries will be brought into balance, that social security charges will be equalized, investments coördinated, and less-favored industries compensated at the expense of the more favored. It implies a series of measures that would make it possible to close enterprises which can exist only if they are protected. All this can be done only if in each country the necessary powers are given to a supranational agency, acting for the good of all and consequently possessing the necessary authority. Timid or selfish people will shrink at the very statement of the problem. True, the problem is enormous, but so much depends upon finding a solution for it that great effort and boldness are justified. If the Schuman plan becomes a reality within a few months, the problem of the abandonment of a fraction of state sovereignty by the nations of Europe will have been given a practical answer. One of the great obstacles to the organization of Europe will have been overcome. We shall have only to follow this extraordinarily significant precedent.

Mr. Acheson has proposed the creation of a single, well-organized military force for all of Western Europe, and this proposal brings the West face to face with the same sort of problem in a different field. It calls for the same kind of practical solution. If

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the Western European countries want some day to be able to prevent or repeal an act of aggression, they must pool their military potential, and this they can do only by merging their military forces. In this field, too, it is high time we rid ourselves of prejudices and outworn traditions, and began to think in terms of the present era and of the danger that threatens us. To try to "coördinate" the individual activities of 15 different countries is an utterly inadequate way of meeting the danger. We shall not solve the vital problem of security until we have conceived and realized the Army of the Brussels Pact or, better yet, the single Army of the Atlantic Pact. We need as soon as possible a man of great experience, influence and prestige to lead this project and be personally responsible to the various Parliaments for the progress of the European defense organization. He would be not only a Commander-in-Chief, but a joint War Minister, so to speak.

The Korean episode is a solemn warning of the need for haste. I approve the action of the United States in Korea. I admire the resolution shown by President Truman. But why must heroism always be asked to retrieve for us what prudence might have given us at less cost? Why must it be that the democracies are always late and that for them only the hour of danger is the hour of wisdom? The effort necessary to meet this present danger cannot be called forth if national selfishness takes precedence over the requirements of the common safety.

For my part—and I say this in plain words, based upon reasoning as valid for an Englishman or a Frenchman as for a Belgian—I say that I prefer to prevent war and, if it comes, to win it under a foreign command rather than lose it under my own national command. The task we must accomplish *is* a common task. Our task is together to defend a certain civilization, a certain way of life and a certain philosophy. Each nation must contribute its share to this common task; each can do this effectively only if all our individual efforts are merged in a single effort.

If we approach the problem of our defense in the proper manner, once more the obstacle of national sovereignties will be overcome. We are beginning to get a clear idea of the borderline between dreams and reality with regard to the organization of Europe. Conceived and desired by idealists, the new Europe will nonetheless be a product of actualities. It will not be born full-panoplied from a few men's brains; it will be the result of long and patient effort in the course of which we shall first of all have to

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solve a whole series of difficult practical problems. But this new Europe is the end we must achieve if we wish one of the most glorious civilizations in history to survive two world wars and the threat of Communism.

III

What should be the reaction of the United States to these basic aspects of European integration? I would like to repeat once more what I have said very often—that Europeans and Americans should become more familiar with each others' special problems. I am sure that the fate of our civilization depends upon their friendship and their joint action. The gratitude that Western Europeans feel for so many real efforts and sacrifices by the United States is enormous and unquestionable, but I would like to be sure that Americans realize that by helping to save Europe, they are not only showing generosity to foreign countries, but are providing themselves with essential protection. The prosperity of Europe and the power of Europe are factors that can prevent a third world war. Russia has no interest in making war on Europe. If the Russians decide to make war, they will do so to destroy capitalism and democracy, so that the Communist ideology can dominate the entire world. For the Soviet Union, the key to this problem is not Europe, but the United States. A third world war will not break out until the Russians are sure that they can defeat the United States. They can never be sure of that if they find in their path a Western Europe that is proof against their ambitions. It is for this reason above all that the United States must continue to play her part in rebuilding Europe's strength.

I have always wanted the United States to take advantage of her own strength and her concern with the welfare of Europe to push the Continent toward "integration." At times I should welcome even more boldness; but Americans must at the same time clearly realize that the task will require many years—that progress in great and complex affairs of this kind cannot be uninterrupted. It would be wrong for Americans to turn away from Europe because they felt that the European countries were not advancing quickly and boldly toward integration. When there are interruptions I shall understand the disappointment of Americans because I shall share it. But the precondition of success is the awareness that this is a long-term undertaking.

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THE PROBLEM OF REVOLUTIONARY ASIA

By John K. Fairbank

OUR military resistance to Communist aggression in Korea has been entirely necessary and unavoidable, yet it has brought with it the danger that American policy toward Asia may become preponderantly military and so defeat itself. May we again win a war but lose the peace to follow? Win the conflict in Korea but lose most of Asia?

It is significant that our military action in Korea since June 25 has been more vigorous and more fully supported by a united public opinion than was our political action there during the preceding five years. We Americans have learned how to fight, even in rice-paddies. But the political problems of revolutionary Asia have largely baffled us. The use of our China policy as a political football in the contest between the Republican and Democratic Parties has been regrettable, if not indeed disastrous; but it could hardly have occurred if the American public had been united in its understanding of the revolutionary process in China.

The unity of the American people on the issue of Korea thus gives us a rare opportunity to develop a more comprehensive and positive policy. This opportunity cannot be utilized, as some suggest, by a sole concentration on warfare in Korea and on mobilization at home. Our weakness in dealing with the Asian revolution in the past has not been solely military or material. It has also been intellectual, psychological and political.

We need to agree upon an analysis of the sources of Communist strength in China, as well as in Korea. We must then envisage more fully the rôle which the American people could play in Asia, if they would, in competition with the Russian influence. How can we relate ourselves more constructively to the forces of social change? How can we forestall the Communist capture and use of these forces for the ends of Communist power?

My own conclusion is that the effort to ally ourselves with "nationalism" in Asia and to use it as a bulwark against Communism is a will-o'-the-wisp unless we combine "nationalism" with "reform" in a very specific and sophisticated manner. In the final analysis, "reform" is the more fundamental force. The effort to comprehend the nature of the revolutionary process in Asia is the most pressing necessity in our current mobilization.

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II. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT

Any analysis of the sources of Communist strength in a country like China must begin with the social context in which the Communists have risen to power. It is hard, if not impossible, for Americans to appreciate this context of social change. The breakdown of the traditional, self-sufficient farm economy, the loosening of the bonds of the old family system, the rise of national consciousness, the emancipation of women and of youth—these are all abstract and general labels which Far Eastern specialists are accustomed to use but which mean little to the American public. Sympathetic insight into the mainsprings of revolution is not easily acquired from a distance. Too few Americans are tenants dependent upon their own hand labor in the fields to understand the bitterness of anti-landlordism. Few non-Negro Americans belong to racial-cultural-geographical minorities that can appreciate the intense feeling of anti-colonialism. "Feudalism" and "imperialism" do not seem our mortal enemies. Ancient glories in our historical heritage do not contrast with an ignominious recent past—no one has been calling us "natives." In short, we have little basis in our own experience for a sympathetic understanding of the motives and feelings which can be used by organizers of revolution in Asia.

The raw ingredients of social revolution, which lie ready at hand in the villages of China, India and the countries in between, must also be distinguished from the process of revolution, by which they are combined and kindled into explosive activity. The backward technology and low productivity in a Chinese village, the stresses and strains in the old kinship structure and the old class structure, the mounting frustrations of a teeming populace gifted with intelligence and infected with hope of a better life—these are not factors making inevitably for Communism, but merely for change. For us the important question is: How did the Chinese Communists unlock the energy of the Chinese village? How did they crack the traditional structure of these atomic elements in Chinese society and control their chain reaction?

III. THE COMMUNIST RISE TO POWER

This deserves our closest study. It is noteworthy that Communism made little progress in China until it found the formula of combining agrarian reform with nationalism. At the end of the

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first decade of Comintern effort in China, the movement was almost a failure, certainly on the defensive. From 1921 to about 1931 the Comintern's main stress had been laid upon the organization of China's weak city proletariat, since by Marxist-Leninist doctrine only it could lead the revolution. The peasant was esteemed less than the urban worker. When Mao Tse-tung eventually broke out of this doctrinaire cul-de-sac by simply organizing peasants, he called them a "landless proletariat" and used other euphemisms to hide his unorthodoxy. By 1932 he was basing Communist power on the countryside, where most of China lives. Chinese Communism rode to power on the backs of an organized peasantry which provided both the manpower for the Communist armies and the food to feed them, both the local espionage network to frustrate the Kuomintang and the coolie corps to support the Eighth Route Army.

How does one organize peasants? The Communist formula has seemed simple and effective: two classes are needed—the peasant masses of the villages and the intellectual youth recruited from the towns and cities. Once indoctrinated and trained, the latter organize the former and the job is done. But how does one recruit the intellectual and idealistic youth of the nation?

Chinese Communism was at a low ebb in the early 1930's when Mao took over. It remained on the periphery of Chinese politics until Japan struck in 1937. From then on the Chinese Communists became leaders of a patriotic effort in North China, for which Western observers at the time rightly gave them credit. Peasants can never be organized so easily as when foreign invaders are burning and raping in the land: the Japanese army delivered the farming populace of North China into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, which was ready and waiting to receive them. More important, the Communists found that the intellectual youth of China responded to the call of patriotism, in the war of resistance against Japanese invasion, in a way that they never had to the call of anti-landlordism in the hills of Kiangsi.

Until the war of resistance, the intellectual youth of China had been largely cut off from the peasantry by that subtle but pervasive bifurcation of Chinese traditional society which made it impossible for long-gowned students to mingle with illiterate peasants on a common ground. Getting the literati into direct contact with the villages was the first essential. This process had begun at the time of the Nationalist Revolution of the 1920's, but

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Japan gave it an impetus that it had never had before. Tens of thousands of Chinese students from the middle schools and colleges went to Free China, where the Chinese Communists soon outdid the Kuomintang in enlisting and training cadres for village mobilization. When the Japanese war ended, Chinese Communism had a grip on the two essentials of power—agrarian revolution as the dynamic of the peasantry and national regeneration as the dynamic of the intellectuals.

The Chinese Communist use of these two elements of power is an object lesson in revolutionary technique. The first stage was the creation of a peasant-supported military force in a territorial base area, such as Ho Chi Minh has in Tonkin, such as the Huks are evidently seeking today on Mindanao. Let us repeat: the peasantry supplied both the manpower and the food supply for the guerrilla armies, the intellectuals of the student class provided the cadres of party-workers necessary to organize the peasantry. In a land which consists of innumerable peasant villages, as most of Asia does, the mobilization and control of the agrarian populace is the key to military power. This activation of the peasantry in turn is achievable only through the devoted work of an élite body of evangelists of the revolution—mainly boys and girls drawn from the esteemed scholar class, imbued with the patriotic fervor of wartime, indoctrinated with the Marxist-Leninist view of the world and trained to use the methods of village organization which Chinese Communism has perfected.

As this new power became established in its territorial bases in North China, it proceeded with a second stage, the economic-political-cultural reorganization of the peasant village society. The whole "liberation" movement deserves more careful study by competitors of Communism: its combination of persuasion and coercion, its use of hope and of fear, its remaking of class structure and cultural values, all provide a textbook study in "social engineering." This program unlocked energies which had been for centuries stultified in the old social order, utilized suppressed desires which had long sought expression, and under the slogan of "Liberation" created a new system of power.

It is a truism that in the peasant-based society of China, the surplus for investment, if it is not to be borrowed from abroad or gained through foreign trade, must come in the main from the peasant economy. Thus the new régime must squeeze the agrarian surplus from the farmer just as inexorably as the landlord class

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ever did. The all-important difference is that the new government not only collects this surplus more efficiently but uses it for wider social ends.

Substituting the government for the landlords has its precedents in Chinese history, but a great deal more has gone with this change-over than the old Confucian literati ever dreamt of. The Communist order in China has fundamentally new ideas and methods, which we minimize at our peril. Among these is its use of the modern technology of communications: the centralized Leninist party apparatus, the monopolistic propaganda machine, and the open and secret police networks. These are familiar features of Communist states elsewhere. They constitute a totalitarian control system more effective and comprehensive than anything in China's past, even when based upon some of the same sanctions as the old imperial administration, with its network of officials, its orthodox Confucian ideology and its monopoly of police power.

Thus agrarian reform is fitted at last into a new pattern of state power. Similarly the patriotism of the Chinese peasant and party worker is channeled into the service of the nation. Increased production, industrialization for defense—these conceptions focus the national effort. They are valid expressions of nationalism.

Let us note one essential step in this Communist rise to power—the capture of the Chinese "liberals," that stratum of unorganized individuals of literary and artistic abilities who have inherited the tradition of scholarship and the position of literati. The Chinese Communist approach to these individuals was in their terms, speaking the language of liberalism, expressing the disgust of the intellectual for corruption and self-seeking in high places, the despair of the patriot over official incompetence, and the hope of high-minded idealists for a better world. Indeed, if these promises of peace, order and plenty should be fulfilled and China not be prostituted for Russian ends, we in America would have no need to fear the course of developments in Asia. Like Pandit Nehru, we cannot rule this happy prospect out of account in China; but neither can we accept it as probable, in view of the Communist record elsewhere.

The desertion of the intellectuals from the old order was a crucial factor in its collapse. As the Nationalist Government sank deeper in a morass of inflation, disinvestment and incompetence, its police and party organizers sought to suppress the disaffection

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of the intellectuals, and so pushed them directly into the Communist camp. Equally important, however, was the appeal of the Marxist-Leninist view of the world.

The harness and checkrein of the new order is its dogmatic ideology of revolution, which can be manipulated only from the top. In the setting of peasant Asia, the Marxist-Leninist formulas take on concrete meaning. "Feudalism," that ill-defined word, becomes identified with the old order of landlordism. Capitalism becomes an outmoded phase of inevitable world history in which the United States is still backwardly immersed. Most of all, the shopworn thesis of Lenin that imperialism is the necessary final stage of capitalism is used first to explain the aggression of Japan in China (on the theory that the *Zaibatsu* sought profits by war abroad) and then to explain the American support of Chiang Kai-shek (as evidence of the classic tie-up between native feudalism and foreign imperialism). "Feudalism" as the landlord and "imperialism" as the foreign invader make good sense to a peasant or a party worker. After all, even Chiang Kai-shek, in "China's Destiny," showed himself, unconsciously like so many others, a believer in Lenin's theory of imperialism.

It is illusory to think that this made-in-Moscow ideology is incompatible with the sentiment of nationalism, particularly in the early stages of Communist revolution. The Chinese patriot who has felt the humiliation of China's "backwardness" and the "unequal treaties" can rejoice in what seems Communist China's new chance to be in the vanguard of progress.

In practice we outside observers are inclined to overlook the fact that Communist movements are in the main carried on by native converts. It is hard to convince a Chinese Communist who feels himself patriotic that he has sold out to Russia. It is as easy for the Chinese Communists nowadays to suggest that a Chinese Christian has accepted an unpatriotic spiritual tutelage to the West. Like any other faith, Communism is accepted as a way to salvation—national salvation quite as much as human salvation in general.

This brief analysis suggests that the Communist system, with its Russian allegiance, can expand to almost any part of Asia that offers conditions similar to those in China, Korea or Indo-China. An insecure peasantry and a frustrated intelligentsia, the hope for economic improvement and national regeneration, are ready at hand to be organized in the Communist pattern. How can the

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United States compete with this system in its seemingly inexorable advance?

IV. THE USE OF NATIONALISM

Military strength is a first essential for any American policy in Asia, as in Europe, since the Russian threat of force can be offset only by a corresponding threat of force. But to concentrate solely on the creation of military force would be a shortcut to disaster. Communism does not rely on arms alone. Neither can we.

To supplement our rearmament, should we seek to ally ourselves in Asia with the forces of "nationalism"? This is an easy slogan to announce. But nationalism is of many kinds. Let us distinguish two varieties—the conservative and the reformist-revolutionary. Conservative patriots in Asia may have no less love of country than their rivals, and yet have little or no comprehension of the social forces making for revolution. Conservatives in power are of course prone to preserve their power at the expense of change. By some, "nationalism" in Asian countries is taken to mean simply "anti-Communism," on the tenable theory that no real Communist can have the good of his country as the ultimate criterion of his effort. The defect in this kind of "nationalism" is the same as that in any and all "anti-Communism" in Asia—given the context of social change, the key to power lies in active programs of change, not in programs of suppression nor even of maintaining stability.

The true nationalist appeal in backward Asia consists not merely in preserving one's country from outside control, as might be sufficient in the West, but of constructing one's country anew, solving its many problems, uplifting its ragged millions, and remaking its society in every respect where it now is inadequate. Thus the higher patriotism of the modern Orient is compounded of love of country and belief in its potentialities, faith in its future rebuilding, and determination to carry through great social changes. This is the other kind of nationalism—the reformist-revolutionary kind, to be found among most of the Asian leaders who have come to power since the war. Nationalist reformers of this type can lead the Asian revolutionary process, while leaders who identify their own careers with the welfare of their countries and become bent upon holding power lose their following. The nationalism toward which such leaders as Nehru, Soekarno and Thakin Nu appear to be working is compounded of diverse things,

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many of which are in the realm of the spirit—self-respect and self-confidence, the expression of national culture. We cannot assist this kind of national fulfillment solely by a program of arms and anti-Communism.

The project of stopping Russia by aiding nationalism thus has to be broken down into a more complex series of problems. The peoples of Asia seek to realize their national life in all its many and varied potentialities. Many Chinese today hope to do it under Communist leadership; the Peking Government already claims the usual plethora of achievements, many of which are undoubtedly real. It is the hope of realizing these many potentialities that makes up the real appeal of "nationalism" in Asia—to develop agricultural production, to industrialize for national strength and welfare, to alleviate disease, illiteracy, poverty and ignorance, to build up a genuine "people's democracy" in the proper sense. This expanded nationalism seeks both freedom and welfare, both independence and growth, both political and economic progress—dynamic "reform" in the broadest sense.

V. LEADERSHIP IN ASIA

Since the United States is of all countries the richest in technological and other resources, we have a great opportunity to participate in the remaking of Asia. With a modicum of capital equipment our agricultural specialists can do much to raise Asia's productivity. But this is a political as well as an economic problem. One lesson learned from our private assistance to China's Rural Reconstruction movement in the 1930's—such as the Rockefeller Foundation gave to Jimmy Yen's mass education movement at Ting-hsien in North China—was that the upbuilding of peasant life through programs of literacy, health, technical improvement and coöperative effort sooner or later threatens the established order of tenant-landlord relationships. The local political power must therefore be behind the reconstruction movement and not feel itself obliged to rely upon the landlord interest, as the wartime Kuomintang Government felt obliged to do after Japan had pushed it into southwest China.

The most recent proof of this comes from the successful work of the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction which was set up by the China Aid Act of 1948 and has been continuing its work in Formosa: the J. C. R. R. program of reducing tenant rents to 37.5 percent and extending landlord contracts to

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three years really got under way only at the last moment, when the Communists were just over the hill. Only then did the landlord interest, facing extinction, acquiesce in the program; only then could official support become vigorous and adequate. Even today the J. C. R. R.'s main problem is to find peasant associations—those inveterate enemies of the landlord—which are strong enough to carry on the many aspects of the reform. In short, it is plain that American specialists, backed with American technology and some supplies, can help carry through genuine rural reform programs; but they must have the active political backing of the local régime. The Asian government in question must aim at reform, not mere self-defense. It cannot be primarily a landlords' government. This means that agrarian reform, even when helped by us, must depend for its main impetus upon an Asian leadership. Our key problem is, therefore, to find and support those Asian leaders who have the youthful vision and the dynamic idealism to seek a genuine reconstruction of the life of the peasant masses on a non-totalitarian basis.

Here we face the fact that the Communist leadership in Asia has been carefully selected, trained and nurtured by the international movement centered in Moscow. This Russian equivalent to the American program of educating Asian youth has concentrated upon the Marxist-Leninist science of organizing revolutionary power. Our own training of "returned students," on a largely private basis in a variety of subjects at all sorts of universities, has lacked this concentration of purpose. So it is that Chinese trained in the United States are today becoming civil servants under the Communist régime at Peking. We have supplied the trained technicians, the Communists have supplied the new order that makes use of them. This is an index of our own ideological inadequacy to meet the problems of social change in Asia. Students who return to Asia from this country have new skills and insights into the potentialities of modern technology applied to human problems, but they have been given little guidance from us as to how these skills can be applied to the specific problems of Asia. We do not pretend to understand peasant problems, which are beyond our range of study. The American ideology has not yet been applied to the far-different conditions of Asian life. The freedoms of the Anglo-Saxon political tradition are not easily transplanted to alien societies. We have not devoted much attention to making export versions.

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Asia thus represents an ideological vacuum in American life. Its problems are not understood by our public, and we lack a comprehensive view and a corresponding will to act in that half of the world. For this weakness the only cure is to foster a greater degree of study and contact, partly in our schools and public life, partly by sending to these new countries of Asia where we still have access a greatly increased number of American students, specialists, travelers and people of good will in all walks of life. As a people we still have the vitality to respond to the intense problems of the Asiatic scene, provided we get in touch with them.

VI. CHANNELS OF AID

Our record in postwar China has a lesson which few Americans have bothered to study. It is significant, first of all, that American influence, which had been exerted for a century through private channels such as the missionary and educational movements as well as private business, suddenly in 1942 began to flow mainly through government channels. The beginning of our large-scale aid to the Nationalist Government marked a departure from the previous century of American activity. Now the United States Government began to carry the enlarged burden of aid to China. As a government it could do this only through the medium of its opposite number, the recognized government of China. This at once brought the United States Government into the Chinese political scene as it had never been before.

This new and greater American influence, however, was even less under our control than the private activity of an earlier day. U. S. Government aid to Free China during the war was given without strings attached in one instance after another. This pattern was set by the first half billion dollars granted to Chiang Kai-shek early in 1942. As the White Paper makes clear, Chiang refused the Treasury suggestion that he state how the money would be spent. The result was that China received an enormous sum outright, and until this day we do not know exactly what happened to it. We did not attach conditions to our gifts in wartime which would ensure that reform programs were undertaken by the Chungking Government. Ambassador Gauss' suggestion that American funds be used in a land reform program, to buy out the landlords, went unheeded. It is a question, of course, how far strings can be attached in our governmental relations with a state whose independence we espouse.

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This suggests that a sole reliance upon government channels as the media of our influence will defeat us by stifling our freedom of manœuvre and flexibility of approach. Throughout the last decade of our intimate relationship with the Nationalist régime, we have been at the mercy of our own principles of international law. The legal sovereignty of the Chinese Government has been further buttressed by the ardent nationalism of its leaders, averse to any semblance of foreign dictation. Finally, when our Government came to the point of formulating conscious programs for domestic reform in China, it was faced by the prior problem of combatting Russian expansion. The growing Communist power forced us into anti-Communism, as distinct from pro-reformism. The Communist success in polarizing Chinese politics put us on the defensive. By making us fearful of Communist subversion, they made us wary of pressing for reforms which the Communists advocated. We thus wound up talking reform but obliged to defend the status quo.

In this context, the Russian example again may be instructive. By the Leninist methods of dual activity in a foreign country—open and secret—Russia was able to maintain relations with the Nanking Government and gain concessions from it, as in Manchuria and Sinkiang. At the same time, the covert and subversive program of the Comintern and its successor system went forward on a different level. By this policy of hitting high and hitting low, both at once, whatever is not gained by formal diplomatic relations may be gained later by Communist-led domestic revolution, as has indeed occurred in China and might sometime threaten in Japan or the Philippines.

Such deception is not possible or acceptable for us. It is not the American aim to subvert foreign governments. We have no intention of pushing them around. But a permissible, honest and open duality of approach on our part might be achieved by an increase of private American contact with Asia, outside of government channels. Private and unofficial American citizens in any country undergoing great changes will include among their number some sympathetic or adventurous individuals who have the genius for participating in the local scene. This participation of private Americans in social movements abroad is part of our tradition. Under our system it cannot be officially organized although it can, by our government's action, be kept within constructive bounds. American support of the Industrial Coöperative Move-

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ment in China, the activities carried on under United China Relief and its successor, are recent examples of an established pattern first marked out by the missionaries of a century ago. American education in Asia, for example, has been a result of private activity. This amounts to saying that enterprising individuals must be left free and actively helped to represent us in Asia. American individuals, whether in business or in social services, with all their variety of talents and the multiplicity of organizations which they represent, are the apostles of the democratic idea. To keep them out of Asia is to tie one hand behind us.

American contact cannot be limited to the conservative factions. American students who did not become aware of the currents of social change abroad would hardly be worth sending there. Social scientists whose job it is to study revolutionary movements must have contact with them. We cannot compete with the Communist agents who are in the field against us unless we are willing to let Americans enter the fray and participate in the process of discussion and ideological ferment. If we deny ourselves contact with the welter of conflicting ideas and loyalties in which Communist subversion is making its bid for power in Asia, we will give the game to the Soviets by default.

In Asia, however, it is the governments that must lead in programs of reform and economic development. Many Asians admire nothing in America so much as the T. V. A. Their governmental programs are often called "Socialistic," meaning chiefly that their societies lack the pluralistic institutions which give us our strength. In Asia we must expect to find the state power playing a greater rôle in the new national life than is the case with us. Private initiative and local capitalist enterprise cannot be expected to do the job in a country like Indonesia or Burma which we expect it to do in our own country. While we may hope that those institutions will have their chance to develop in these new countries, we cannot look to them for immediate results.

This suggests that our competition with Communism in Asia can be mounted most effectively on a basis of increased private American contact arranged directly with the Asian governments. This unofficial American contact, represented on the ideological plane by students, professors, universities and research agencies, can be stimulated and financed in part by expanded State Department programs for educational and cultural exchange. Given the growing facilities of the Voice of America and the United States

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Information Service, our urgent need is not for outlets toward Asia but for inlets of ideas from Asia. Advertising America does not stop Communism abroad; our information and propaganda work needs an intellectual adaptation to the target audience more than it needs equipment. The great private sector of American education should be enlisted in this ideological effort at home, and mobilized for greater activity abroad.

On the plane of economic and technological aid, the beginnings under our own Point Four program and through the United Nations needs steady expansion—always bearing in mind that undeveloped economies cannot absorb such aid rapidly, and that technology alone, which can be prostituted for political purposes, is no bar to totalitarianism of the right or left.

It is plain that we can neither revive the old "imperialism" and "colonialism" nor escape the problems left in their wake. The new problem of creating a partnership between Eastern and Western states which claim equality in international law but are unequal in economic and military power has not been solved by the Communist system. We have it to solve. It is plain that our doctrine of self-determination for all peoples must be redefined to meet the reality of a world where power is concentrated in big states and the complete independence of small states is impossible. To solve this problem we cannot think purely in political terms, and when we broaden the scope of our thinking, we face at once the social and economic problems of the Asian revolution: how can peasant life be recreated, how can the patriotic intelligentsia be recruited to lead movements of reform, how can we inspire and help them to work out alternatives to the Communist system? We will get no answer, nor will we save Asia from Communism, except by a concerted nation-wide effort of study and action. Our success will depend upon the degree and quality of contact that we can establish, in the immediate future, with the peoples of Asia. In this nonmilitary effort every American agency, from Americans for Democratic Action and the Associated Press to Rotary and the Y. M. C. A., should be enlisted in an all-out intellectual mobilization.

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IMPONDERABLES OF THE SCHUMAN PLAN

By William Diebold, Jr.

THE day before Foreign Minister Schuman proposed the pooling of the steel and coal industries of France and Germany any number of statesmen, experts and journalists would have explained why such an offer could not be made. Now they are explaining why it has been made—the greatest gesture toward French-German rapprochement and the economic integration of Western Europe since the end of the war. What seemed but "the shadow of desires of desires" has suddenly become a possibility of practical politics, the daily fare of civil servants and politicians in half a dozen capitals.

By this initiative France has renewed her claim to a position of leadership in European affairs. She has, at one blow, stored up credit for herself in the opinion of much of the western world. Much has already been said and written about the vistas of peace and prosperity opened by the thought of creating "a new community of interests" in Western Europe. Rather less has been said about the aura of ambiguity that surrounds the Schuman Plan. There is, of course, great uncertainty about the kind of economic arrangements that will result from the negotiations. But the ambiguity stems from other sources as well, from the nature of the proposal and the circumstances in which it has been advanced.

The Schuman Plan may provide an end of Franco-German rivalry that is satisfactory to France. It may provide the machinery by which Germany finally dominates France. It may mark the point at which the continent moves sharply toward economic integration without Britain or it may demonstrate that British caution has all along enabled Continental governments to avoid facing decisions they did not care to make. The Plan may increase or decrease the amount of competition in the European steel industry; it may promote the most efficient allocation of production or it may hinder such a development in the interest of high cost producers and their governments. Carrying out the Schuman Plan may weld Germany to the West or it may draw France into a neutral bloc. And so on. On the most elementary level this means that different people will support the Schuman Plan for different reasons, trying to turn it to their own ends. But it also means that enthusiastic slogans, justified as they may seem, are not the best guides to understanding where this project may lead.

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When the results of the Paris negotiations are published we shall be able to discuss some of these possibilities more intelligently. Details are crucial. What the Schuman Plan may mean for the economy of Western Europe depends very largely on the "technical details" of the treaty or other conventions, and then on how these agreements are put into practice. Meanwhile, there may be value in speculating on some of the imponderables of the Schuman Plan. This is what is attempted here, and not a systematic or balanced discussion.

II

The origin of the Plan will make an interesting historical study. During the last war many official and unofficial planners hit on the idea of internationalizing the heavy industry of the Ruhr-Lorraine area. As early as 1942 the possibility was discussed in the "War and Peace Studies Project" of the Council on Foreign Relations as a means of controlling the Ruhr. From other sources came plans for international public corporations in coal and steel, as parts of a program of "functional coöperation" in Europe. Since the end of the war Barbara Ward and André Philip, among others, have recommended a similar approach. Many Socialist groups have studied a series of plans of this sort.

When the International Authority for the Ruhr was created, a number of Germans of widely differing political views reacted with a unanimity that was impressive—or suspicious. Much as they disliked foreign control of the Ruhr, they said, they would not actively oppose it provided this was the first step towards international control of the basic industries of all Western Europe. Perhaps this reflected a real desire for European union. Perhaps it was an attempt to combine present acquiescence, due to weakness, with a free hand for the future by postulating a condition that seemed impossible of achievement. No doubt the motives and their mixture varied from one group to another. This situation shows one of the advantages of the speed and surprise with which M. Schuman announced his proposal. Had there been time for the decision of the French Cabinet to be noised about, the chances are that either some of the Plan's enemies, or German groups bent on adding to their stature, would have begun describing M. Schuman's proposal as an acceptance of German demands. Had that view been widely accepted most of the political impact of the French initiative would have been destroyed.

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It was not only the Germans who talked of extending the Ruhr Authority to a wider area. The idea has had some popularity in the United States. More important, it has been said that members of the American delegation at the Six Power Conference which drew up the Ruhr Statute in 1948 informally advanced a proposal of this sort. In October 1949, Mr. McCloy suggested the same idea in a speech in London.

There is no evidence, however, that the Schuman Plan was directly inspired from the United States. This is the Communist line, which appears also to be believed by some of the anti-Stalinist left in Europe. The indications are that American officials were as much taken by surprise as anyone else. Of course, in making its decision the French cabinet must have been strongly influenced by the good impression the Plan was expected to make in the United States. Truman, Acheson, Hoffman and others have made statements welcoming the French initiative. M. Monnet has called on some of his American friends for advice in working out the Plan. However, American officials have leaned over backwards to avoid intervening in the negotiations or putting forth prescriptions for the Plan, at least in its early stages. They consider it of major importance that this enterprise originated in Europe and is to be worked out, in a satisfactory manner they hope, by Europeans.

III

Finding possible sources for the idea of the Schuman Plan does not explain French policy. Although the Plan is being worked out by six governments, and may be open to others, it was launched primarily as a new policy in French-German relations. Adenauer was the first prime minister to endorse the Schuman Plan. The French got his agreement to the controversial communiqué announcing the opening of negotiations before they submitted it to the British or other governments.

For several years France has been on the defensive in matters of German policy. On one issue after another the Americans—and to a lesser extent the British—have pressed for action to speed the rehabilitation of Western Germany and to remove many of the restrictions imposed when Potsdam was policy. The French wanted a slower pace and differed from the Anglo-Saxons on the kind and number of safeguards needed against the ultimate danger of a revival of German aggression. The French had their

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way in the Saar and gained material advantages at the cost of some political embarrassment. The International Authority for the Ruhr looked to many Frenchmen like a cretin instead of the stalwart they had envisaged. As the cold war got hotter and Bonn gained increased independence, many Frenchmen must have recalled how the dreams of the '20s became the nightmares of the '30s. The choice may well have seemed either equal rights—or even a preferred position—for Germany, including virtually free disposition of the Ruhr's resources, or equal diminution of the freedom of action of national governments, the French as well as the German.

In this setting, the Schuman Plan looks like an attempt to cut French losses and establish a wholly new situation at one blow. "In the immediate situation," wrote Raymond Aron in *Le Figaro* of June 7, "the Schuman project means above all that France is proposing the dialogue with Germany that has been obstinately refused up to the present." The official presentation of the Plan also emphasizes this aspect. Creation of the steel and coal pool "will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes, not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible," said the original communiqué approved by the French Cabinet. "If . . . particular stress is laid on the Franco-German aspect of the scheme," Ambassador Massigli explained to Mr. Bevin, "this is in order to give to the grand idea which is the inspiration of the scheme as striking a form as possible, particularly with regard to German opinion."

The Schuman proposals seem to rely on three main elements to nullify, or at least diminish, the threat that the French feel is inherent in being neighbors of the Germans. First, there are the political and psychological results hoped for from treating Germany as virtually an equal and emphasizing that France and Germany *together* must be at the core of European unity because they are the natural leaders of the Continent and share many problems. Second, creation of a single market for coal and steel would increase and tighten Germany's economic ties to the west; the offer also mentions the prospect of German participation in African development. Third, the "common higher authority" may be relied on to prevent German heavy industry from being put on a war basis. Underlying this policy might be a reassessment of the German position, taking into account the difference between truncated Western Germany with its heavy dependence on

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imported foodstuffs, and the prewar or Bismarckian Reich. The French might also be counting on the maintenance of Allied security controls in Germany. It is hard to imagine the Schuman Plan being carried out without removal of ceilings on German steel production but the Plan might be compatible with continued prohibition of the manufacture of arms in Germany.

Obviously there are risks in the new policy—if this is the new policy— but the French may feel they are no greater and perhaps less than those of the old policy, which seemed on the verge of bankruptcy. The Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* wrote: "The French Government is fully aware of the danger of an industrial union . . . in which the strongest single steel and coal industry would be Germany's. . . . But the French Government prefers this risk to that of a continued Western European division and the danger that Western Germany . . . should one day transfer her strength to the Eastern bloc, leaving France one vast Dunkirk beach."

If this is what the Schuman Plan means, there has been a radical change in dominant French thought about policy toward Germany. To discuss whether the change is a healthy one and the new risks well calcuated goes beyond the bounds of this article. Is there any significance in the fact that the Schuman Plan stems from the offices of the Monnet Plan in the Rue de Martignac rather than from around the corner on the Quai d'Orsay? It has been said that the Schuman Plan was made by Frenchmen who do not fear Germany. What about the rest of the Frenchmen?

Much depends on what foreign support the French feel they can count on. One reason the Schuman Plan caught the British unawares was that they had assumed, as had most other people, that the French would never go this far with the Germans without being sure of British support. What happened?

Did the French really expect the British to join in the negotiations? If that was a major aim it is hard to believe that the French would have insisted so strongly on formal acceptance of the high authority in advance of negotiations. Lord Brand offered a more plausible explanation to the House of Lords on June 28: "I should say that the French were more concerned to maintain their principle of the high authority in relation to Germany than to see the British taking part in the negotiations. They have the object, I am sure, of making the partnership with Germany very difficult to break."

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Does this mean that the French are convinced the pool can be safely undertaken without British participation? Or do they expect that for commercial or political reasons the British will eventually have to come into the Plan on some basis? Foreign Minister Schuman has frequently mentioned this possibility and Sir Stafford Cripps told the Commons, " . . . we are prepared to do our utmost either to join in or to associate ourselves with any scheme that meets with the approval of the six countries now meeting in Paris." But if no such arrangement is made, what will the French think of their position? Will they judge it necessary to manœuvre within the terms of the agreement and take advantage of its "realistic precautions" mentioned by M. Schuman?

Might the French have wanted to keep the British out? The record of the negotiations published in the British White Paper could be read on that hypothesis. The French motive, in that case, might have been the desire to get the full psychological effect of the Schuman initiative by dealing directly with the Germans, or fear that the dragging of British feet during the negotiations would be more damaging to the success of the Plan than British exclusion. This would still leave the way open to ultimate British adherence. What might close the way, or at least narrow the possibilities, would be a French desire to make the pool the groundwork for a continental bloc operating quite independently of Britain. Do the French expect the Schuman Plan to start a chain of events that will lead to a real European union, and are they willing to transmute what now appear as French national interests into the interests of the new entity?

Alternatively, do the French believe that the pool can be constructed so as to minimize the risks of creeping German domination? Do they expect that they can in any case rely on British help in time of need? Is the new French policy based on the belief that the American commitment in Europe makes obsolete the need to depend on Britain for security against Germany?

Whatever answers to these questions may be in the minds of French policy makers, it remains to be seen whether they are acceptable to the French people. M. Schuman's presentation of the Plan was a *coup* at home as well as in foreign chancelleries. He created a situation which muted possible opposition to the Plan inside France—except, of course, on the part of the Communists. Doubts have been expressed with caution for fear of weakening the French initiative and undermining foreign policy.

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Industrial opposition has been restrained for fear of the consequences of appearing to put selfish interests before French security. By avoiding details and emphasizing that the means of achieving the Plan's purposes would have to be worked out, the Government reduced the opportunities for critics to support the "principle" while boggling at a "fatal flaw" in the details.

In the circumstances it is very hard to assess French opinion of the Schuman Plan. The bold and striking elements of the Plan's new hope for solution of the German problem and the fact that French diplomacy seems once again able to generate a head of steam call forth public support. In some quarters the fact that the British have been left behind increases the attractions. For others the possible long-run discrepancy between the effectiveness of an *idée force* and French economic inferiority to the Germans may be disturbing. Against the support to be gained from seeing France in the "rôle of champion of a united Europe," as M. Schuman's communiqué put it, must be set the doubts that may be raised by too radical a departure from the policy precepts of traditional nationalism.

Louis Marin, the aged conservative nationalist, attacked Schuman in the Assembly for having gone too far without consulting Parliament. The risks of inviting German collaboration—as well as constitutional practice—worried M. Marin. Earlier the Government had had a similar brush with right wing and Communist groups in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly when the chairman's vote was needed to defeat a motion that no decision regarding the Plan should be taken without Parliament's consent. Some French newspapers hinted that disagreement over the prospective terms of the Schuman Plan helped prolong the Cabinet crisis of June and July.

"After having conquered Germany we are offering her what she would have imposed on us if she had won. What did we fight the war for?" The opinion is not surprising, only its source: Pierre Etienne Flandin. General de Gaulle, who traded Jeanne d'Arc's standard for Charlemagne's sceptre some time ago, has been urging rapprochement of France and Germany. When the Schuman Plan was announced he quickly explained that only a reformed and reconstituted French government would be strong enough to meet the Germans on this ground.

The French Socialists have favored the Schuman Plan with some reservations. They fear that the high authority may become

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a private cartel and some of them, at least, are troubled by the absence of the British. They may also feel a certain chagrin that a good Socialist idea should suddenly become a political act that may bring added strength to the Catholic parties of Bidault, Adenauer and de Gasperi.

The views of individual Socialists undoubtedly vary greatly. The party's position was defined in mid-May by a resolution of the Executive Committee. Four conditions would have to be met if the Schuman Plan was to be successful, said this document. First, the negotiations should include a number of countries, not just France and Germany. Second, the high authority should have the power to impose its decisions on all the participating enterprises so that it could achieve real planning. Third, the members of the high authority should be chosen from people who have never had any financial connection with the private coal and steel industry. Fourth, "the high authority must be made responsible to a supranational political authority emanating from the Council of Europe and having limited but real powers."

The reaction of French steel-makers has been rather hushed but there appears to be a fair amount of opposition—or at least reserve—within the industry. Raymond Aron reports that the industrialists fear the Plan may lead to increased government control. He believes, however, that a more effective reason for industry opposition is that "the specialists are not convinced that the project, in the grandiose form indicated by the French statement, can be realized in the short run." Whether the industry keeps a united front remains to be seen since individual firms may be affected in very different ways. Instead of flatly opposing the Plan the French steel industrialists are more likely to try to turn the new situation to their own advantage. There may well be good opportunities to do so among the intricacies of the practical arrangements that have to be made to put the project into effect.

These reservations and qualifications in French attitudes do not mean that the Schuman Plan will have hard sledding when it is put in concrete form. That depends on events between now and then and the terms of the concrete proposals. What is clear is that a fundamental commitment of the French body politic to the new initiative does not yet exist. As M. Schuman told the Assembly, a treaty will be submitted for ratification, "and then you can say yes, or no, or yes with conditions."

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IV

Many people in England were dissatisfied with their Government's handling of the Schuman Plan negotiations, but few of them would have taken a different final decision if they had been sitting in Whitehall. The French insisted that before entering into negotiations the British should accept "the fundamental objectives to be reached," namely, "pooling . . . coal and steel production and . . . the institution of a new higher authority whose decisions will bind" the signatory governments. This struck many British people as unreasonable and a little suspicious. Lionel Robbins hit the dominant note in a letter to *The Times:* "Like the public in the days of the South Sea Bubble, we are being asked to subscribe without reserve to an undertaking the nature of which shall hereafter be revealed." Or, as the question was put in the House of Commons, "Is the hon. Gentleman in favor of buying pigs in a poke when he does not even know if they are pigs?"

Jean Monnet and some of his advisers visited London to acquaint British officials with French ideas about the way the Schuman Plan might work. Afterwards the cliché, "There is no Schuman Plan," expressed the British impression that while the French had a lot of ideas, some of them were contradictory and there was no general agreement on what ought to be done. There was also some suspicion that the French were counting on the British to do the dirty work of devising workable arrangements and there was a corresponding *Schadenfreude* when it began to appear that French officials would have to sweat out the drafting in the hot Paris summer. (At the same time, however, British officials had to set to work under Sir Edwin Plowden to devise a counter-plan.)

There seems to be a paradox here: the British rejected the Plan because they knew it meant international control; they also rejected it because they didn't know what it meant. This is one of those apparent paradoxes that is also true. Acceptance of the high authority was a fixed part of the French proposal; what the high authority was to do was open to negotiation. Much play was made in Britain with the difference in national approach embodied in this issue. The French said, "Accept the principle and deduce the consequences;" the British said, "Let us see what we plan to do and then figure out what kind of agency should do it."

Still, many people were dissatisfied. Bevin's illness and the

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absence of Attlee and Cripps from London during much of the negotiations left an impression that the Government had not devoted its full energies to this crucial matter. "As sorry a piece of diplomatic muddling as the world has ever seen," *The Economist* called it. When the issue was debated in the House of Commons the most cogent opposition speeches were those arguing that British interests would be better served by participation in the negotiations than by abstention. But on what terms could Britain have participated? Most of the Conservatives and Liberals were careful to avoid saying they would have accepted the French formula; they recommended a reservation of the sort the Dutch had made. This the Government rejected as inadequate, and in any case unlikely to have been accepted by the French. With their brief in the hands of their most able advocate, Sir Stafford Cripps, the Government had the better of the argument. True, the statement in the French memorandum of May 30 that "there will be no commitment except by the signature of a treaty between the States concerned and its parliamentary ratification" may have been an invitation to regard the pledge given in advance more lightly than the British were willing to. But the next paragraph again stressed the great importance of "agreement between participating Governments on the fundamental objectives to be reached." On the face of the record it looks as if there could not have been real agreement between the British and the French, whatever formula was found. For neither side was British participation in itself the dominant objective.

The British Government would have escaped more easily had it not been for the appearance of "European Unity," a policy statement of the National Executive Committee of the Labor Party. The timing of this statement can only be explained either by fearful mismanagement within the Labor Party or by an insensitiveness of some of its leading figures to the climate of world opinion. Initial reactions to the "Dalton brown paper," as Churchill dubbed it, stressed (and to some extent exaggerated) its weaknesses while overlooking its redeeming qualities. The statement suffers from many things, such as lumps of undigested doctrine which sometimes seem inconsistent with other things the report says; treatment of dangers or part-truths or circumstances which may pass as present and permanent facts; and a considerable lack of imagination on some issues if the use of that faculty might lead to conclusions that would disturb some of the flat statements that

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appear in the text. General statements of support for Western European economic coöperation are somewhat offset by objection to specific measures and a failure to suggest further steps, except that the Strasbourg Assembly should discuss international action to promote full employment, an honest proposal also calculated to embarrass some of the strongest Continental supporters of the Council of Europe.

A major theme of "European Unity" is that to be democratic, coöperation must be intergovernmental and must permit democratic governments to practise Socialism. Some of the reasons for this view are very cogent but part of the bad impression made by the pamphlet came from the unimaginative, belligerent and unduly blunt application of the argument to the immediate circumstances in Europe. "No Socialist Party with the prospect of forming a government could accept a system by which important fields of national policy were surrendered to a supranational European *representative* authority, since such an authority would have a *permanent* anti-Socialist majority and would arouse the hostility of European workers." (Italics supplied.) This defeatism cannot read very well to Continental Socialists. There is a real issue here, but elsewhere in the report there is some evasion of the possible conflicts between the kinds of coöperation the Labor Party Executive approves and the "freedom . . . to apply the economic controls" it deems necessary to achieve Socialism.

The tone of much of the pamphlet (but not, on the whole, the section on basic industries) contrasts sharply with the Government's statement at the end of the negotiations which "welcomed the French initiative" and expressed the desire "to be associated with these discussions" and "to do their best to see whether a workable scheme could be produced." In the Parliamentary debate several Labor members showed a hankering after a more active British policy of continental coöperation. Behind these manifestations are conflicting forces that shape opinion in the Labor Party—and among other Britons as well. There is a great heritage of internationalism and a real desire for international coöperation. There are also real difficulties arising from some of the British Government's economic policies, many of which are not peculiarly "Socialist." There is also a reluctance, politically and historically natural, to consort too closely with continental conservatives and reactionaries. In a snappish and unedifying debate in July, the House of Commons quarreled about

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whether War Minister Strachey had called the Schuman Plan a "plot." What really mattered, as some members pointed out, was whether the attitude of mind that brought him even close to doing so and required him to tell the House, "I regret the tone of some of the expressions which I used about the Schuman Plan," was widespread in the Labor Party.

Because Western European coöperation offers some peculiar difficulties, an increasing number of Englishmen are seeking a larger framework in which to tackle their problems. There are some important statements along this line in "European Unity" that ought to have been loudly applauded in the United States. For instance: "Western Europe neither could nor should attempt to constitute a geographical Third Force. For some time to come its economic stability and strategic defense will depend on close coöperation with the U. S. A. . . . Neutrality is not a possible choice. . . . Outside Britain and Scandinavia there is no government with a more progressive domestic or foreign program than the present U. S. Administration. . . . Until the Soviet Union allows the United Nations to function, as it should, the first immediate aim of British foreign policy must be to construct an organic unity throughout the whole of the non-Communist world." Whether this line of thought is altogether consistent with the pamphlet's argument about Socialism and international cooperation is another question. In any case, much of the Labor Party statement coincides fairly closely with United States policy.

Against the background of these propositions, which are widely accepted in England, it becomes obvious that British caution with regard to the Schuman Plan is due to much more than Socialism. How completely dare Britain merge her basic defense industry with those of the relatively exposed Continent? Considering the tremendous importance of coal and steel in the British economy, can any government forego the right to control them? How would the Schuman Plan affect the perennial economic and political problems of the Commonwealth and the sterling area? Is there a conflict between increasing British commitments in Western Europe and playing a full rôle in world politics?

On the other side, the British can find arguments for going into the Schuman Plan. Even after the negotiations much could be done from the inside to shape the project. Should Britain try to "capture" the Plan and with it the leadership of Europe? There may be commercial advantages in the Plan, or at least disadvan-

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tages to being outside it. There is some concern in England about the continental consortium engrossing supplies of Swedish iron ore, and possibly those of Spain and North Africa also.

Fundamental political questions arise as well. So far the British have succeeded in pursuing what they conceive to be their interests on the Continent by more or less old-fashioned means: intergovernmental negotiations, and a holding back from major political and economic mergers. This time something sizeable has gone into motion without them. If it keeps going ahead, can the British afford to stay out? "I say deliberately," Anthony Eden told the House of Commons, "that in all its dreams of wedge-driving Russia could hope for nothing better than the reduction of Britain to the status of observer in Franco-German relations." If Britain goes in, should it be as a new means of furthering old ends, and continuing to be in a position of holding the balance between France and Germany? Or must it be a real step toward creating a new center of gravity in Europe?

V

Many Americans who have welcomed the Schuman Plan have assumed it would tie Germany effectively to the West. It may, but the possibility exists that it may strengthen the forces making for a Europe that tries to be neutral in the struggle between the United States and Russia. At this stage the issue cannot be judged with finality. The subject is a tricky one, especially for an American observer. The evidence is opaque; developments are likely to be ambiguous. There is often no sharp distinction between steps toward the desirable end of strengthening Europe, materially, politically and spiritually, and measures which increase the possibility that Western Europeans may try, however futilely, to disengage themselves from the main currents of world politics.

At a rally of his party in Cologne, after he had welcomed the Schuman Plan, Chancellor Adenauer said that there must be a united Europe which would be "a third power" strong enough to "decide in favor of peace." The statement is equivocal but with editorial changes it could have been used to describe past German policy when the Reich sought to swing between East and West.

French cabinet ministers have frequently rejected neutrality. Some weeks before the Schuman Plan was announced Prime Minister Bidault made one of the first bids for the strengthening of the North Atlantic Pact. But the coming drive for rearmament

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will increase political and economic strains, the French Government is democratic, and the neutrality idea is alive inside the country. Part of the support for the Schuman Plan may come from these quarters. General de Gaulle, who has sometimes wished away the Marshall Plan and whose antipathy for the British is well known, has argued for French-German rapprochement as the necessary basis for the creation of a separate European power.

If the Schuman Plan provides effectively for the most economic location of steel production in Western Europe, the time may come when Germany will heavily outweigh France in this field. If that happens, will the high authority suffice to nullify the political consequences or will such a community of interests have been created that one no longer speaks of Germany dominating France? If not, German rather than French ideas of foreign policy will prevail and the main issue may become the return of Eastern Germany. R. H. S. Crossman told the House of Commons, "A distinguished German diplomat over here said to me the other day, 'After all, we ran France for five years. We are not going to worry about the terms that are signed. We sign first and change after.' " One need not assume that this is a dominant attitude, or that influential Germans are not sincere in their desire for a western orientation and anxious for rapprochement with France. But the sentiment reflects a political possibility.

Mr. Churchill put the issue in the forefront of British policy. "The question . . . is whether British reluctance to assert herself within a movement towards European unity will not bring about just this very danger of a neutral geographical bloc, and whether we, by standing out, may not become responsible for bringing about the very situation the Socialist Executive in their pamphlet so rightly fear." But he added, "The unity of France and Germany, whether direct or in a larger continental grouping, is a merciful and glorious forward step towards the revival of Europe and the peace of the world."

This brief sketch is not meant to show that the Schuman Plan necessarily makes for a neutral Europe. But it is important that Americans, for whom the outcome is of great moment, should not be blind to that possibility and above all that they should not take it for granted that the Plan necessarily moves the other way.

VI

There is so much to be said about the economic potentialities

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of the Schuman Plan that this aspect of the question is better left until a more detailed product emerges. Whether the high aims of the Plan will be achieved—"the more rational distribution of production at the highest level of productivity . . . the fusion of markets and the expansion of production"—depends in the first instance on the detailed terms of the agreement.

Are the French prepared to expose their steel industry to substantial German competition? The question excites incredulity, yet that is the implicit or explicit assumption of those who take the Schuman Plan at its face value. It is supported by the official statements of the Plan. At the outset M. Schuman listed the trade barriers and discriminations that would be ended. The Monnet working paper published after the first week of negotiations says that the authority is "to set general rules designed to enable the price system to perform its real function." There are also some indications that the French industry may be in a stronger position than is generally supposed. There has been a substantial increase in French steel output while German capacity has been held down. Some of the new French plants are the most modern in Europe; there has been no significant moderization in Germany. The higher cost of production in France is due in part to the fact that the Germans charge a higher price for their export coal than for that sold domestically. In part the higher cost is due to higher wages and social security charges in France. The Plan would aim to "equalize" these, which must mean raising German wages or subsidizing the French producers. To the extent that these factors are effective, the Germans may be hesitant about too much competition, at least until they get more modern plants. On the other hand, the steel market inside France is tied up in price agreements aimed at protecting the least efficient producers. Many Frenchmen realize that their country would be stronger if these restraints on production and competition could be ended, or at least mitigated. Some of the authors of the Plan may be hoping that they have at last found a way to do this.

The widespread suspicion that the Schuman Plan will turn out to be a cartel, public or private, arises not only from the feeling that "skim milk masquerades as cream," but also from the fact that the history of European heavy industry offers little ground for supposing that a movement in this direction would be very dynamic or have a great appeal among industrialists, whatever their nationality. For some time conversations have been going on

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looking toward the resumption of restrictive arrangements, if not the full-fledged revival of the prewar cartel. (From the point of view of the French, Belgian and Luxembourg steel-makers this is a good time to begin because the Germans are weaker than they used to be.) Can an international board, instructed to pursue the public interest, impose competition on reluctant entrepreneurs?

It is not only European industrialists who regard competition as a questionable practice. Labor and government officials are not very fond of it either. Perhaps the Schuman Plan will create what Raymond Aron calls "semi-private, semi-public *dirigisme*." This would not be incompatible with a certain amount of competition which might be limited in type and scope. In any case, as Americans should know, competition among steel plants is not the same as competition among grocery stores. It will be progress if the Schuman Plan results in at least some arrangements that favor low-cost producers, burden the high-cost ones more than at present, and encourage more economic allocation of investment. The obstacles are obvious. For one thing it will take determination to move the Schuman Plan out of the initial stage during which there will be a complex of "transitional arrangements" designed to cushion the impact of the changed situation. Not least of the questions is whether governments will accept the political and social consequences of economic adaptation.

It is so much easier to see how the scheme might work to restrict production and prevent change than to provide for expansion that the burden of proof is on the proponents. However, critics must note that the alternative to the Schuman Plan is almost certainly not a high degree of competition and the most efficient allocation of production, but instead perhaps a private international cartel, or several national cartels with varying degrees of government backing. The result is likely to be a blend of somewhat conflicting tendencies. We shall know more about how they may balance when we see the specific terms of the project.

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SMUTS AT EIGHTY

By Sarah Gertrude Millin

ON MAY 24, 1950, General Jan Christian Smuts became 80. General Smuts' political followers alone celebrated his eightieth birthday. As he could not be everywhere on the same day, May 23 was allotted to Johannesburg, the 24th to Pretoria, and later days to Capetown and Durban. No day was allotted to Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State, because General Smuts has only one Parliamentary follower in the Free State and not many other supporters, and the celebrations were not national, they were partisan. No member of the government sat or stood beside him to wish him a few more years of life. That was the position after General Smuts had striven for a Union of Brothers in South Africa, a Union of States in the Commonwealth, a League of Nations, a United Nations.

But it was his friends, not his political opponents, who all but made it his last birthday. May is winter in South Africa. Before coming to Johannesburg, General Smuts had had not only a pressure on his sciatic nerve which for seven months had given him the greatest pain, he said, he had ever known in his life; he had also, within the last few days, had a strange new pain in his chest.

On May 23, the Rand had its first white frost. Not wearing an overcoat or hat, General Smuts arrived from his farm, 35 miles away, to drive through the streets of Johannesburg; made a speech indoors on being given the freedom of the city; stood outside the City Hall on a dais, which was formed like a birthday cake, with 80 great candles, and made another speech.

Next day, on his farm, he found the well-wishers more exhausting than the functions of the day before. He lasted through an open-air rally and a Party ball in Pretoria. He thought next day he would find peace and warmth in the bushveld and insisted on driving the 80 miles himself. Suddenly there was the news that he was not going to Capetown, not going to Durban, not flying to England to present degrees at Cambridge University, of which he is Chancellor. He was very ill.

It appeared cumulatively that he had pneumonia, two embolisms of the lung, weakness of the heart, and on top of all a mysterious unyielding temperature which, in the end, was found to be a recurrence of the malaria he had got in East Africa, fight-

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ing there during the First World War. He was, after all, human; he was mortal. So long General Smuts had been a part of South Africa; so long he had stood to the world for South Africa—he had been so ready, so eager, to do the work of 20 men—how could it all at once happen that 80 was 80, even for General Smuts?

But, after seven weeks, there he was again on the verandah outside the little room he wants for his bedroom (as at his official residence in Pretoria, he chose, when he was Prime Minister, a valet's room): so weak, though, that even his children might rarely see him, but alive, interested in life and going to live.

It was in the middle of June, when his recovery seemed unlikely, that the news appeared of his retirement as leader of the Opposition, and that he wanted J. G. N. Strauss to succeed him. One said J. G. N Strauss, as one said J. C. Smuts, as one said J. H. Hofmeyr. They all had the name of Jan. For years Jan Hofmeyr had been Smuts' political heir. But Hofmeyr was stigmatized as a *Kaffir-Boetie*—a Little Brother of the Kaffirs—and this had lost the United Party the election of 1948 which had been fought, as are most Union elections, on the color question; and, six months later, overworked, overwhelmed by the contumely of foes and the recrimination of friends, he had died of a thrombosis of the heart.

So now Strauss, at one time Smuts' private secretary, a man of quiet wisdom, high integrity and unquestioned loyalty to Smuts, was the man in Hofmeyr's place, was the man to succeed Smuts. Not all Smuts' parliamentary followers wished to follow Strauss who was 50 but looked 35, while some of them were 60 and 70. But, not to break the Party, they agreed to do so.

The people of South Africa who were not Smuts' enemies felt suddenly how small South Africa would look to the world without Smuts; and perhaps even his enemies in their hearts felt it. Could they fail to know that kings and queens and presidents and prime ministers and scholars and soldiers everywhere in the great world held, ever had held, ever would hold, no other South African so high as Smuts; and that South Africa itself stood in a higher place than it would have done had it not stood on the shoulders of Smuts?

So why did not all the Afrikaners of the country, why did only a small part of them, wish to honor the last living leader of the Boer War, the closest friend of Kruger, after whom they were going to call a day in South Africa's calendar? The story goes back a long way.

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II

The story goes back to 1652. In 1652, the Dutch East India Company, under the House of Orange, made a trading concern of the Cape, and only five years later Dutch farmers proclaimed themselves Free Burgers, *want zij gheen compagnie's slaven willen wezen*—since they wished to be no company's slaves. Within another 30 years persecuted French Huguenots came and were soon absorbed by the Dutch. And these Dutch-French people were not the sort of people to tolerate the harsh dominance of the Company and kept moving—trekking—away.

Holland followed France into revolution in the 1790's, and when, in 1795, the Prince of Orange, a fugitive to England from revolutionary Holland, asked the English to guard the Cape from Napoleon, the English became the heirs of the hated Dutch East India Company. They inherited the hate that, for 150 years, had burdened the Dutch India Company. Eight years later the English returned the Cape to Republican Holland under the Peace of Amiens. They took it in the way of war after the Battle of Trafalgar. They kept it under the Treaty of Vienna.

In 1800 there came the first missionaries of the London Missionary Society. The first two leaders married Hottentot girls (not entirely out of idealism) and began to preach the marriage of black and white and to charge the Boers with great cruelty toward the Kaffirs and Hottentots. They caused an inquisition (the Black Circuit) into the Boers' treatment of the blacks that exonerated the Boers but was never forgiven by them. Among the chief reasons given by the Boers for trekking away from the English on the greatest of their migrations was the odium cast on them by English missionaries.

This time they moved not east, but north, and founded two republics. One of the trekkers was Paul Kruger, a boy of ten. People have always found it hard to resist taking a big land occupied only by savages. International law permitted it. In due course, Kruger became President of the Transvaal, considered that it had to be "from the Zambesi to Simon's Bay, Afrika for the Afrikaner," and walked into Bechuanaland.

There he met another of those English missionaries who spoke of the Boers' cruelty to natives, and this one thought England ought to take over Bechuanaland to prevent such practices. There was someone else, however, who wanted Bechuanaland, "the key to the north." He wanted it for the Cape; he wanted it

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for a plan he had "for the furtherance of the British Empire, for the making of the Anglo-Saxon race into one Empire;" but he did not want any "amateur meddling" from "irresponsible and ill-advised persons" thousands of miles away; Cecil John Rhodes wanted to take South Africa according to his own system.

Though the son of a parson, he also did not like missionaries. In fact, the sort of people he liked and felt he could work with were the Boers. And they liked him and felt they could work with him; and particularly the first great J. H. Hofmeyr, the great-uncle of Smuts' J. H. Hofmeyr. Only Kruger did not like Rhodes. "That young man," he said, when Rhodes came interfering with him in Bechuanaland, "is going to cause me trouble."

However, that young man in the end caused Kruger only the amusement of the Jameson Raid. It was not to the hostile Boers of the Transvaal, but to the friendly Boers of the Cape and the English in England that the Raid was a shock. The Boers of the Cape felt betrayed; the English in England felt humiliated; Kruger had the pleasure of making a lost fool of Rhodes.

Rhodes was dying when the Boer War began. It was not he, nor was it Joseph Chamberlain, it was Milner who could not bear the British in the Transvaal to be no more than "helots." He "turned the screw" until the Boers declared war.

III

Smuts was born in 1870, a British subject, in the Cape, the son of a Cape member of Parliament. That was the year in which diamonds were found in Kimberley.

Rhodes came to Kimberley next year and, by 1888, all the diamond mines of Kimberley were amalgamated under him and he had also a cession from the Matabele chief, Lobengula, over his lands in the north. With money from the diamonds of Kimberley, Rhodes was setting out on his enterprise of taking Africa for England. He had now also, for some time, been a Member of the Cape Parliament, and it amused him to tell his fellow members one day: "I went down to the Cape, thinking in my practical way, 'I will go and take the North.' "

It was in the great year of 1888 that Smuts first saw Rhodes. Smuts was now 18. His schooling had begun at 12; at 16 he had entered a college at Stellenbosch, a village near Capetown; he was sentimental; he was romantic; he had a giant, speedy, far-reaching, absorptive mind; he was reading the greatest writers and

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writing about man and liberty and such things as "Who, having felt the heartbeat of the Motherland call unto his heart, could fail to respond to the need of rivalling the heroic deeds of old Europe, perchance in nobler realms?" He saw South Africa in terms of Elizabethan England, stretching forth, spreading out, growing and growing; he saw in Rhodes an Elizabethan.

At this moment Rhodes visited Smuts' university and made a speech to which Smuts had to reply; he spoke about Elizabethan England and Rhodes decided that here was a man he could use in the British-Boer brotherhood that was to start his world enterprise. It was not destined.

By the time Smuts returned from Cambridge and London, a barrister, full of honors and with a theory of psychoanalysis set down a year before the publication of Breuer and Freud's "Studien über Hysterie," six years before the publication of Freud's "Traumdeutung"—by this time things had gone wrong with Rhodes' "bringing the whole civilized world under British rule." The diamonds were there all right that were to start him on his journey to the north; but Matabeleland had not turned out to be a second golden Transvaal. What was a man to do now, who knew he had not long to live, but take the Transvaal itself? Smuts had hardly got back from Cambridge, still full of Rhodes and Elizabethan England, when there was the Jameson Raid. Shocked, shamed and infuriated, his idol smashed, Smuts left the Cape for the Transvaal to be a Kruger man.

IV

For some years past, Kruger had been in decline. The modern young men in the Transvaal thought him out of date. When, therefore, the brilliant young man from Cambridge, in his great revulsion from Rhodes, became his partisan, he could not advance him quickly enough. Smuts had not yet qualified to be a full burger when Kruger made him, at 28, his State Attorney. The year was 1899. It was the year of the beginning of the Boer War.

In May of 1899, Smuts went with Kruger to meet Milner in Bloemfontein. Their business had nominally to do with the question of a speedier franchise for the *Uitlanders*—the Outlanders, the foreigners—which Kruger felt would give all power to the English. But at last he could no longer bear the talk. He wept. "It is my country—my country—that you want."

The Boer War was not yet begun when there appeared a book

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called, in its English version, "A Century of Wrong." It was issued as "the official exposition of the case of the Boer against the Briton," but somehow it did not sound official: its author was Jan Christian Smuts. And, in later years, when the Boers accused Smuts of betraying them to the British, their cartoons often included in the various mockeries of Smuts, a book lying about, called "A Century of Wrong."

Except for the moving fact that "A Century of Wrong" was an appeal from a menaced nation to the conscience of the world, it had indeed features one might find somewhat amusing. In years to come Smuts learned to smile at, but never quite learned to overcome, the style of "Who, having felt the heartbeat of the Motherland." Its echoes are even in the Preamble he wrote, at 74, to the Charter of the United Nations.

"A Century of Wrong" told anew the story of the odium cast on Boers by English missionaries and England's support of the blacks against them. It described the pursuit of the trekkers even into their new republics; their annexation of the Transvaal in 1877; England's capitalism and jingoism; the Jameson Raid. It said: "In this awful turning point in the history of South Africa, on the eve of the conflict which threatens to exterminate our people, it behooves us to speak the truth in what may be perhaps our last message to the world. . . . Every sea in the world is being furrowed by ships which are conveying British troops from every corner of the globe in order to smash this little handful of people. . . ."

But this little handful, the book said again, would do to England what Greece had done to Xerxes; it would withstand Chamberlain as its forefathers had withstood Alva, Richelieu and Louis XIV. "It is ordained that we, insignificant as we are, should be the first among the peoples to begin the struggle against the new world tyranny of capitalism." The beginning and the end of the book did not quite match, yet both told the truth. There was indeed national death, for by 1902 the Boers, with 16,000 men left to fight England's 400,000, had to surrender and they lost their lands. There was national vengeance when, eight years later, the Boers, in a way, got the English colonies, the Cape and Natal.

In the war Smuts began as a general, at 29. He said later, "Everything from science to soldiering is only a matter of thought"—and so why should he not be a general? He became indeed a successful guerrilla general: his was the last success of the

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Boer War, and his the last shot fired. He emerged from the war, no longer a pale, weedy student, carrying in his saddle-bag a Greek Testament and Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," but a burly, ruddy, yellow-bearded man among men, and he said in years to come that his greatest happiness in life had been to range the veld as a guerrilla leader.

Three years after the Boer War, England became very excited over what the Liberals called Chinese slavery, and Jameson called the pigtail question, in South Africa: in other words, the importation of Chinese laborers to work in the Rand mines. The Chinese, in due time, returned to their miseries in China, but by merely coming they had done an extraordinary piece of work. For the exploitation of their slavery on the Rand helped bring a change of government in England; it occurred to Smuts to go and ask this new Liberal Prime Minister to give the Boers "responsible government;" he got it and at once set about devising a union of the four South African states. There was a national convention, chiefly run by Smuts. In 1909 the British Parliament passed the South Africa Act, the result of Smuts' suggestions, arguments, compromises, decisions. In 1910 General Louis Botha—Natal-born, and therefore also originally a British subject, and the last head of all the Boer forces—became the first Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa. General Hertzog's opposition to him began, and it included Smuts, when he felt himself slighted at the time the Union's first Cabinet was formed. From that time to this, none but a Boer has rested his head in the house that Rhodes, in his prescience, left for the Prime Ministers of a United South Africa; none seems likely to do so.

It was not Smuts' idea that, through union, the Boers should acquire South Africa, but it became the idea of others. To Smuts, union of all kinds was simply the principle of his life. He saw the states of South Africa united into a greater South Africa; he saw this greater South Africa united with the other member of the greatest empire the world had known. There were Boers who came to call him Rhodes Redivivus because of this dream. But his thought, the thought that led to his philosophy of Holism—whole-making—had come to him when, in searching for the secret of personality, he had analyzed Whitman's poems in his Cambridge days, and it was expressed in these words of Whitman:

I will not make poems with reference to parts,
But I will make poems, songs, thoughts, with reference to Ensemble.

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It was during the talks which preceded union that Steyn, the last President of the Free State (whose son is Smuts' sole parliamentary supporter now in the Free State) spoke these words: "South Africa is still Naboth's vineyard. Germany means to take it. She wants our gold, our diamonds, our coal. Her plans are already made, her preparations even now complete. . . . What else is German-West but a jumping-off place to attack us from the north while their ships destroy our ports. . . . I have means which you have not of knowing what is going on." He was speaking of that South-West Africa about which the Union still argues with the United Nations, since it has ever been a menace and a necessity to South Africa's security.

Not only Steyn among the Boers knew, as far back as 1909, that Germany was planning a world war. The Germans were getting at particular Boers to aid them against England. From the time, too late, they had joined in the scramble for Africa—from the 1880's—the Germans had been prodding the Boers against England. They had prodded Kruger on to Bechuanaland; they had offered him forces against Rhodes and Jameson; they had offered him all help in the Boer War. None of these offers had come to anything.

However, it was the Germans, and no others, that persisted in murmuring in the Boers' ears; the Germans were of a blondness much valued by people in a land of black men; the Boers were lured by the Germans; there was that century of wrong.

What Smuts felt was that he had been trusted by the British that time he had gone to ask for responsible government and union had followed. He was prepared to give trust for trust. And when the Germans attacked the world in 1914 and crossed the South-West border, expecting help from the Boers, and General Botha expressed in the House the Union's "wholehearted determination" to stand with Britain and the Empire and General Hertzog replied saying it was not South Africa's war, General Smuts said: "Whose war is it then if it is not our war? Who was the aggressor? . . . A German force has entrenched itself on South Africa's territory. . . . What are those German cruisers doing in South African waters? . . . Our mother countries have been attacked . . . England, our mother country, has been forced into war. . . . Here we are today, a free people, able to develop as we please and able to do as we want. . . . We have shed many tears to secure what we have now. Are we going to keep what we have, or are we going to say: 'Let them take it?' "

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He told the English during the war: "For a brief moment in your national history you got off the track and came to grips with a small people. . . . You returned to wiser counsels. You made us free. . . . Fifteen years ago I was fighting against the British Empire. There is no change in me. The cause I fought for fifteen years ago is the cause I am fighting for today. I fought for liberty and freedom then, and I am fighting for them today."

The British made Smuts a member of their inner War Cabinet and a lieutenant-general in their army. The first Allied victory in that war was the taking by South Africa of German South-West Africa; and Smuts, like other South Africans, has always regarded the United Nations' denial of it to South Africa as an insult and injustice.

A telegram from the Kaiser had instructed the Governor of German-West to "guarantee Boers existence Boer Republics if they attack immediately." Among the people got at by the Germans was the Commandant-General of the Union's forces. He was to be the President of the Boers' Republic. He resigned his position as head of the Union's forces to attack the Union's forces. It was Botha himself who resisted the rebellion, for it was better, he thought, that brother should fight brother, than nation nation. There was much death and suffering. So here began very seriously the enmity of the greater part of his nation against Smuts. It was not true independence, they felt, to be under Britain; and Botha and Smuts would not let them achieve a true independence.

And the more Smuts succeeded with the British, the more he failed with his own people. At the peace, there was self-determination, and Hertzog led a deputation to Paris and told Lloyd George: "We are here today to ask you that wrong which was done in 1902 may be undone." Above all, the Boers, he said, could not stand the "insufferable British air of superiority." They wanted their republics back again.

He felt himself greatly mocked when Lloyd George said: "Do you know anything about the views of the native population in South Africa?"

"The natives of South Africa?" said General Hertzog, all but dazed by this irrelevance. "No," he said.

v

It was not many years after the First World War that General Smuts himself was asked questions about the natives and about

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the Indians too. He said about the Indians: "We found a formula, a general form of words, which did not mention Indians or Asiatics in particular, but which had the effect of placing it in our power to stop further immigration on any appreciable scale. Whatever may be the position in the British Empire as a whole, in South Africa we are not based on a system of political equality. The whole basis of our particular system in South Africa rests on inequality and on recognizing the fundamental difference which exists in the structure of our population. We started as a small white colony in a Black Continent. In the Union the vast majority of our citizens are black; probably the majority of them are in a semi-barbarous state still. . . . We are trying to build up a native system of itself apart from the white system. . . . They will manage their own affairs in all matters of local government. . . . As they become politically educated and acquire administrative experience, you will have a parallel system built up in South Africa. We will not try to mix what cannot be mixed. . . ."

"The Indian question," said General Smuts (little foreseeing the future which began with Gandhi's passive resistance in South Africa), "the Indian question with us is an entirely subsidiary question. But you cannot deal with the Indians apart from the whole position in South Africa; you cannot give political rights to the Indians which you deny to the rest of our colored citizens in South Africa. . . . You cannot treat them on the same basis as Europeans. . . . You could not carry it. You would have a revolution in South Africa." To which Mr. Sastri replied: "You should recognize the principle that at the end of a series of years the franchise has got to be given. . . . We are not talking idle words. . . . Things have moved very fast. . . . India has been stirred up now as she never was. . . ."

But Mr. Churchill said: "Any Asiatic may enter England without any restriction. But if hundreds of thousands of Asiatics were to enter and compete with the working and clerical classes under conditions of extreme economic competition, there is no doubt great changes would be brought about in the laws of the land—it is affectation and humbug to say they would not. . . . It is a question of self-preservation. That is terrible fact, but when it comes up it undoubtedly governs the actions of communities. . . ."

The second German war was not yet over when a leading member of the Delhi central legislature said: "I wish India were in a position to declare war on South Africa here and now. If she

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were, I should lose no time in taking an army to South Africa. . . . Some day India will come into her own and be in a position to take more effective action against those who persist in assailing her self-respect. . . ."

By this time Smuts no longer saw the Indian question as a subsidiary question. He could not help thinking all the time that there were some 340,000,000 Indians and a little more than 2,000,000 South Africans, and that the Indians regarded Africa as a place for their surplus population. He offered the Indians what the native now had: three white Members to represent them in the Union Assembly and others in the Senate. They demanded equal political rights. They scorned to be treated like natives. They refused the offer. After the election of 1948, the Nationalists had a majority of one in the Senate, and things might have been very different if the Indians had accepted the offer. But when General Smuts in 1946, struggling to give what could be given lest all be lost, appeared before the United Nations to answer India's charges against South Africa and Nehru's sister dramatically opposed him, he was received in disdainful silence, but the people in the galleries rose to their feet and applauded Mrs. Pandit.

VI

Soon after the First World War, there was an industrial revolution on the Rand, the end of a series of great strikes, that had as its nominal principles the raising of white men's wages and the keeping of black men "in their places." Its two real motives were strikingly different from its avowed motives and from each other. The Englishmen who took part in it were called syndicalists by General Smuts, but they were under instructions from Russia. The Afrikaners—Boers—who took part in it were continuing the rebellion of 1914, the Boer War and their other doings during the century of wrong.

There was again great bloodshed. And the end of it was that General Smuts lost the next election, and from 1924 to 1939 did not again lead South Africa. The Second World War brought him back. All then had gone as in the First World War, with General Hertzog for neutrality and General Smuts for association with the Commonwealth, and no one was so surprised as General Hertzog himself when he was defeated by a vote in the House. During the war, Smuts overwhelmingly won another election.

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He was as surprised as Hertzog had been in 1939, when he lost the election of 1948.

And who defeated Smuts? The people who now dismissed Hertzog as head of the dissident Boers—a group of men whom, throughout his career, General Hertzog had feared and violently opposed; a group whose leader in the House, though not out of the House, was another man, born a British subject in the Cape, an ex-*Predikant,* Dr. Malan; an élite of Afrikaners in key positions who, seeing in the First World War that by no open means would they get their republic back again, had in 1917 gone underground. Through church, school, press, finance, Parliament they worked—delving, pushing, spreading—to gain control, and in 1948 they got it. They called themselves the *Broederbond*—the Band of Brothers.

Another resistance group had developed out of the celebrations in 1938 of the hundredth anniversary of the great trek. It called itself the *Ossewa Brandwag*—the Sentinels of the Oxwaggon, and one might have supposed it to be an arm of the *Broederbond.* In fact, it was an arm of the Nazi Party. If the *Broederbond,* when Germany was winning, was prepared to treat with Hitler for the best possible terms, it was yet no more anxious to be ruled by Germany than by England—in its heart, perhaps less anxious. The *Ossewa Brandwag* was prepared to go in under Germany and, after Germany lost the war, it began to fade out.

When Dr. Malan formed his government, half his Ministers were found to be *Broeders,* and most of his Parliamentary followers. *Broeders* were given the places hitherto held by Smuts men. The *Broederbond* still further strengthened its hold on the country through church, school, the press, finance and Parliament. The word on which Dr. Malan had fought and won the 1948 election, exactly one word, was *Apartheid*—aparthood—the separation of black from white.

And yet had not General Smuts himself always stood for the separation of black from white? Warning South Africans to have a care lest brown children one day played in the ruins of the Union Building; speaking in 1917 of the European and Asiatic civilizations lost in Africa; saying privately in 1921: "The whole basis of our particular system . . . rests on recognizing the fundamental differences which exist in the structure of our population;" saying publicly in 1929: "A race so unique, and so different in its mentality and cultures from those of Europe requires a

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policy very unlike that which would suit Europeans;" saying at Oxford in 1936: "Wherever Europeans and natives live in the same country it will mean separate parallel institutions . . . in separate areas."

Had not the very first Governor in the Cape tried to separate whites from Hottentots? Had not later Dutch Governors made this river and that river the boundary between Kaffirs and Europeans? Had not the revolutionary, no less than the royalist, Dutch Governors felt this to be right? Had not the natives' leading missionary defender, in the 1820's, demanded homes for Hottentots and Kaffirs in separate lands and the President of the Institute of Race Relations said, a century later, that separation had to be the Liberals' choice? Had not Rhodes given them separate lands? Had not the Union natives lands of their own? Were not whites forbidden in the British territories of Basutoland and Bechuanaland? Did not the last Cape Governor before Union add an appendix to the Act of Union, saying that the native territories had to be "governed apart from parliamentary institutions of the Union. . . . It is useless to govern blacks and whites on the same system"?

What, then, was the difference on this matter of *Apartheid* between Dr. Malan and General Smuts and 95 percent of the people of South Africa—perhaps 99 percent? Politically, none. It was a question only of treatment and degree. The difference between Dr. Malan and General Smuts was in their attitude to England.

The reason why 95—perhaps 99—percent of South Africans are against association with natives might be understood by 95—perhaps 99—percent of Americans if they had to consider a position, not of one Negro to ten whites, but (speaking in terms of all Africa) of 80 Negroes to one white. It might do white Americans no biological harm if they became rather yellower and jollier. But for whites to welcome the idea of drowning themselves in the blacks would be, as Mr. Churchill said of welcoming millions of Asiatics into England, affectation and humbug.

There is only this to say about *Apartheid:* the whites, not the blacks, would be the losers by it. The blacks would muddle along, but the whites would have the foundation of their existence taken from under their feet. And in the end, it would make no difference. Talk is useless. Africa is the black man's continent; it may also be the yellow man's continent. In Africa the white man is "a transient and embarrassed phantom."

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

NOTE—FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free,* with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 58 East 68 Street, New York 21, N. Y.

General: Political, Military and Legal

WAR OR PEACE. By JOHN FOSTER DULLES. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 274 p. $2.50.

Apart from giving us the views of a leading figure in American political life, Mr. Dulles' book is useful as a concise exposition of the issues dividing the United States and Russia.

EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. By VERA MICHELES DEAN. New York: Knopf, 1950, 349 p. $3.50.

A survey of Europe today and its significance for the United States. Certain of Mrs. Dean's general premises—her picture of an overly conservative United States and a dominant "Socialist" current in Western Europe and, in particular, her reduction of the East European and Soviet question to one of "catching-up"—may be challenged as somewhat misleading simplifications.

THE COMING DEFEAT OF COMMUNISM. By JAMES BURNHAM. New York: Day, 1950, 278 p. $3.50.

Starting from his thesis that we are now at war with Russia, that appeasement will not work and containment is not enough, the author of "The Managerial Revolution" urges "political-subversive warfare." In supporting his belief that this promises success he tends to over-prove his case against the Soviet system.

DOCUMENTS ON EUROPEAN RECOVERY AND DEFENCE: MARCH 1947–APRIL 1949. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949, 150 p. $2.50.

A very useful compilation of basic documents from the Benelux Customs Convention (September 1944) to the Council of Europe Statute (May 1949).

ATLANTIC PACT, COMMONWEALTH AND UNITED NATIONS. By ANDREW BOYD AND WILLIAM METSON. London: Hutchinson (for the United Nations Association), 1949, 100 p. 8/6.

A brief handbook on the origins, creation and significance of the Atlantic Pact.

THE RELATIVITY OF WAR AND PEACE. By FRITZ GROB. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949, 402 p. $5.00.

A scholarly examination of that difficult question, "What are war and peace from the point of view of the law?" The author contends that since in law the concepts of war and peace are relative, a definition of "war in *the* legal sense" is impossible.

INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION. VOLUME VIII: 1938–1941. EDITED BY MANLEY O. HUDSON AND LOUIS B. SOHN. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1949, 653 p. $4.00.

The first addition, since the appearance of Volume VII in 1941, to this "collection of the texts of multipartite international instruments of general interest."

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LES MESURES COERCITIVES SUR LES NAVIRES DE COMMERCE ÉTRANGERS. By Julien Le Clère. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1949, 190 p. Fr. 500.

A technical study of modern law and practice.

CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS. By Amos J. Peaslee. Concord (N. H.): Rumford, 1950, 3 v. $22.50.

This first compilation in English of all the national constitutions of the world is especially welcome since the admirable French collection by F. R. and P. Dareste is now out of date.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION. By W. Y. Elliot and Others. Charlottesville: University of Virginia, Bureau of Public Administration, 1949, 108 p. $1.50.

A symposium dealing with the question: how to assure the integral functioning of the national machinery of government vis-à-vis international commitments.

L'ÉGLISE CATHOLIQUE ET L'ORGANISATION DE LA SOCIÉTÉ INTERNATIONALE CONTEMPORAINE (1939–1949). By Richard Arès. Montreal: Facultés de Philosophie et de Théologie de la Compagnie de Jésus, 1949, 269 p.

Primarily a collection of Papal statements and pronouncements.

QUATRE ANS APRÈS. By Jean Baumier. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1949, 188 p. Fr. 190.

A Communist criticism of any Western European union.

CONSERVATISM REVISITED: THE REVOLT AGAINST REVOLT, 1815–1949. By Peter Viereck. New York: Scribner, 1949, 187 p. $2.50.

An ably expressed rediscovery of the values of political conservatism, unnecessarily buttressed by an excessive rehabilitation of Metternich.

AN ESSAY FOR OUR TIMES. By H. Stuart Hughes. New York: Knopf, 1950, 196 p. $2.75.

Beneath the smooth surface of these sensitive reflections lurks the abyss of Spenglerian apocalypse, over which passes only the admittedly fragile bridge of Soviet-U.S. "coexistence."

THE COMMON CAUSE. By Weldon A. Brown. Blacksburg (Va.): The Author, 1949, 258 p. $4.50.

DEMOCRACY: MAN'S GREAT OPPORTUNITY. By Weldon A. Brown. Blacksburg (Va.): The Author, 1949, 229 p. $4.50.

Neither of these two companion volumes, which seek to reassert the values of democracy and to explore the possibilities of democratic planning, contains any particularly original or stimulating insights.

THE EAGLE AND THE BEAR: A PRIMER OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. By Pennington Haile. New York: Washburn, 1950, 194 p. $2.50.

The author, following F. S. C. Northrop, is more successful in tracing the philosophical ancestry of the American Eagle than that of the Russian Bear.

BEHIND CLOSED DOORS. By Rear Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias (ret.). New York: Putnam, 1950, 367 p. $3.75.

This "secret history of the cold war" displays the weakness inherent in the keyhole approach: it is impossible for the reader to check the reliability of the information except by trying to estimate the probability of certain statements or by awaiting the promised course of events. The author's sources in the Kremlin failed to give him the tip on Korea.

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MOSKAU, TOKIO, LONDON. By Herbert von Dirksen. Stuttgart (U.S. Zone): Kohlhammer, 1949, 279 p.

Recollections by the former German ambassador to Russia, Japan and Great Britain, largely without benefit of documents and adding little new information.

TRIAL OF NIKOLAUS VON FALKENHORST, FORMERLY GENERAL-OBERST IN THE GERMAN ARMY. Edited by E. H. Stevens. London: Hodge, 1949, 278 p. 18/.

Volume VI of the War Crimes Trials Series records the trial in 1946 of the Commander-in-Chief of the German armed forces in Norway from 1940 to 1944.

I RESPONSABILI. By N. P. Comnène. Milan: Mondadori, 1949, 491 p. L. 1800.

Further reflections on the advent of the Second World War by a Rumanian diplomat, author of the more informative "Preludi del Grande Dramma" (reviewed in the issue of July 1948).

POLITICS, TRIALS AND ERRORS. By The Right Hon. Lord Hankey. Chicago: Regnery, 1950, 150 p. $2.50.

A former secretary of the British Cabinet criticizes the Allied demand for unconditional surrender and the German and Japanese war-crime trials.

COMPARATIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT. By G. Montagu Harris. London: Hutchinson, 1949, 207 p. 7/6.

A concise, well-informed manual based on wide personal investigation, by a former president of the International Union of Local Authorities.

YEAR 1949. Edited by Baldwin H. Ward. Los Angeles: Year, 1949, 192 p. $5.00.

A profusely illustrated popular review of the year's events, in which about half deals with national and world affairs.

ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS 1949. Edited by Clyde Eagleton. New York: New York University Press, 1950, 322 p. $5.00.

The proceedings of the first annual New York University conference.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

THE ECONOMICS OF FREEDOM. By Howard S. Ellis. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1950, 549 p. $5.00.

This important book is the most ambitious attempt made thus far to analyze the progress of the Marshall Plan and to discuss its accomplishments. Although Dr. Ellis of the University of California is the responsible author, a staff of scholars contributed chapters in their fields of special competence, and the project as a whole was directed by a study group of the Council on Foreign Relations, with General Eisenhower as chairman. The book surveys the specific problems faced by the participating states and considers the implications in the determination of American policy. The basic importance of political factors in European recovery is recognized, but the specific treatment is of the economic questions. The prospects for the future are discussed within the framework of certain provisional assumptions.

THE COMMERCE OF NATIONS. By J. B. Condliffe. New York: Norton, 1950, 884 p. $7.50.

A professor of economics at the University of California writes an extensive and useful history of the interplay between world trade, public commercial policy, and the development of economic theory. Over one-third of the volume is devoted to contemporary problems for which, however, no very clear solution emerges beyond the imperative need "to create a more effective means of international economic coöperation than now exists."

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CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. By Henry William Spiegel. Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1949, 726 p. $5.00.

A useful text, utilizing the national-income approach in the pursuit of four themes: economic progress, economic security, economic freedom and international trade.

THE MEASURE OF GOLD. By W. J. Busschau. Johannesburg: Central News Agency, 1949, 164 p. 12/6.

A South African economist assembles an array of statistical information in support of his thesis that increases in gold prices are necessary.

L'ÉTALON-OR, SON AVENIR APRÈS L'ACCORD MONÉTAIRE DE BRETTON WOODS. By Jean Perrenoud. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1948, 348 p. Fr. 1000.

A theoretical rather than historical investigation of the gold standard in the light of the Bretton Woods agreement. The author regards the gold standard as a moribund system.

THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE. By Jacob Viner. New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1950, 221 p. $2.50.

A well-known economist examines the possibilities and limitations of customs unions as a method of regulating international commercial relations.

THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND THE STANDARD OF LIVING. By R. G. Hawtrey. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950, 158 p. $1.75.

An analysis, with special reference to Great Britain and Western Europe, of the question whether an adverse balance of payments can be corrected by the working of free markets or whether recourse must be had to controls and restrictions.

INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY STOCKPILING AS AN ECONOMIC STABILIZER. By M. K. Bennett and Associates. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1949, 205 p. $3.00.

Detailed critical studies of the proposal made by Benjamin Graham in 1944 for a Commodity-Reserve currency.

ECONOMIC CALCULATION IN THE SOCIALIST SOCIETY. By T. J. B. Hoff. London: Hodge, 1949, 264 p. 21/.

A balanced and competent discussion, originally published in Norwegian in 1938, of the controversy set off by the studies of such economists as Barone, Von Mises, Hayek, Robbins and Lange. The author is of the view that "in practice economic calculation is impossible in a Socialist society whose aim is the maximum exploitation of existing resources in order to satisfy the needs of the community."

PIANI ECONOMICI DEL DOPOGUERRA (BULGARIA, CECOSLOVACCHIA, FRANCIA, GRAN BRETAGNA, JUGOSLAVIA, OLANDA, POLONIA, STATI UNITI, UNGHERIA, U.R.S.S.). By Ugo Sacchetti. Rome: Centro di Studi e Piani Tecnico-Economici, 1949, 448 p. L. 2000.

The author distinguishes between planning activities directed toward full employment or postwar reconstruction (the U.S., Great Britain, the Netherlands and France) and collectivist planning aiming at forced industrialization (U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Jugoslavia and Bulgaria).

LA SOCIALISATION. By Serban Voinea. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 220 p. Fr. 400.

A veteran Rumanian Socialist, now a political exile, offers some intelligent reflections on postwar socialization in Europe.

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THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNISM. By R. N. Carew Hunt. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 231 p. $2.75 (London: Bles, 12/6).

A concise and clear introduction, by a non-Marxian, to Marxist theory and its development through Lenin and Stalin.

KRAVCHENKO CONTRE MOSCOU. By Georges Izard. Paris: Éditions Paris-Vendôme, 1949, 429 p. Fr. 450.

Texts of the summations by two of Kravchenko's attorneys in the 1949 libel case in Paris, preceded by a lengthy critique of Soviet justice.

THE TWILIGHT OF WORLD CAPITALISM. By William Z. Foster. New York: International Publishers, 1949, 168 p. $1.50.

The American Communist leader surveys his life and times through the familiar spectacles.

STUDIES IN REVOLUTION. By Edward Hallett Carr. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 226 p. $2.00.

These essays by an eminent British historian are primarily devoted to the European and Russian intellectual background to the October Revolution.

NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN POLITICS. Edited by Edward Conrad Smith and Arnold John Zurcher. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949, 437 p. $3.25.

A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS. By Harold S. Sloan and Arnold J. Zurcher. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949, 268 p. $3.00.

A revised and expanded edition of a familiar reference work is now joined by a companion volume on economics.

L'ÉCONOMIE DU COMMONWEALTH. By François Crouzet. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1950, 135 p. Fr. 90.

L'ÉCONOMIE EUROPÉENNE. By Hubert d'Herouville. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1949, 127 p. Fr. 90.

Two volumes of the "Que sais-je?" series, presenting compact surveys of the contemporary economic situation in Europe and in the British Commonwealth.

EMPIRE AND COMMUNICATIONS. By H. A. Innis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950, 230 p. $3.00.

Lectures concerning methods of written communication in shaping history.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. By E. H. Carter. London: Pitman, 1949, 189 p. 8/6.

A popular and rather uneven sketch of "the great stream of history" and "the age-old search for peace," of little value to the serious student.

BASES ET PROFILS DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DE DEMAIN. By Jean-P. Vaudaire. Neuchâtel: Éditions du Griffon, 1949, 236 p. Sw. Fr. 9.50.

This curious book attempts, "by pure logic," to delineate the society of the future.

THE CLASH OF LOYALTIES. By Edmond Privat. New York: Macmillan, 1949, 96 p. $1.50 (London: Allen and Unwin, 7/6).

In a lecture delivered to the Society of Friends the author discusses the conflict of loyalties toward God and toward the State.

CONFLICTING PATTERNS OF THOUGHT. By Karl Pribram. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949, 176 p. $3.25.

Challenging economic determinism, Dr. Pribram holds that "the prevailing mode of thought is the matrix of all institutions" as well as the source of social conflict. The four main patterns in the Western World—the universalistic, the nominalistic,

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the intuitional and the dialectical—are seen to have their social expression in, respectively, the Catholic Middle Ages, Western Europe and especially the Anglo-Saxon countries, Germany and Central Europe, and Bolshevik Russia.

The Second World War

I WAS THERE. By Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy. New York: Whittlesey House, 1950, 527 p. $5.00.

The former United States Ambassador to Vichy and Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman adds his contribution of recollections, many of them documented, to the unfolding history of the war years. Less readable than Stimson's or Sherwood's accounts, and less informative than Hull's memoirs, this volume nevertheless throws valuable new light on American military planning, organization of the armed forces, and relations with the Soviet Union. His comments on Vichy and De Gaulle are perhaps most useful for their clear expression of the Admiral's own attitude.

THE GRAND ALLIANCE. By Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Houghton, 1950, 903 p. $6.00.

The third volume of these masterly memoirs of "The Second World War" covers the year 1941 and the first two weeks of 1942. In this decisive period which brought Russia and the United States into the war the narrative is somewhat denser, the prose somewhat less Churchillian. The volume contains a wealth of documentary material, part of which is relegated to an extensive appendix, and some pungent observations on the conduct of the new ally to the east.

LE PANORAMA DE LA GUERRE 1939–1945. By Colonel Eychène. Paris: Tallandier, 1948–49, 3 v. Fr. 13,800.

As the author of the text to this handsome album says, its purpose is to give the reader "an exact picture, the very image of the scenes he has experienced personally or the account of which has so often lifted his hopes or aroused his fears." This purpose has been strikingly achieved by a vast array of photographs, pictures, maps and posters of all aspects of the Second World War.

KRIGEN 1939–1945. Edited by Erik Møller and Others. Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1947–49, 27 pts. Kr. 150.

An extensive illustrated history of the Second World War, with contributions by some 30 Scandinavian historians and specialists.

GREAT MISTAKES OF THE WAR. By Hanson W. Baldwin. New York: Harper, 1950, 114 p. $1.50.

Taking perhaps undue advantage of hindsight, a leading military critic finds that the basic American error of neglecting political objectives was compounded by six major politico-military mistakes.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC. GUADALCANAL: THE FIRST OFFENSIVE. By John Miller, Jr. Washington: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1949, 413 p. $4.00.

The second volume to appear in the subseries on the Pacific War.

THE GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN. By Major John L. Zimmerman. Washington: U. S. Marine Corps, Historical Division, 1949, 189 p. $4.25.

The fifth of a series of monographs on Marine Corps military operations.

UNITED STATES SUBMARINE OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II. By Theodore Roscoe. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1949, 577 p. $10.00.

While not an official account, the material for this interesting history of the

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submarine service—which has hitherto received relatively little detailed attention—is based upon records and narratives originally assembled under official auspices.

GENERAL KENNEY REPORTS. By George C. Kenney. New York: Duell, 1949, 594 p. $4.50.

A straightforward account of the air war from Port Moresby to Okinawa by the commanding general of the Allied Air Forces of the Southwest Pacific.

ANALYSE DES CONFÉRENCES NAVALES DU FUEHRER. By Commander A. Vulliez. Paris: Grandes Éditions Françaises, 1949, 139 p. Fr. 250.

Documents from the captured archives of the German Navy illustrating the manner in which Hitler and his admirals arrived at policy determinations.

HITLER AS WAR LORD. By Franz Halder. London: Putnam, 1950, 70 p. 3/6.

The former Chief of the German General Staff exposes Hitler's failures as a military leader.

LA CAMPAGNE DE POLOGNE (SEPTEMBRE 1939). By Robert Jars. Paris: Payot, 1949, 222 p. Fr. 525.

An analysis of the German military campaign in Poland, based upon Polish and German sources.

DESTINY CAN WAIT: THE POLISH AIR FORCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR. London: Heinemann, 1949, 402 p. 25/.

A detailed and often exciting account of the heroic contribution of Polish airmen to what was for them an equivocal victory.

The United States

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1949. By Richard P. Stebbins. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1950, 572 p. $5.00.

The latest volume in the Council's annual series reviewing American foreign relations around the world is both scholarly and readable. Concerned with events from the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty to the close of 1949, the narrative also covers the origins and development of the Point Four program and pursues the domestic controversy over Far Eastern policy into the early weeks of 1950. Considerable emphasis is placed on United Nations affairs. George F. Kennan contributes a timely and important introduction.

ROOSEVELT IN RETROSPECT: A PROFILE IN HISTORY. By John Gunther. New York: Harper, 1950, 410 p. $3.75.

Mr. Gunther's unpretentious, observant and literate reporting continues to charm in his latest contribution to contemporary history—a review of the whole of the late President's career and an appraisal of an extraordinarily complex personality. While the author's obvious admiration for his subject does not inhibit a frank discussion of Roosevelt's weaknesses, many of the more blatant charges and rumors—especially those concerning FDR's foreign policy and his health—are effectively demolished.

ROOSEVELT: FROM MUNICH TO PEARL HARBOR. By Basil Rauch. New York: Creative Age Press, 1950, 527 p. $4.50.

A refutation of the thesis advanced by the late Charles A. Beard and others that President Roosevelt lured the United States into the Second World War. Charges that Roosevelt "plotted" war are overwhelmed by a mass of well-ordered evidence; the author's view that the President was attempting to follow a neutral course is in line with the concept of the "new neutrality" as expounded by Justice Jackson.

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THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Gabriel A. Almond. New York: Harcourt, 1950, 269 p. $3.75.

A probing examination of the relation of American public opinion to foreign policy and of the need for achieving a more effective consensus.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. Edited by Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for World Peace Foundation), 1949–50.

The latest additions (Volume IX: January 1–December 31, 1947, 759 p. $6.00, and Volume X: January 1–December 31, 1948, 705 p. $6.00) to this extremely useful series, which is now published on the calendar-year basis.

THE AMERICAN MIND. By Henry Steele Commager. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, 476 p. $5.00.

A disciple of Parrington has written a wide-ranging, sharply phrased interpretation of American thought and character from the 1880's to the present.

AMERICA AND COSMIC MAN. By Wyndham Lewis. Garden City: Doubleday, 1949, 247 p. $2.75.

Wittily and with amiable historical inaccuracy Mr. Lewis suggests that it is the destiny of America to produce the first of a new species of man, the new Cosmopolite.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRESIDENCY. By Louis Brownlow. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1949, 137 p. $2.75.

Six popular lectures, delivered in 1947, on the American presidency, its development, functions and problems.

AMERICAN THEMES. By D. W. Brogan. New York: Harper, 1949, 284 p. $3.50.

Some twoscore pieces over a wide range of subjects (previously published as articles) by one of Britain's more discerning interpreters of the American scene.

REMOVAL AND RETURN: THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON JAPANESE AMERICANS. By Leonard Bloom and Ruth Riemer. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949, 259 p. $3.75.

A sociological study of the effect of wartime evacuation upon Japanese Americans, useful in its information on the economic losses suffered by the evacuees.

RACE RELATIONS IN A DEMOCRACY. By Ina Corinne Brown. New York: Harper, 1949, 205 p. $3.00.

A compact, simple and balanced statement of the problem of Negro–white relations in the United States.

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY: A REAPPRAISAL. Edited by William S. Bernard and Others. New York: Harper (for the National Committee on Immigration Policy), 1950, 341 p. $4.00.

A substantial inquiry, critical of past policy and demolishing a great many myths concerning the unassimilability of immigrants.

THE COMMUNIST TRIAL. By George Marion. New York: Fairplay Publishers, 1949, 191 p. $3.00.

A disjointed and vituperative attack on the trial of the 11 Communist leaders.

SEEDS OF TREASON: THE TRUE STORY OF THE HISS-CHAMBERS TRAGEDY. By Ralph de Toledano and Victor Lasky. New York: Funk (for *Newsweek*), 1950, 270 p. $3.50.

A journalistic reconstruction of the background to the Hiss trial, based in part upon court evidence but including much irresponsible surmise concerning persons on the periphery of the case.

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TREASON: THE STORY OF DISLOYALTY AND BETRAYAL IN AMERICAN HISTORY. By Nathaniel Weyl. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950, 491 p. $4.50.

An engrossing and balanced story of the issue of treason and disloyalty from Benedict Arnold to the recent Coplon, Hiss and Communist trials.

FIGHTING WORDS: SELECTIONS FROM TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE *DAILY WORKER*. New York: New Century, 1949, 239 p. $2.50.

About two-thirds of the pieces and articles in this highly selective selection were written after V–E Day.

THE SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY AND THE INTERNATIONALS. By Eric Hass. New York: New York Labor News Co., 1949, 187 p. $2.00.

The lonely pilgrimage of Marxism-De Leonism through the reefs of Social Democracy and the shoals of Stalinism.

MINK AND RED HERRING. By A. J. Liebling. Garden City: Doubleday, 1949, 251 p. $2.95.

A further selection of *The New Yorker* articles on the foibles of the American press in covering, among other things, political news.

THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1949, 524 p. $3.75.

A one-volume abridgment containing the essential findings with regard to each department of the government but omitting the dissenting and minority views.

THE STATISTICAL AGENCIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. By Frederick C. Mills and Clarence D. Long. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1949, 201 p. $2.00.

A survey undertaken at the request of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government as part of its general appraisal.

A HOOK IN LEVIATHAN. By Bradley D. Nash and Cornelius Lynde. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 234 p. $3.00.

A perceptive exposition and interpretation of the work of the Hoover Commission.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–1919. Washington: Department of the Army, Historical Division, 1949–50, 5 v.

The first two volumes of this projected 17-volume documentary history were reviewed here in April 1950. Volume III (743 p. $3.75) is concerned with the training and use of American units with British and French forces; Volume IV (806 p. $3.75) with early military operations of the AEF, including Château-Thierry; Volume V (693 p. $3.50) with the Champagne–Marne and Aisne–Marne operations; Volume VI (563 p. $3.00) with the Oise–Aisne, Ypres–Lys operations and the battle of Vittorio–Veneto; and Volume VII (921 p. $4.75) with the Somme offensive.

THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, 1790–1915. By Stephen H. Evans. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1949, 228 p. $5.00.

A brief postscript covers developments to 1949.

AIR POWER AND UNIFICATION. By Louis A. Sigaud. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1949, 119 p. $2.50.

On the application of Douhet's principles of warfare to the United States.

ALASKA TODAY. By B. W. Denison and Others. Caldwell (Id.): Caxton Printers, 1949, 374 p. $5.00.

A prospectus for the tourist or potential settler.

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Western Europe

QUATRE ANNÉES AU POUVOIR. By Philippe Pétain. Paris: Couronne Littéraire, 1949, 178 p. Fr. 300.

Defense memoranda prepared by the Marshal during his imprisonment in 1945, plus a selection of his addresses and proclamations as head of the French state.

RÉVISION. By General Héring and Major Le Roc'h. Paris: Éditions Self, 1949, 215 p. Fr. 180.

Aiming at a reversal of Marshal Pétain's sentence, this book undertakes, largely on the basis of information appearing since the trial, a point-by-point refutation of the 32 charges of the indictment.

MES CAHIERS, XII. By Maurice Barrès. Paris: Plon, 1949, 386 p. Fr. 360.

This volume of Barrès' diary, running from January 1919 to June 1920, contains many reflections on the resurgence of Pan Germanism.

FRENCH FREEMASONRY UNDER THE THIRD REPUBLIC. By Mildred J. Headings. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1949, 314 p. $4.00.

As might be expected, the French masons are found not to have been the mysterious directors of the Third Republic but to have reflected the general political currents and contradictions of that segment of French society from which they were drawn.

FRANCE AND THE SAAR, 1680–1948. By Laing Gray Cowan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, 247 p. $3.50.

An objective treatment of the historical vicissitudes of a much disputed area.

LA MARINE FRANÇAISE. By André Vovard. Paris: Gigord, 1948, 308 p. Fr. 390.

A brief illustrated history of the French navy from the fourteenth century to the present.

LES RICHESSES DE LA FRANCE D'OUTRE-MER. By Charles Robequain. Paris: Payot, 1949, 221 p. Fr. 480.

An eminent geographer presents an intelligent and critical survey of the economies of France's colonies, with emphasis on the natives' position.

PORTRAIT DE LYAUTEY. By G. Hardy. Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1949, 418 p. Fr. 540.

An admiring but discerning portrait of the great French colonial administrator.

L'ATTITUDE DE LÉOPOLD III DE 1936 À LA LIBÉRATION. Paris: Michel, 1949, 276 p. Fr. 270.

An anonymous but spirited defense of the actions of the Belgian king from the return to neutrality in 1936 to the liberation.

NEDERLANDSE BELEGGINGEN IN DE VERENIGDE STATEN. By K. D. Bosch. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1948, 701 p. Guilders 22.50.

An extensive study of Dutch investments in the United States in the course of the economic development of the two countries.

THE UNITED STATES AND SCANDINAVIA. By Franklin D. Scott. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 359 p. $4.00.

This seventh volume of the American Foreign Policy Library is a concise treatment of geographic, economic, social and political problems of the five countries of northern Europe, with emphasis on American-Scandinavian relations.

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SCANDINAVIA: BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. Edited by Henning Friis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for the New School for Social Research), 1950, 388 p. $4.50.

Emphasizes social and economic problems in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

LOOK AT NORWAY. By Arne Damm and Carl Just. Oslo: Damm, 1949, 192 p.

Handsome photographs of various aspects of Norwegian life.

BLOCKADE UND GEGENBLOCKADE. By A. Vaudaux. Zürich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1948, 128 p. Sw. Fr. 9.

Swiss import and export policies during the Second World War.

DECISION IN GERMANY. By Lucius D. Clay. Garden City: Doubleday, 1950, 522 p. $4.50.

In giving his account of the first four critical postwar years in Germany, General Clay, Deputy Military Governor in 1945–47 and then Military Governor until 1949, has not written a light volume of memoirs. The book is stocked with factual information, extensively documented, regarding the establishment of military government, financial and economic reconstruction, the efforts at denazification, and, of course, the growing conflict with the Russians leading to the Berlin blockade. The major criticism raised by reviewers has been the author's reticence in commenting on certain controversial issues and events which he was in a unique position to observe.

BERLIN COMMAND. By Brigadier General Frank Howley. New York: Putnam, 1950, 276 p. $3.50.

The commandant of the American sector of Berlin during the period of the airlift displays no bashfulness in this outspoken account of his dealings with the Russians. A number of factual errors are included.

AGAIN THE GOOSE STEP: THE LOST FRUITS OF VICTORY. By Delbert Clark. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949, 297 p. $3.00.

A severely critical and pessimistic story of United States failure to denazify, decartelize and democratize Germany, by the head of *The New York Times* Berlin Bureau from 1946 to 1948.

GERMANY, KEY TO PEACE IN EUROPE. By Karl Brandt. Claremont (Cal.): Claremont College, 1949, 109 p. $2.75.

Three lectures, sponsored by the Associated Colleges at Claremont, California, and appealing for equality of status for West Germany in erecting a defense against Soviet pressure.

STATIST AUF DIPLOMATISCHER BÜHNE, 1923–45. By Paul Schmidt. Bonn (British Zone): Athenaeum, 1949, 604 p.

The only living witness to many of the most critical diplomatic encounters in European history between 1923 and 1945, Dr. Schmidt, former chief interpreter of the German Foreign Office, has written an absorbing volume of memoirs. While no sensational revelations appear, the book offers a number of additions to our knowledge of Germany's interwar and wartime diplomacy.

WE SURVIVED. As Told to Eric H. Boehm. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949, 308 p. $3.75.

The harrowing stories of 14 men and women, Jews and German anti-Nazis, who managed to survive the Nazi tempest.

ZWISCHEN DEN ZEILEN. By Rudolf Pechel. Munich (U.S. Zone): Droemer, 1948, 348 p.

These articles, written between 1932 and 1942 by the editor of *Deutsche Rundschau,* were published to demonstrate the subtle, often exceedingly Aesopian battle waged against the Hitler régime by at least a section of the German press.

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SOZIALPOLITIK IN DER WEIMARER REPUBLIK. By Ludwig Preller. Stuttgart (U.S. Zone): Mittelbach, 1949, 560 p.

This massive study of social policies, broadly defined as all efforts and measures undertaken to ameliorate the conditions of a society in respect to its productive activities, is an important contribution to the history of Germany between 1914 and 1933.

VON VERSAILLES BIS LAUSANNE. By Hans Ronde. Stuttgart (U.S. Zone): Kohlhammer, 1950, 210 p.

A review of the German reparations question after the First World War.

EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN MODERN GERMANY. By R. H. Samuel and R. Hinton Thomas. London: Routledge, 1949, 191 p. 12/6.

This critical if rather pedestrian examination of schools, universities, teachers and texts since the early nineteenth century is very skeptical of the reality of *Lehrfreiheit* and *Lernfreiheit* in the German tradition.

THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1914–1921. By A. Joseph Berlau. New York: Columbia University Press, 1949, 374 p. $4.75.

Although his conclusions are not novel, Dr. Berlau writes an able and well-documented account of the transformation of the German Social Democratic Party—largely away from professions of radical Socialism and toward increased support of the German state—under pressure of war and political responsibility. The failure of the SPD to "provide a third way out of the unhappy alternative between the old Powers and the extreme left" is regarded as an important element in weakening the new German Republic.

GERMANY'S DRIVE TO THE WEST (DRANG NACH WESTEN). By Hans W. Gatzke. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950, 316 p. $5.00.

A scholarly examination of German war aims in the West during the First World War.

GERMANY: 2000 YEARS. By Kurt F. Reinhardt. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1950, 765 p. $8.50.

A survey, virtually a textbook, of German political and cultural history to 1933, from a Centrist and somewhat conservative point of view.

AUSTRIA. By E. H. Buschbeck. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949, 251 p. $2.50.

About half the volume is devoted to a not very penetrating discussion of the period since 1919.

HUNDERT JAHRE ÖSTERREICHISCHER WIRTSCHAFTSENTWICKLUNG 1848–1948. Edited by Hans Mayer. Vienna: Springer, 1949, 714 p. Schillings 132.

Lengthy essays by a number of specialists on most aspects of Austrian economic history in the last century, but omitting the agricultural question.

THE HABSBURG MONARCHY, 1809–1918. By A. J. P. Taylor. New York: Macmillan, 1949, 279 p. $3.50. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 15/.)

A thoroughly revised and greatly expanded edition of a first-rate history of the Habsburg Empire (first published in 1941).

DIARIO 1937–1938. By Galeazzo Ciano. Bologna: Cappelli, 1948, 333 p. L. 800.

The well-known "Ciano Diaries," edited by Hugh Gibson (reviewed here in July 1946), covered the years 1939–1943. An earlier part of Ciano's diary, running from August 23, 1937, to the end of 1938, reaches the public only now, presumably because it had been seized by the Nazis and then recovered more or less fortuitously. In contrast to the impression left by the sections published in 1946, the present vol-

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ume reveals Ciano's loyalty to Mussolini, his pro-German sympathies, and his eagerness to foment international trouble in characteristic Fascist style.

BENITO MUSSOLINI: MEMOIRS 1942–1943. London: Weidenfeld, 1949, 320 p. 18/.

An American edition of this series of articles by Mussolini was reviewed here in April 1949. The British edition, using a different translation, contains an additional chapter by Mussolini on the Messe case, accounts by various people associated with the fallen leader during his last year, and a very useful bibliographical note.

PIETRO BADOGLIO RISPETTO A MUSSOLINI E DI FRONTE ALLA STORIA. By Saverio Cilibrizzi. Naples: Conte, 1948, 259 p. L. 650.

An ardently nationalist historian finds Marshal Badoglio responsible for a surprising number of Italy's disasters from Caporetto to the 1943 armistice.

UNA RIVOLUZIONE MANCATA. By Camillo Pellizzi. Milan: Longanesi, 1949, 274 p. L. 550.

A former Fascist undertakes a post-mortem on the abortive revolution of Italian Fascism.

THE ITALIAN LEFT. By W. Hilton-Young. New York: Longmans, 1949, 219 p. $3.50.

Though welcome as an addition to the scanty store of information in English on the Italian Socialist movement, Mr. Hilton-Young's brief history is not very weighty.

ITALY FROM NAPOLEON TO MUSSOLINI. By René Albrecht-Carrié. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950, 314 p. $4.25.

A competent and readable interpretation written around a number of significant or illuminating episodes.

STORIA MONDIALE DAL 1814 AL 1938. By Pietro Orsi. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1940–49, 3 v. L. 2900.

Its publication delayed by the war until 1947, the third volume of the late Italian historian's modern world history covers the years from 1915 to 1938, with particular emphasis on Italy. The postwar publication of documents and memoirs has outdated many of his chapters.

THE LAST OPTIMIST. By J. Alvarez del Vayo. New York: Viking, 1950, 406 p. $4.00.

The title of this autobiography relates to the former Spanish Foreign Minister's belief that the Popular Front remains a workable political formula.

MEDITERRANEAN BACKGROUND. By Bernard Newman. London: Hale, 1949, 286 p. 16/. (New York: British Book Centre, $3.00.)

A rather sketchy political guide—"wide rather than deep," as the author says—to the countries bordering the Mediterranean.

Eastern Europe

THE SOCIALIZED AGRICULTURE OF THE USSR: PLANS AND PERFORMANCE. By Naum Jasny. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1949, 837 p. $7.50.

This long-awaited study by an outstanding specialist, now a consultant with Stanford University's Food Research Institute, is an extremely searching and detailed analysis of Soviet farming since collectivization. In contrast to the optimistic views of Baykov and Dobb, Mr. Jasny concludes that "socialized agriculture failed to produce either abundantly or cheaply," and that "the total decline in per capita income of the rank-and-file peasant in the decade 1928–38 was equivalent to about 20 per-

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cent." In the course of his argument he makes a devastating critique of Soviet crop statistics. Although it is clear that the burden of forced industrialization has lain heavily on the peasants, some reviewers question whether Mr. Jasny's bleak picture, resulting in part from nonrecurrent factors, may not underestimate future possibilities of improvement.

PUBLIC OPINION IN SOVIET RUSSIA. By Alex Inkeles. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950, 379 p. $5.00.

This first volume of the Harvard Russian Research Center studies is a scholarly and sober investigation of the media of mass communication in the Soviet Union. Not an analysis of the content of public opinion, it examines the means by which that opinion is formed and controlled.

NATURAL REGIONS OF THE U.S.S.R. By L. S. Berg. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 436 p. $10.00.

A careful translation of an outstanding Soviet textbook on physical geography, first published in 1937.

A SOVIET HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. Translated by William Edgerton. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950, 58 p. $1.00.

This brief prospectus of a new authoritative Soviet text will appall the independent mind but provides some revealing clues to the current official *Weltanschauung*.

LES MARÉCHAUX SOVIÉTIQUES VOUS PARLENT. By Cyrille D. Kalinov. Paris: Stock, 1950, 302 p. Fr. 360.

A Russian colonel, who left the U.S.S.R. in 1949, writes a number of unpretentious sketches of the Soviet marshals, who come to life as real people.

SOVIET ARMS AND SOVIET POWER. By General Augustin Guillaume. Washington: Infantry Journal, 1949, 212 p. $3.50.

A translation of "Pourquoi l'Armée Rouge a Vaincu," reviewed here July 1949.

SOVIET IMPERIALISM: RUSSIA'S DRIVE TOWARD WORLD DOMINATION. By E. Day Carman. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1950, 175 p. $3.25.

This study of Soviet territorial aggrandizement from 1939 to 1949, while not mastering all the complexities of a difficult subject, is a compact survey of the areas of expansion and attempts to analyze Soviet motives and methods.

SOVIET EXPANSION AND THE WEST. By Anthony Trawick Bouscaren. San Francisco: Pacific States Printing Co., 1949, 199 p. $3.00.

A not too illuminating account of Soviet misdeeds since 1939.

MILITARY ATTACHÉ IN MOSCOW. By Major-General Richard Hilton. London: Hollis, 1949, 231 p. 10/6. (New York: British Book Centre, $2.50.)

General Hilton's running feud with M.V.D. officials attempting to check his movements is the most interesting part of this surprisingly uninformative book.

SOVIET GOLD. By Vladimir Petrov. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1949, 426 p. $4.00.

MY RETREAT FROM RUSSIA. By Vladimir Petrov. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, 357 p. $4.00.

The vivid personal narrative of the author's life as a slave laborer in the Siberian mines from 1935 to 1941 is followed by the story of his flight from Russia with the retreating German forces.

WHY I ESCAPED. By Peter Pirogov. New York: Duell, 1950, 336 p. $3.50.

About the two Russian aviators who flew into the American zone in Austria in 1948 and later came to the United States.

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LENIN AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By Christopher Hill. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 245 p. $2.00.

Mr. Hill's concise interpretation of Lenin's career amounts to a carefully phrased apotheosis.

EAST OF THE IRON CURTAIN. By Vernon Bartlett. New York: McBride, 1950, 212 p. $2.75.

A Liberal British journalist's report on a tour through most of East Europe in 1949.

THE CURTAIN ISN'T IRON. By Joseph C. Harsch. Garden City: Doubleday, 1950, 192 p. $2.00.

A foreign correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* reports and reflects on his two visits to Eastern Europe in 1947 and 1949. The somewhat misleading title means merely that the curtain was not equally ferruginous in all areas.

SUOMEN TASAVALLAN PRESIDENTIT. By Matti Kuusi. Helsinki: Söderström, 1950, 200 p. M. 550.

Biographies of Finland's presidents from K. J. Ståhlberg to J. K. Paasikivi.

LAULAVA LAPPI. By Eliel Lagercrantz. Helsinki: Söderström, 1950, 396 p. M. 450.

A distinguished student of Lapp culture contributes new data on Lapland.

EI SE NIIN TAPAHTUNUT. By Onni Talas. Helsinki: Karisto, 1950, 210 p. M. 300.

A rebuttal of the "Leftist" interpretation of the Finnish Civil War.

COMES THE COMRADE! By Alexandra Orme. New York: Morrow, 1950, 376 p. $4.00. (London: Hodge, 15/.)

A Polish woman draws a vivid and not unsympathetic picture of the behavior of the Russian soldier during the Red Army's occupation of a Hungarian village. The English edition was entitled "From Christmas to Easter."

L'AFFAIRE RAJK. Paris: Éditeurs Français Réunis, 1949, 458 p. Fr. 200.

Stenographic court report, in French translation, of the Hungarian trial in September 1949 of Laszlo Rajk and others for treason.

TITO'S PLOT AGAINST EUROPE. By Derek Kartun. New York: International Publishers, 1950, 127 p. $1.50.

The Communist line on the Rajk trial by the foreign editor of the London *Daily Worker*.

ESCAPE TO ADVENTURE. By Fitzroy Maclean. Boston: Little, Brown, 1950, 419 p. $4.00.

Aptly described as an extrovert T. E. Lawrence, Brigadier Maclean has written an absorbing account of his experiences in Moscow, Soviet Asia, Persia, North Africa and Jugoslavia. Dominating the book is the story of his parachute mission to Marshal Tito in 1943, but those interested in the Soviet purges should read his masterly description of the Bukharin trial.

INSTEAD OF THE BRIER. By Anne Dacie. London: Harvill, 1949, 318 p. 10/6.

A personal and impressionistic account of the experiences of a free lance journalist in Jugoslavia in 1945 and 1946.

DNEVNIK: TREĆI DEO (OD 10 NOVEMBRA 1943 DO 7 NOVEMBRA 1944). By Vladimir Dedijer. Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Knjiga, 1950, 297 p.

The diary of Colonel Dedijer, one of Tito's officers during the war and subsequently head of the Jugoslav office of information, is one of the most important

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sources for the history of the Partisan movement. This third volume carries the story to the liberation of Belgrade and includes Dedijer's missions to Cairo and Italy.

L'ALBANIE. By Pierre Courtade. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1950, 93 p. Fr. 110.
A French Communist observes the new people's democracy and finds it good.

MACEDONIA: ITS PLACE IN BALKAN POWER POLITICS. By Elisabeth Barker. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950, 129 p. $1.00.
A concise and lucid account of the Macedonian question with a particularly useful chapter on the period from 1941 to 1949.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

CRISIS IN BRITAIN. By Robert A. Brady. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950, 730 p. $5.00.
The author of an important work on the rationalization of German industry turns his attention to the achievements and shortcomings of Britain's Labor Government. Covering the years from the end of the Second World War to the summer of 1949, he makes a detailed inquiry into the main areas of action and controversy: the Bank of England, coal, iron and steel, utilities and transport, health and social insurance, agriculture, industrial planning, and Empire relations, in all of which he detects little of "Socialism." His conclusions are rather bleak: while Labor has probably done as well or better than would its Opposition, there is much evidence of short-sightedness and unclear thinking; little has been done to crack the basic problem of industrial productivity and foreign trade relations.

THE DOLLAR CRISIS: CAUSES AND CURE. By T. Balogh. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 269 p. $3.00. (Oxford: Blackwell, 15/.)
An Oxford economist, stressing the shattering effects of the Second World War and the overwhelming economic position of the United States, argues against devaluation or any sudden return by Great Britain to uncontrolled multilateralism and for the necessity of long-range planning, especially in a Western European context.

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF BRITISH CAPITALISM. By Keith Hutchison. New York: Scribner, 1950, 301 p. $3.50.
Devoting less than 25 pages to the postwar years, Mr. Hutchison is primarily concerned with the gradual metamorphosis, under increasing social pressure, of British capitalism since 1880.

FIFTY YEARS' MARCH. By Francis Williams. London: Odhams, 1949, 383 p. 7/6.
As befits a birthday celebration, this history of the British Labor Party since its founding in 1900 is affectionate and indulgent.

EUROPE UNITE. By Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Houghton, 1950, 506 p. $5.00.
Fifty-two speeches delivered in 1947 and 1948 on a wide range of domestic and foreign topics.

STAR OF EMPIRE: A STUDY OF BRITAIN AS A WORLD POWER, 1485–1945. By William B. Willcox. New York: Knopf, 1950, 399 p. $5.00.
A skillful and balanced interpretation of British history since the Tudors, paying greater attention to internal developments than the title indicates.

CONSCRIPTION CONFLICT. By Denis Hayes. London: Sheppard, 1949, 408 p. 12/6.
Mr. Hayes enters an unsurveyed field with his extensive history of the debate over military conscription in Great Britain from 1901 to 1939.

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A LIFE'S WORK. By The Rt. Hon. Margaret Bondfield. London: Hutchinson, 1949, 368 p. 20/.

This rather dry autobiography of the first woman member of the British Cabinet is enlivened by her diary of a visit to Russia in 1920.

THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, 1931–1940. Edited by L. G. Wickham Legg. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949, 968 p. $12.50.

"The Supplement to the Dictionary of National Biography which is now offered to the public contains the names of King George V and 729 of his subjects who died during the decade from 1931 to 1940."

PAPERS ON PARLIAMENT: A SYMPOSIUM. London: Hansard Society, 1949, 116 p. 6/.

PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN BRITAIN: A SYMPOSIUM. London: Hansard Society, 1949, 105 p. 6/.

Collections of brief essays on various aspects of the parliamentary system.

THE LAW AND THE COMMONWEALTH. By R. T. E. Latham. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1949, 632 p. $1.75.

This study of constitutional law in relation to the British Commonwealth first appeared in "The Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs" for 1937.

BRITAIN'S CRISIS OF EMPIRE. By R. Palme Dutt. New York: International Publishers, 1950, 166 p. $1.25.

Mr. Palme Dutt is Vice-Chairman of the British Communist Party.

SELECTED SPEECHES AND DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1763–1917. Edited by Arthur Berriedale Keith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949, 805 p. $2.45.

Originally published in 1918. For "colonies" read "Dominions."

MACKENZIE KING OF CANADA. A Biography by H. Reginald Hardy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949, 390 p. $4.50.

This anecdotal account of the late prime minister's career throws little light on the major issues of recent Canadian history.

FINANCING CANADIAN GOVERNMENT. By A. E. Buck. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1949, 367 p. $5.00.

A methodical study emphasizing federal-provincial fiscal relationships.

CROSS-COUNTRY. By Hugh MacLennan. Toronto: Collins, 1949, 172 p. $2.50.

Interesting essays by a Canadian novelist on aspects of Canadian and American life.

ANTIPODES NOTEBOOK. By Janet and William Beveridge. London: Pilot Press, 1949, 144 p. 8/6.

Lord Beveridge and his wife tell of their experiences and observations, particularly of social experiments, in New Zealand and Australia.

The Middle East

THE RISE OF ISRAEL. By Jeremiah Ben-Jacob. New York: Grosby House, 1949, 217 p. $3.00.

A brief sketch of the background of Zionism, the struggle for Israeli independence, and the emergent problems facing the new state.

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VISION AND VICTORY. By Abba Hillel Silver. New York: Zionist Organization, 1949, 232 p. $2.50.

Addresses by the American Zionist leader.

ARAB REFUGEES. By S. G. Thicknesse. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1949, 68 p. $1.00.

An examination of the present situation of Palestinian Arab refugees and the problems of repatriation or resettlement.

LES PROBLÈMES DU TRAVAIL ET LES ORGANISATIONS OUVRIÈRES EN ÉGYPTE. By Zaki Badaoui. Alexandria: Société de Publications Égyptiennes, 1948, 183 p.

A discussion, by an inspector in the Egyptian Ministry of Commerce and Industry, of the history of the Egyptian labor movement, wages and living conditions of the workers, and government labor policy.

LAND DER TRÄUME. By Franz Carl Endres. Zürich: Rascher, 1949, 200 p. Sw. Fr. 10.80.

Casual essays on Near Eastern culture and history.

South and Southeast Asia

ASIA'S TRADE. By B. G. Ghate. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Indian Council of World Affairs), 1949, 160 p. $2.75.

A study, based largely on prewar statistics, of the composition and direction of Asia's trade, both intra-Asian and with the rest of the world.

VISIT TO AMERICA. By Jawaharlal Nehru. New York: Day, 1950, 182 p. $2.50.

Addresses delivered by the Prime Minister of India in the course of his visit to the United States and Canada in 1949.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONGRESS CONSTITUTION. By N. V. Rajkumar. New Delhi: All India Congress Committee, 1949, 147 p. Rs. 2/14.

The texts of the constitutions of the Indian National Congress from 1899 to 1948 are accompanied by a brief history of the movement.

THE PRODUCTION CRISIS. By Prakash N. Agarwala. Bombay: Thacker, 1949, 196 p. Rs. 5.

A Calcutta businessman discusses the economic problems confronting India.

THE STAKES OF DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By H. J. Van Mook. New York: Norton, 1950, 312 p. $3.75.

The former Lieutenant Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies interprets recent events in Southeast Asia, with particular emphasis on Indonesia, as the interruption of the great work of the colonial powers by Japanese treachery, Allied ineptitude, and nationalist madness.

THE LEFT WING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. New York: Sloane (for the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1950, 298 p. $4.00.

While failing to probe the inner dynamics of Asiatic Communism this study provides a good deal of information about the radical movements in Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya and Indonesia and includes a helpful biographical appendix.

HUMAN BONDAGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Bruno Lasker. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press (for the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1950, 406 p. $6.00.

This valuable analysis of involuntary servitude illuminates the setting in which contemporary political developments in Southeast Asia are taking place.

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IN 70 DAYS. By Edwin Maurice Glover. London: Muller, 1949, 248 p. 8/6.
The revised edition of a lively account of the Japanese invasion of Malaya, first published in 1946.

SAÏGON SANS LA FRANCE. By Jacques Le Bourgeois. Paris: Plon, 1949, 247 p. Fr. 240.
A personal account of the Japanese *coup de force* of March 9, 1945, and the growth of the Viet-Minh movement.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION IN THE FAR EAST. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949, 125 p. $1.35.
While some of the material in these pages presented at a round table conference held in 1947 has been outpaced by events, much of it constitutes a more permanent contribution to a study of Asian economy.

THE FAR EAST. By A. D. C. Peterson. London: Duckworth, 1949, 336 p. 21/.
A manual on the human, or "social," geography of the arc of countries stretching from Pakistan to the Soviet Far East.

NEW FORCES IN ASIA. Edited by Bruno Lasker. New York: H. W. Wilson (in association with the American Institute of Pacific Relations), 1950, 237 p. $1.75.
Reference material, comprising a selection of recent magazine articles.

HALF OF ONE WORLD. By Foster Hailey. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 207 p. $3.00.
A journalist's report on postwar developments in the Far East.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UPLAND AREAS IN THE FAR EAST. By Pierre Gourou and Others. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949, 82 p. $1.00.
This volume, devoted to China, the Philippines and Japan, constitutes the first of a series of surveys on the present condition and possible future significance of upland areas in Eastern and Southeastern Asia.

NEXT STEP IN ASIA. By John K. Fairbank, Harlan Cleveland, Edwin O. Reischauer and William L. Holland. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (in coöperation with International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1949, 90 p. $1.50.
Four timely papers on Communism in China, economic developments in the Far East, the problem of Japan and Korea, and American Far Eastern economic policy.

NOTES ON LABOR PROBLEMS IN NATIONALIST CHINA. By Israel Epstein. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1949, 159 p. $2.25.
Mr. Epstein's study of the period 1927–1945 is supplemented by Mr. Julian Friedman's briefer and less statistical paper on the years 1945–1948.

NOTES ON EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS IN COMMUNIST CHINA, 1941–47. By Michael Lindsay. New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950, 194 p. $2.50.
A report on the principles and practices of the Communists' educational work in China based largely on material antedating their conquest of large cities.

MAO TSÉ TUNG. By Pierre Fromentin. Paris: Éditions Médicis, 1949, 211 p. Fr. 280.
A balanced but not particularly serious sketch.

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CHINA IN BEWEGUNG. By Anna Lorentz. Berlin: Historisches Kabinett, 1949, 143 p.

Pro-Communist observations by a former German resident in China.

PIVOT OF ASIA. By Owen Lattimore. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1950, 288 p. $3.50.

Assisted by a staff of specialists, Professor Lattimore presents an extraordinary amount of historical, political, economic and cultural information on Sinkiang, currently an area of considerable importance to Soviet-Chinese relations.

ROOF OF THE WORLD: TIBET, KEY TO ASIA. By Amaury de Riencourt. New York: Rinehart, 1950, 322 p. $3.50.

The record of an expedition to Tibet in 1947. The treatment of politics and economics is sketchy.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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

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

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